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
MAN THE PUPPET

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The Art of Controlling Minds

By

ABRAM LIPSKY, Ph.D.



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To

J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO

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MAN THE PUPPET

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The belief that we are at last on the track of psychological laws for controlling the minds of our fellow men has brought about a revolution in the popular attitude towards the science that teaches how to do it. When psychology was groping around for "the threshold of consciousness" and measuring "reaction times," as it did not very long ago, its lure was felt only by a few specialists. The change from studying what mind is to what can be done with minds has made psychology the most popular of sciences. Out of this change has sprung the universal interest in psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, hypnotism, character-analysis, mob-psychology, salesmanship,—all connoting a technique with which one may control the minds of others.

The up-to-date salesman considers his prospective customer "from the psychological point of view." He approaches the con-

sumer armed with a subtly devised apparatus for controlling his volition. "In influencing the mind of another," writes Professor Walter Dill Scott, "it is of importance to know in what terms he is thinking, so that the construction of the argument may be best adapted to his particular mental processes, for in this way he can be most easily influenced." The salesman is expected to study his prospect's dominant instincts, and play upon his latent desires.

The universal urge to control the minds of others, for the satisfaction of which the methods we know to-day have been developed, is not new. It was felt in the Stone Age. Salesmanship was unknown, but love, medicine, religion, and politics were even then not without devotees. The Chippewa Indian who wished to make one of the opposite sex love him carried around her image, pinched its heart, and inserted magic powders in the punctures. A Dyak medicine man who has been fetched in a case of illness lies down and pretends to be dead, is treated like a corpse, bound up in mats, taken out of the house and deposited on the ground, and when after an hour, other medicine-men loose the pretended dead man

and bring him to life, the invalid recovers too.

The struggle between individuals in civilized society is obviously not one in which the contestants are engaged in trying to snatch something from one another, but rather an effort to get somebody to relinquish something—to part with his money in return for wares or services, to choose you for a husband, or a wife, to vote for you, or your measure, to render a verdict in your favor, to praise you in public. Pleading, at the bar of public opinion or in the legal forum, is an effort to win over minds to the propositions of the orator. Statesmen are helpless without the coöperation of their fellow statesmen. The physician's "personality" counts for more towards success than his science, not only in attracting patients, but in actually healing them. Of what avail are priceless virtues in the lover if he cannot make them visible to her whom he courts? All have need more or less of the actor's talents, for all are under the necessity of "putting something across," getting the acquiescence of others to their own visions, convictions and projects.

It is well understood that the verdicts of juries are not rendered solely upon evidence or in strict accord with the principles of scientific induction. This explains the interminable inquisition of talesmen by opposing counsel, who know that very much depends upon whether the jurors are married or single, old or young, rich or poor, pillars of society or proletarians. Among twelve jurors you have the possibility of twelve or more "biases," of which both sides seek to take advantage. In the case of an old man on trial for wife-murder, defendant's counsel has been known to manifest a predilection for old men who have been married. A young woman accused of killing a false lover has her fate entrusted, if her lawyer can manage it, to the hands of romantic young men. Demagogues, since the beginning of political history, have understood the tactics of indirect assault upon the mind of the demos. In Cæsar's time, Guglielmo Ferrero tells us, "the merest trifle, a well placed rumor or a fortunate phrase, would sometimes alter all the probabilities of the situation between night and morning, leading perhaps, by some sudden freak of popular feeling, to a result which was

equally surprising to all parties concerned." Such surprises, with "the best men" and arguments on one side but the victory going to the other side, are not unknown in modern politics. The direct appeal may have been addressed to the reason of the voters; the indirect suggestions to the plebeian, disowned, but very powerful feelings, prejudices, "complexes" lurking out of sight.

It is commonly thought that the state rests upon force. So it does, but it first has to get the force, and this it can only do by first controlling minds. The theory that kings were evolved from the strongest and boldest warriors of primitive tribes was over-emphasized by Herbert Spencer. It has been shown by J. G. Frazer, with an immense array of evidence, to be far from the whole story. The royal line frequently starts with the medicine-man, or public magician, who brings rain when it is needed and sends it away when there has been enough, who supervises the growth of the crops, drives away pestilence and, in general, practices sorcery for the benefit of the whole community. Now, how does the public magician become king? Not, of course, by the display of physical power, but solely by

impressing upon the minds of his contemporaries the belief that power of another sort is at his command, namely, that derived from the spirit world. "It is a profession," says Frazer, "that draws to its ranks the ablest and most ambitious men of the tribe, because it holds out to them a prospect of honor, wealth and power such as hardly any other career can offer. The acuter minds perceive how easy it is to dupe their weaker brethren for their own advantage. The general result is that at this stage of evolution the supreme power tends to fall into the hands of the keenest intelligence and the most unscrupulous character."

A happy coincidence is probably necessary to give the medicine-man a start. Once going, however, he makes use of a set of stage properties especially calculated to heighten his prestige, a grotesque and awe-inspiring head-piece, a painted or tattooed face, unusual garments, a wand and other accessories. Hypnotic dancing and weird charms muttered rhythmically help in weaving the spell over his subjects. How suggestive these things are of the contrivances employed by the kings of civilized states for

sticking to their thrones, the so-called "regalia," the ermine, crown, scepter, rings, the bewildering processions, ceremonials, and rituals! Divine descent, divine right to rule, and supernatural healing powers are but of yesterday.

The state has to use psychological methods to rally its friends and confound its enemies. This discovery, that the real basis of the state is psychological, has burst with startling violence upon men's minds in the last few years. Political constitutions have been seen wavering and dissolving into air. Every nation has been asking itself the fearful question: "What shall we do if the proletariat takes it into its head to dictate?" The only answer is that the proletariat must be prevented, as it has been for the most part successfully in the past, from getting any such idea fixed in its head. A bit of Dr. Samuel Johnson's conversation with Boswell is curiously apt. "Providence has wisely ordered that the more numerous men are the more difficult it is for them to agree in anything, and so they are governed. There is no doubt, that if the poor should reason 'we'll be the poor no longer; we'll make the rich take their turn,' they could

easily do it, were it not that they can't agree. So the common soldiers, though so much more numerous than their officers, are governed by them for the same reason." It was Machiavelli who advised the ruler to keep the populace contented by lavish entertainment, to enhance his own prestige by a great show of munificence and by successful war. These devices are of doubtful efficacy at the present time, although they have been of service in the past not only to autocracies but to many a democracy. The state has more effective weapons than these. Churches, schools, moral codes, the press; legends of heroic founders, fathers and defenders of the country; slogans and songs, myths, and all the familiar apparatus for quickening patriotism may be relied upon, if wisely used, to dissipate the irrational impulse to govern by the brute force of numbers.

It must be apparent that the endeavor to control the minds of other men is universal in human society. The struggle for existence is not the clash of opposing bodies usually pictured, but rather a vast campaign of conciliation, persuasion and seduction. Man, as an individual, is more interested

in getting others to do things for him than in controlling the forces of nature. Single-handed he can exercise but an insignificant control over nature, but if he succeeds in controlling the minds of his fellows, he may well leave them to struggle with nature while he gathers in the world's prizes. John Smith hustling for a living in the world has more need of his fluent speech, agreeable presence and amiability, than of his physical strength or learning. When the clash of wills takes place between parties, classes or nations, a large part of the struggle consists in persuading the hostile forces to dissolve and disperse, in dissipating the enemy's organization or converting it into a friendly one.

The process of mental control is employed by individuals in seeking advancement, by classes in clinging to privileges or reaching out for more, by governments in getting power, and by the enemies of government in fomenting revolutions. Man,—evolutionists have pointed out,—has ceased developing specialized physical organs of offense and defense in the struggle for existence. Left to his physical equipment he would succumb, but he has an immeasurable

advantage in brain power, which enables him to work in groups, in nations, and makes possible the mobilization of the past as well as the present against his racial enemies. The internal struggle going on between individuals and classes unceasingly is also of a peculiar character. The weapons are powers of persuasion and mental control. The strategic objective is to gain allies; in other words, friends, patrons, creditors, business connections, clients, patients, matrimonial alliances. "Solid" attainments are, of course, useful, but chiefly in gaining recognition.

For the individual, the advantage of scientific or artistic achievement comes down at last to a question of salesmanship. What can the scientist or artist induce somebody to give for what he has discovered or created? The inventor does not put his invention to work, but has to sell it to a capitalist who reaps the bulk of the profits. He in turn sells it, or its products, to the public. Sopranos, tenors, violinists, prize-fighters, are helpless without a manager to sell their abilities for them. The prodigious financial returns of a modern best-seller as compared with the trifling sum paid by

“Paradise Lost” measure the difference between the feeble salesmanship of the age of Milton and that of Sinclair Lewis. The individual who creates what is beautiful or useful needs, in order to succeed, the art also of persuading men.

CHAPTER II

THWARTING THE COMMON MAN

THE mad impulse of the majority to rule appears to break out at long intervals. The French Revolution and the Bolshevik uprising are commonly accepted as examples of such eruptions from the lower depths. We know, however, that in the French Revolution spontaneous outbursts of popular wrath were carefully elaborated in advance by the Jacobin leaders. Lenin and his colleagues have themselves told how much they trusted to the Russian masses for the installation of the communist millennium. During these secular scares the innocent bystander is afflicted with a doubt whether government as such, not any particular form of government, can be kept going. The truth that government is fundamentally a contrivance for the preservation of conditions favorable to those who have been successful in getting

what they want, is then revealed in lightning flashes.

The less successful, not having a low opinion of their own powers, but attributing to chance, fate, fraud, or the rules of the game their inferior lot, would not be averse, —the lucky but fearful minority surmises, —to a new deal or a change in the rules of the game. The problem that then confronts the rulers of society is, how to convince the majority of the people that the chances are against an improvement of their lot by reshuffling the cards and prove to them that ill-luck, force, and fraud would not be wiped out by a new deal, a new distribution of places, property and privileges.

Democracy was once supposed to be such a new deal, but radicals now speak with derision of political democracy. It gets the masses nothing. The attack upon political democracy has gained in respectability in recent years. It has become rather commonplace to point out that the greater the scale upon which democracy is attempted the less we have of it. James Bryce asserted that no city of more than 300,000 inhabitants, can be well governed. Chesterton and Belloc have shown that in

democratic England, the cabinet is self-perpetuating, that positions in the government are handed out to the members of a few powerful families, that the seeming conflict between "government" and "opposition" is staged for the appeasement of the populace, while behind the scenes both parties meet in a convivial spirit, the changes in a ministry involving no fundamental change in the governing oligarchy. In the United States, it does not imply hostility to true democracy to favor the short ballot or commission government of cities. One may remain one hundred per cent. American while remembering that the House of Representatives never got through with more business than in the days of "Czar" Reed and that few legislative bodies ever gave such exhibitions of inability to function as our democratically elected Senate on several important recent occasions.

It is often asserted in defense of the democratic principle, that the trouble with existing democracies is that they do not go far enough, that the cure for faulty democracy is more democracy. Make de-

mocracy universal. Extend it to industry, to the schools, to the churches, to every form of human endeavor. But when we inspect the organizations that are held up as models of pure democracy we find little to support this contention. Professor Robert Michelis, in his interesting book on *Political Parties*, has shown that labor unions and working-men's political parties also suffer from lapses from the democratic ideal. The present officials of the American Federation of Labor have held office for a generation. They get themselves reëlected, add to their own body and propose legislation to which the members of the organization assent as a matter of duty. The same is true of the General Federation of Labor of France. The highest posts, in that most revolutionary of all labor organizations, are filled by a process that amounts to appointment by the chief secretary. The leaders of the old German Socialist and Trade Union parties were similarly permanent until removed by death or resignation. The resemblance between these phenomena and the familiar one in American politics of bosses, like Platt, Quay, Murphy,

Crocker, Aldridge and others, holding on to power for life, or until satiated, will be readily recognized.

Revolutions brought about in the name of Democracy itself show the same domination by individuals and small groups. There were only 5000 Jacobins, according to Taine, in a Parisian population of 700,000, but they acted for the entire French people. "If we had to wait until the masses of the Russian proletariat were educated up to socialism," said Lenin, "we would have to wait five hundred years. The socialist party is the vanguard of the working class; it must not allow itself to be halted by the lack of education of the mass-average but must lead the mass using the soviet as organ of revolutionary initiative."

We may consider the fact established that democracy has a tendency to slip into something undemocratic, to breed a principle antagonistic to itself. In every democracy we see individuals and minority groups controlling the administration or the government. By what mechanism do they impose their will upon the many? If government rests ultimately upon force, as Hobbes, Spencer, Tolstoy and others have

maintained, there is here a paradox calling for explanation. The majority have the force, yet minorities rule. Shelley, it seems, thought the majority only needed stirring up. In his song, "Men of England," he cries,

"Rise like lions after slumber,
In unvanquishable number.
Shake your chains to earth like dew,
Which in sleep had fallen on you—
Ye are many—they are few!"

What sort of chains are these that have fallen upon the many? Obviously they are not of a physical nature. The few do not forcibly compel the many to bear the burdens of society; they convince them that it is right and true happiness to do so. The majority is not compelled; it is persuaded. What are the devices by which the masses are kept from throwing off the yoke?

To begin with, no political boss, demagogue or oligarch fails to do homage to the dogma of The Sovereignty of the Majority in public. Just as the Shoguns could rule only in the name of the Mikado, and the Mayors of the Palace only in the name of the Merovingian Kings, so every ruling

oligarchy must entrench itself behind the proclamation that the true source of power and the only rightful sovereign is the majority. This is another illustration of "mimicry" as known to biologists,—the assumption by relatively weaker creatures of known and dreaded aspects of power in order to paralyse and subdue others better armed than themselves with mere physical capacity.

A minority in the political field mimics the majority by making a noise like a great multitude, with mass-meetings, much public speaking, letters to the papers, league-long petitions. It thus appears like a great host attacking simultaneously at a hundred places, which is classical strategy of weaker against stronger forces in actual warfare. Gideon of the Old Testament divided his small army into three parts which he ordered at night to three widely separated stations around his much stronger enemy. The three bands stood waving torches, blowing trumpets and shouting, "the sword of the Lord and Gideon," and the Midianites and the Amalekites, who were like grasshoppers for multitude, ran and cried and fled. Napoleon at Arcola used the same

device. "I gave every man a trumpet and gained the day with this handful." So the Jacobins in the French Revolution spoke for the Third Estate, and finally Robespierre spoke for the Jacobins. The Russian Communists speak for the Proletariat and Lenin or his successor for the Communists. The Anti-saloon League spoke for all the moral people in the United States.

Mimicry of the majority is assisted by a complementary psychological state aptly named by Bryce "the fatalism of the multitude," also known as "gregarious inertia." This is a state of indifference especially characteristic of the citizens of large democracies. It shows itself, for example, in an aversion to taking part in primaries and a willingness to let professionals run them. The dislike of voting on the losing side may be considered an expression of the same instinct. In England it appears as reverence for tradition and custom. The masses look on in awe at mysteries they do not comprehend. Those who are admitted to the inner circle of the governing class are persuaded, sooner or later, to play the game. A half dozen determined men, it has been said, could overthrow the system in parliament,

but thus far reverence has prevailed. The psychology of ancient democracies was the same. In Rome the voting was done at the capitol and comparatively few of the citizens could or did come to the city to vote. That duty was left to the professionals, largely the venal proletariat, whom the bosses were adept at controlling.

Citizens are not without valid excuses for their inertia. They have not the time to learn the routine of political procedure, to acquaint themselves with precedent and statute, to master the ritual of nomination and election. They have not the time to study the personal histories of dozens of candidates, or the difficult problems of economics and sociology with which politics are concerned. The average citizen is not criminally negligent. His dependence upon the professional politician is practically unavoidable. He does not object to being governed, provided he is well governed.

Students of democracy discover with some surprise that the bosses are in favor of more and ever more democracy. It suits the purposes of the bosses very well to give the voters many candidates and measures to vote for. The multiplicity of

choices thrust upon the voter is sure to make him incapable of any intelligent choice whatever. He is compelled to leave the task of selection to the professional expert, who presents him with a slate to which he can say only "yes" or "no."

Another device for swaying the majority is to make it appear that your candidates are inevitably destined to succeed anyway. It is easy to win an election if you can convince a majority that you already have the votes. This sounds paradoxical but it describes the tactics of every political manager, whose objective is a stampede initiated by the claque method. This is the purpose of ringing predictions of success, "straw votes," quotations of betting odds; in short, all the tricks designed to convince the populace that nothing remains to be done but a perfunctory casting of ballots in an issue already decided. The familiar convention stampede appears to the uninitiated as a boiling over from the depths of emotion and enthusiasm—mystical, irrational and unpredictable. In so far as volume and power are concerned these explosions are all that. The directors behind the scenes, however, do not leave the inauguration of

the tumult to chance. The mechanism of its provocation is planned with a profound knowledge of human nature.

There is a slow kind of stampede, or mass contagion, which is engendered by ideas, rational in themselves, but operating in a hypnotoidal manner. The idea of inevitability, offered in our day as a corollary to the theory of evolution, is one of them. This is the fatalism of the Darwinian Age. Put into logical form it runs something like this: Since progress is cosmic, impersonal and irresistible, we as individuals have only to divine its course and get out of its way. It is wicked and foolish to oppose the next step of Progress once that is authoritatively announced. And so, getting on the "band-wagon" becomes a profoundly philosophic act.

The growth of socialism before the war was an illustration of this glacial kind of stampede. Certainly nothing contributed so much to its expansion as the dogma of inevitability which Karl Marx had made part of socialist theology. Herbert Spencer spoke pathetically of socialism as "the coming slavery." Society in the picture he drew was a hypnotized bird waiting to be

swallowed by the cosmic snake, which for some inscrutable reason belonged to the socialist species. The spread of prohibition sentiment and the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment may fairly be considered illustrative of the same process. Friends of prohibition proclaimed it the next step in social evolution. The Liquor Dealers' Organization fought with constantly waning courage. The great body of American citizens awaited with the fatalism of the multitude the inevitable triumph of the Next Step.

The most effective bulwark of government is the word. Put into slogans, catch-words, shibboleths or "stereotypes," it is worth more than legions. Who can calculate in military units the defensive value to America of phrases like "the Constitution"? It was said by an ancient Greek, that "Democracy is a state in which everything, even the laws, depend upon the multitude set up as a tyrant and governed by a few declamatory speakers." Plato noted the fact that oratory is the art of ruling the minds of men. "No British man can attain to be a statesman or chief of workers till he has proved himself a chief of talkers,"

said Carlyle; and Emerson: "it is eminently the art which flourishes only in free countries." The instruments on which orators play are democratic assemblies.

The value of print to the art of government is no new discovery. Julius Cæsar grasped its importance when he had a law passed ordering certain magistrates to post the news of the day on whitewashed walls in different parts of the city, so that even the poorest Roman, who could not subscribe to the hand-copied booklets that served as newspapers, might inform himself gratis on current events. Was it likely that the magistrates whose duty it was to post the news would allow anything that was damaging to the sponsor of the law to appear? William Jennings Bryan not long ago advocated the establishment by the government of publicly owned newspapers, apparently unaware of Cæsar's priority to credit for this political invention.

A government that is threatened from within immediately strikes at its enemies' verbal machinery. It imposes a censorship on speech and printing, shuts off the flow of argument and at the same time itself institutes departments of intelligence and

information. Cromwell ruthlessly suppressed all hostile prints. The Bolsheviki have maintained themselves in power largely through their understanding of this tactical principle. Their first move was to gain possession of the newspaper offices. They forthwith began snowing Russia with printed paper. No newspapers appeared but their own. In the debate that followed with the more sentimental wing of the party, the victorious dictators gave this candid justification of their policy:

“The suppression of the bourgeois press was dictated not only by the purely military needs of the cause of the insurrection and for the checking of the counter-revolutionary activity, but it is also necessary as a means of transition toward the establishment of a new régime under which the capitalist owners of printing presses cannot be the all-powerful and exclusive manufacturers of public opinion.” It was resolved that the manufacture of public opinion as of all other commodities should be kept in the hands of the government.

The war between the Bolsheviki and their opponents became a war of printing presses. The Bolsheviki were well prepared for a

campaign of words. All their leaders were journalists: Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin, Karachan, Radek, Bucharin, Kameneff, Lunacharsky. Although the Bolshevik propaganda was masterly from a literary point of view, their main reliance was not upon argument but upon news. Controlling the sources of information, they fed out nothing detrimental to their prestige but only glowing reports of the success of Bolshevism in Russia and of the conversion of the world to its principles.

It would be a mistake to assume that democracies alone make use of the psychological means of government. An autocracy, which is usually thought to rest upon force, depends perhaps more than any other form of government upon imponderable psychological support. The difference between democracy and autocracy is simply that in the one there are constitutional methods for determining the will of the majority, while in the other the channels for the expression of the popular will have to be broken afresh at every crisis. Autocracy too is obliged to create public opinion. Cromwell controlled the English by means of an army of 50,000 devoted men, but to get their services

he had to persuade them. "Louis XIV was able to remain at the apex of one of the most complete despotisms that Europe has ever known by watching and humoring the bishops who taught the people to obey." The Russian church served czarism by dining into the ears of the peasants the doctrine of the sanctity and benevolence of the Little Father. Kaiser Wilhelm II was obliged to make an ally of *Gott*.

The cooperation of theocracy with autocracy is shown throughout history. After the Revolution had "abolished" Christianity in France, Robespierre discovered that his dictatorship had nothing but air under it. He saw his political structure beginning to topple unless he buttressed it with a cult. He was driven to inaugurate the worship of the Supreme Being, with himself as high priest. Napoleon ordered the teaching of that remarkable catechism of his in the public schools in which the children professed loyalty to their protector and benefactor "because he is head of the church universal." He preferred Catholicism to Anglicanism, he said privately, because in the former the people did not understand the words they sang.

Alexander the Great, after conquering Egypt, spent a month of the most difficult marching through the Sahara to the oasis of Siwah, in order to have himself proclaimed by the oracle that dwelt there as the son of Zeus. This was not a vain and foolish act. "From what I have said," writes Plutarch, "it is evident that Alexander was not mentally affected or insanely puffed up but was merely seeking to maintain authority over others through the claim of divinity." Alexander's deification was a political device. Its purpose was to consolidate his rule over the cities of Greece as well as the races of Asia and Africa. "To Alexander the Great governments have been in serious debt for over two thousand years." From him to Wilhelm II runs an unbroken line.

Altars and temples were dedicated to Julius Cæsar—the next universal divine king—in his life-time. His statue was set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription "To the unconquerable God." His image was drawn through the streets with those of the immortal gods. A temple was decreed in honor of Jupiter Julius. In a decree of the council of Ephesus he is described as "the god made manifest, the son

of Ares and Aphrodite." His successor Augustus had a statue fifty feet high on the Palatine representing him with the attributes of Apollo. The interest of Augustus in religion was conspicuously displayed. As pontifex maximus he was the head of the religious hierarchy, official guardian of religion, and, by virtue of other religious offices, in control of the entire religious machinery of the state.

The deification of Greek kings and Roman emperors was not a sign of religious piety but of political astuteness. Deification of living rulers was the product not of superstition but of irreligion. It was the classical method of legalizing absolutism, the psychological instrument for obtaining political submission. Religion was necessary to every form of government in the ancient world, whether oligarchy, monarchy or democracy. No government could live without this mechanism of control. It seems probable that none could today. The ancient saying, "It were as easy to build a city on air as to construct a state without belief in the gods," still holds true. Modern democracy, although officially divorced from religion, still represents itself as the fulfil-

ment of the religious ideal. If it opposes traditional religion, as in Russia, it makes a religion of itself. De Tocqueville shrewdly remarked, that a politician in the United States who should express dissent from one particular religious denomination might not have that sect against him, but if he were known as a religious sceptic in general he would have everybody against him.

The idea that a government can rest indefinitely upon force is seen, after a little analysis, to be an absurdity. It is true a government can perpetrate atrocities for the purpose of intimidation. But whom will it get to do the hangman's work? The king cannot go out himself singlehanded. Someone must be induced to enlist, to fight. The problem then in the first place is to enlist a sufficient number of fighters. But even after that point has been gained, it is plain that a population that should refuse to be intimidated by exhibitions of violence and terrorism could not be governed by "force." The government might shoot some of these obstinate people but that would not be governing them, and if the majority of the population persisted in not being impressed, the whole adventure must fail. "He who be-

comes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it may expect to be destroyed by it," wrote Machiavelli. But massacre is not government. Exhibitions of power, to succeed, must be accompanied by suitable propaganda setting forth the justice and wisdom of the government's action. In the absence of such considerations violence is just as likely as not to arouse revolt, which only needs organization to become irresistible.

In a democracy, fear has a very limited field of usefulness as an engine of government. The masses are governed by implanting in them the conviction that the government is their own and its ends their ends. Whether this conviction be true or not, the state could not survive if the majority did not think it was. There are always a few individuals who cannot be convinced, who are not amenable to the influence of the church, the press or the schools. In times of peace it is often admitted that such persons, secreting somehow a corrective against mob-madness, serve a useful purpose. But they are intolerable in war time when a nation prefers to be mad.

It was Machiavelli who first set forth ob-

jectively the psychological technique of government. "We are much beholden to Machiavelli and others who wrote what men do and not what they ought to do," says Francis Bacon. In the *Prince* he set out the principles of Realpolitik, as practiced since by Queen Elizabeth, Napoleon and Bismarck. If you wish to get power, he taught, you have to use such and such moral or psychological devices. For instance, win the affection, confidence and respect of your subjects by every possible means. He was not scrupulous about the means. Since you govern only by consent, get a reputation for courage, power, justice, liberality, chastity, faithfulness and all the most esteemed virtues. "It is not necessary," he adds, "that a Prince should have all the qualities I have enumerated above, but it is essential that he should seem to have them." There is the odious Machiavellian touch.

Defenders of Machiavelli put forward the plea that a good deal of his diabolism is attributable to the morals of the age in which he lived rather than to him personally. The plea is unnecessary. Machiavellism inheres in the very business of getting and exercising political power. No one expects a

statesman, let alone a politician, to tell the whole truth. It is recognized that the motives of politicians must often remain hidden from the people or the politicians would be swept aside. Complete frankness would not be understood. It is impracticable. A politically trained citizenry tacitly accepts the principle that the personal beliefs or prejudices of candidates for office are of less consequence than their official intentions. A candidate who seeks the suffrage of a large multitude must hit upon the greatest common denominator in opinions—the greater the multitude the slighter the thought-content in the principles which are acceptable to the majority. The basic truth which seldom can be spoken is that candidates for office seek power. It may be put moralistically, as Theodore Roosevelt did, when he wrote in a private letter that he wished to be re-elected to the presidency because the job made it possible for him to “do big things.” The art of government is a technique for controlling the common man.

CHAPTER III

PUBLIC OPINION

LET us admit that democracies are governed by Public Opinion. But how do we know public opinion? It is the "aggregate" of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community, says James Bryce—a rather indefinite description since opinions cannot be added together like algebraic quantities. Is it the opinion of the majority? A certain school of political writers object to calling it so, for that would give to public opinion something of an accidental nature. It would rob *vox populi* of its mystic authority—*vox populi* being in democratic theory the counterpart of monarchical Divine Right.

In their efforts to save Public Opinion from the debasement of identification with mere majority opinion, the backers of *vox populi* sometimes make pulp of logic. Public Opinion is not strictly the opinion of the numerical majority, it is said, and no form

of its expression measures the mere majority, for individual views always to some extent are weighed as well as counted. When the opinion of a majority is referred to, it is not the numerical but the effective majority that is meant. But to speak of an effective majority as distinguished from a numerical majority is merely to juggle with words. We may speak of an effective opinion, but majority is a numerical concept, and an effective majority which is not also a numerical majority can only mean a minority which somehow manages to rule.

Obviously, until opinion is measured, that is, counted, we are only guessing when we say public opinion is this or that. Each observer merely gives expression to his personal estimate. Usually Public Opinion means just such a vague and unmeasured impression of prevalent opinion. Counting, that is voting, decides the matter for all. It is another question, however, whether the registration of opinion voices public opinion or makes it. For what exists before public opinion is registered? Only a multitude of confused dispositions, needs, instincts, vague and feeble reactions to a dimly conceived situation. These are not opinions.

Opinions are decisions, choices between alternatives. On public matters few men have opinions. Public Opinion is rather the reverberation of an action. Those who have voted for a proposition are unalterably convinced of its correctness. The surest way to fasten an opinion upon a man is to get him to do something consistent with its acceptance. Many a man finds it less onerous to hand over a dollar or to vote than to think his way clear through a problem. The report of the vote becomes public opinion.

If left to itself, public opinion may grow by the slow secular process of trial and error; something like a social habit or folk-way finally getting established. But public opinion is not left to itself, and to-day less than ever. Persuasion is part of the art of government. It is the business of leaders and statesmen to *form* public opinion, to direct the thought of a nation in predetermined ways.

A good deal of what appears to be public opinion in a community is not opinion at all but habit. A society can not afford to expend energy in forming an opinion upon every point on which it is required to act. If certain types of opinion, or rather of con-

duct, were not habitual in a society, it would perish from excess of agitation in making up its mind. These types of conduct (like letting other people's property alone) are unconscious, for the same economical reason that personal habits like eating three meals a day, buying a morning paper and shaving, concerning which one does not make up one's mind every day, are automatic. The marked apprehension that is felt in a community when a social habit is challenged and held up for review is due to the instinctive dislike of the members of the community to the painful work of forming a real opinion.

People are born into certain types of opinion, Christians or Jews, monarchists or republicans, bourgeois or proletarian. The number of those who work on the material in their heads and form opinions of their own is very small. The so-called opinions that one hears in conversation are well known to be duplicates of a few originals found in newspapers or in printed matter sent out by interested makers of opinion. There are three kinds of persons in every community: Those who make opinion, those who accept opinion, and those who

have no opinion at all. The makers of opinion are the politicians, journalists, writers and thinking professional men. It is much the smallest class of the three.

The range of subjects upon which men are fitted to form original opinions is very narrow. Most men are obliged to accept the opinion of someone having prestige in politics, in religion, in science, in morals. This is unavoidable, since it is possible for the average man to be expert only in the small field of his regular occupation. He shows his judgment, his character, however, in the choice he makes of the leaders whom he follows. He is obliged to read the signs of trustworthiness, of genuine ability as distinguished from pretense, in men. That the choice of experts, of leaders and authorities is one of the most important and critical of human preoccupations is everywhere apparent in conversation, which is mostly about persons, and whether you have heard So-and-So speak, and whether you have read So-and-So's book.

The leaders that are followed are not always men who have first-hand information on the subjects on which they issue opinions, but those who are credited with special abil-

ity in choosing the real thinkers and experts. Clergymen, for example, announce their views on every literary, scientific, philosophical, dramatic and political subject. Men who have won distinction as inventors, chemists or automobile manufacturers pronounce verdicts on problems of education, biology, economics and religion. They are listened to respectfully because they are supposed to know better than the average man on which side the truth is likely to be found. They are the trusted secondary authorities.

It is no doubt true that one man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for as much as several men who hold theirs weakly. Yet it is well known that the intensity with which an opinion is held is in no wise proportional to its truth or to the depth of the mind that entertains it. The shallowest and the most ignorant are the most violent in their opinions. All we know of the intensity of an opinion is the fierceness with which it is expressed and the doggedness with which it is clung to,—qualities not of opinions but of temperaments. Fierceness and tenacity go far in getting opinions accepted by others partly because of the natural dislike of most men for controversy, partly owing to the

presumption that an opinion sincerely and strongly held is more apt to be true than one indifferently defended.

Leaders whose opinions crowds adopt are largely synthetic personalities. No sooner does a man aspire to become a leader than there begins the formation of a myth in the minds of the people which becomes less and less like the actual person as time goes on. This is partly the work of a mythologizing instinct operating spontaneously in man. The work is skillfully aided, however, by the makers of opinion, the disciples, Old Guard or political henchmen who have enlisted under a certain banner, using armies of publicity agents. Once the synthetic leader has come into existence, practical men and economic interests find it convenient to use him as a symbol or figure-head. The political boss, officially a private citizen but an actual master, has the symbol borne aloft and steered by invisible wires.

Since mistakes are disastrous to prestige, leaders of opinion are careful not to be too far in advance of their followers. There is the danger of the rank and file refusing to follow. A leader must, of course, always seem to lead, but the surest way of having

his ideas accepted is to know in advance what ideas are acceptable. The successful political leader, therefore, keeps his ear to the ground and is the first to give expression to views that are sure to be adopted. He must constantly keep in the limelight and not allow the idea of his leadership to fade for any length of time from the minds of his followers.

It may be objected that there is a contradiction in saying that Public Opinion is formed by a few leaders and again that leaders are forever watching to see which way the wind blows. The contradiction is only on the surface. Although the populace has no opinion, it has emotions, instincts, prejudices. An opinion that thwarts or frustrates these cannot prevail. It is for evidence of these emotions, instincts, and prejudices that the leader listens and when the people seem to be ready to react to a definite suggestion he leaps ahead uttering his war-cry and calling for his men to follow.

"With words we govern men," but the effectiveness of words is not in proportion to their significance in logical propositions. As Barrett Wendell taught the sophomores a generation ago, words have connotation as

well as denotation. They have penumbras, clangs, echoes, associations, affective tones. "I am by calling a dealer in words," said Rudyard Kipling in a speech before the Royal College of Surgeons, "and words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind. Not only do words infect, ego-tize, narcotize, and paralyze, but they enter into and color the minutest cells of the brain very much as madder mixed with a stag's food at the zoo colors the growth of the animal's antlers."

Joseph Conrad, like Kipling, felt the omnipotence of words:

He who wants to persuade should put his trust not in the right argument, but in the right word. The power of sound has always been greater than the power of sense.

Nothing humanly great—great I mean, as affecting a whole mass of lives—has ever come from reflection. On the other hand, you cannot fail to see the power of mere words; such as Glory, for instance, or Duty. Shouted with perseverance, with ardor, with conviction, these two have set whole nations in motion, and upheaved the dry, hard ground on which rests our whole social fabric. Give me

the right word and the right accent, and I will move the world.

The name is everything. Concepts are fixed by names. A thing is what it is conceived to be. A name classifies a person, an object or a thought, and it becomes difficult to think of him or it except as a member of the designated class. In order to fix an object in a class it is necessary only to name some prominent trait which is recognized as characteristic of the class. Imagination completes the picture. A good caricature often conveys a sharper impression of a man's character than a photograph. The Father of his Country, Old Hickory, Stonewall Jackson will remain forever animated virtues. You mark as permanent objects of affection "Teddy Roosevelt," "Uncle Joe Cannon," "Big Bill Edwards." A man speaks with a foreign accent and whatever else he may be as an individual he is first of all a foreigner.

Nicknames are an ancient offensive weapon. Few take the trouble to investigate the appropriateness of the labels that persistently cling to things that have the name-maker's condemnation. This is especially true of classes and nationalities

of men. We see an everlasting fitness in "jolly Irishman," "phlegmatic Dutchman," "subtle Chinaman," "canny Scotchman," etc.

We give attractive names to things we wish to promote and deterrent names to those we wish to destroy. Roosevelt called a certain type of journalist a "muck raker" and the name did much to put the tribe out of business. It is a terrible thing to-day to be called a "reactionary." The Bolsheviks supplied the reactionaries of the world with the deadly weapon of their name. "Walking delegate" was not long ago a handicap to labor leaders. A certain type of politician in New York finds "the interests" extremely handy.

Some of the ready-made categories under which men are frequently classified for the purpose of condemnation or blame owe their immense prestige to major trends in religion, philosophy and science. "Anti-social" carries more vivid condemnation than "impious," "unscientific" carries more conviction than "ungodly" or "irreligious." It is obvious, too, that a name derives its blasting or its transfiguring power from the affections, dislikes, fears, desires,

hopes and sentiments of those to whom it is addressed. If you speak about Jews, Catholics, or Negroes to an audience of Ku-Kluxers, your words arouse waves of repulsion in the hearts of the listeners. To speak of "the interests" at a bankers' convention would only excite merriment. In short, *shibboleths* get their explosive power from the "complexes" of the special audiences to whom they are addressed.

Professions, trades and classes have their specialized shibboleths. The language of political orators is full of one kind; clergymen, scientists, philosophers, artists, business men, women and boys have their own kinds. "I yield to no man in respect for the chief executive of the United States, but—," said a governor of New York in a recent document. How familiar the cliché! "It is thus a highly arbitrary proceeding on the part of Prof. X—— to accept speculative evidence merely because it meets the needs of his theoretical structure,"—a well-known scientific specimen!

Great pains have been taken to prove that opinions are not shaped solely by emotions or desires. But that is a position nobody takes. Emotions and desires have a power-

ful influence, but the evidence of the senses, authority, uncontradicted testimony, and other elements influence the formation of opinion. The passengers on a sinking ship are surely enough compelled by the evidence of their senses to believe that the ship is sinking, despite their wish to keep it afloat. But a palpable fact which is not a matter of opinion at all should not be confused with situations in which opinion is the nearest approximation to truth possible. Yet even in the case of the sinking ship it will be found that if there is the slightest room for doubt desire will play a part in determining opinion. The greater number will not give up until the evidence against them is overwhelming. And some will not be convinced that they are going down never to rise again until they strike the water. Even then, if they but float a few minutes, they will look around for something to cling to in the hope of ultimate rescue.

It is often thought that the non-rational impulses which influence opinion—prejudices, emotions, desires—are baneful impurities which interfere with the formation of true opinions. They are, however, the things that lend drive to thought. Without

them we should not care enough about the problems before us to form any opinion whatsoever. William James wrote that if he wanted to pick an outright duffer for a scientific research he would take a student who was impartial and unprejudiced. An emotional urge, even if it be only pride in a preformed opinion, is necessary to give the push to intellectual activity.

The process of forming an opinion rationally is powerfully affected by the contagion of crowds. Except in rare instances, an individual does not feel sufficient confidence in his own opinion to pit it against that of a multitude. If he reasons at all it is to the effect that the many are more apt to be right than the few. Generally, however, he simply hates to be left behind by the crowd. He wants to be on the right side, but even more, on the winning side. He wants above all to be a "good fellow."

Makers of opinion accordingly aim, as far as possible, to create crowd conditions. It should not be forgotten that crowds are not limited by locality. The same newspapers, the same best-sellers, the same editorials, speeches, and now the same radio-talks and movies, keep people over the whole United

States in a state of crowd-mind. The crowd-mind is, briefly, one in which there is a diminished sense of personal responsibility for the correctness of one's thinking. Neither the origin nor the soundness of ideas are scrutinized. Each one feels that it is enough if the idea appears acceptable to the crowd. With the surrender of responsibility there comes an intoxication, a feeling of irresistibility. To produce the crowd-mind manipulators must create a sense of contact, physical or mental, with a multitude obeying a common impulse. In order to arouse the feeling of such a common impulse reactions are called forth from the crowd—cheers, applause, parades, demonstrations, letters and interviews in the press, speeches, votes, petitions,—all operated for the purpose of inciting to imitation.

To produce conviction, that is, opinion, it is essential to concentrate or limit the attention to the particular idea desired. Walter Bagehot stated the underlying principle correctly when he said that the primitive or primordial mind believes everything presented to it without contradiction. "The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that our belief and attention

are the same fact," says William James. "Every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To conceive with passion is *eo ipso* to affirm." Exciting thoughts crowd out all others.

The application of this principle to an abnormal degree is seen in the practice of hypnotism, which is primarily an intense narrowing of the attention of the subject to the operator and his suggestions, all other impressions being pushed into the background. The hypnotist says that a clothes-pin is a dagger and the subject sees a dagger. Outside of the clinic two great civilizing institutions make use of the principle of the limitation of attention. They are the platform and the press.

An orator who gets a crowd into a hall has one great advantage over his hearers—they must keep silent while he talks. If he is master of his art they can think nothing but his thoughts. They must, for the time at least, believe them. Only exceptional persons can maintain the attitude of incredulity while passively listening in an assembly. If a considerable number in the audience are in sympathy with the orator, they coöperate by their murmurs, facial expression, and ap-

plause in carrying conviction to the rest or at least in paralyzing independent thinking. The practice of heckling does not materially lessen the advantage of an orator supported by partisans and reserving the privilege of the last word. That this strategic superiority of the orator is not due to any degeneration in modern audiences is apparent when we recollect that in the palmiest days of democracy, in the city-democracies of Greece, the same condition prevailed. "No ruling assembly ever contained so many men who had intelligence to guide their wills coupled with freedom to express their wills by a vote, as did that of Athens, but that will was the will rather of the crowd than each man's own and was in the last resort due to the persuasive force of the few strenuous spirits who impressed their views on the mass."

The grasp of an orator upon his listeners' powers of judgment is strikingly shown in the workings of the jury system. The average juryman is for the defendant while counsel for the defence is speaking; for the prosecution when the state's attorney speaks. If the verdict were rendered immediately upon the close of the pleas, its nature would depend upon which one of the orators

had just concluded. The charge of the judge is interposed and is accepted by every fair-minded jurymen as a welcome depolarizer. It enables him partly to resume a judicial attitude. The net result is that the great majority of cases are decided by the judge, who has the last word, whose voice is still in their ears as the jurymen begin to deliberate, and who speaks with the immense prestige of official and undisputed impartiality.

Newspapers narrow attention by giving prominence to news that support their policies and by printing inconspicuously everything that points to opposite conclusions. Antagonistic opinions are excluded. Newspapers have the great privilege of repetition and may say the same thing in slightly varied form day after day, week after week. Most men read the same paper every day, become saturated unwittingly with its opinions and view the world of politics, economics and morals through the editorial lenses.

There is another method of limiting attention. It is through the control of the practical machinery of registering opinion. By this is not meant ballot-box stuffing or other strong-arm methods, but only the control of

the mechanism for stating the alternatives from which a choice must be made. The public left to itself might go on milling about in a confused sort of way, distressed perhaps as individuals by the situation in which they find themselves but with no common thought, nothing amounting to an opinion, no conception of anything to be done. Along comes a leader and advances a proposition, raises an issue. After that the public can do nothing but decide, yes or no, on that proposition. No other business can be transacted until that question has been settled. The issue may be a false one having little or no bearing upon the actual difficulty; nevertheless that is the sole question officially and actually up for settlement. There may be several other formulations of the problem extant in the community. None of these get recognition. The political managers and bosses have put up the only alternatives that can be considered.

The weakness or utter inability of a mass of men to plan an action is inherent in numbers as much as is their slowness in getting out of a theater with a single exit, or their inability to speak distinctly in unison. The attempt of each person is neutralized

by the action of the others. It affords political bosses their capital opportunity.

Gabriel Tarde in his *Laws of Imitation* makes limitation to two alternatives a psychological condition of choice. In legislative assemblies there are never more than two propositions in conflict at the same time, the affirmative and negative. "A greater number of bills may be up for consideration but there are never more than two in conflict at the same time in the hesitating mind of the law-maker." Every decision is a duel between opposites, the elimination of irrelevant claims to attention being the first step in the formation of opinion. "Hence whatever political parties there may be in a country, for example, there are never more than two sides in relation to a question, the government and the opposition, the fusion of the heterogeneous parties united on their negative side. Have you ever seen a battle take place between three or four parties? Never. There may be seven or eight or ten or twelve armies of different nationalities but there can be only two hostile camps, just as in the council of war prior to a battle there are never more than two opinions at

the same time in relation to any plan of action, the one for it and the other made up of those united against it."

The caucus, the nominating convention, and the steering committee are the technical devices of politicians for exploiting this situation. The splendid lead they have by virtue of their official position enables them to make slates and bring in bills. A conspicuous example of the use made of this advantage is familiar. The selection of candidates for the presidency of the United States through the operation of national conventions falls in practice into the hands of a small group of politicians. The nation is obliged to choose between two men few citizens would have selected. It often happens that a candidate nominated by a convention has scarcely been known outside of his own state except by professional politicians and journalists. The Peace Conference at Versailles resolved itself into a council of ten. This again became the Big Three or Four which wrote the Treaty. The minor allies and the enemy had to take this or leave it.

The art of controlling public opinion has in recent years made notable progress.

Much of this is due to the expansion of psychological research having the definite aim of discovering the motives of conduct, the conditions that influence particular forms of behavior and the means of controlling it. Some of the progress is due to the great improvement in the mechanical means of communication,—the telegraph, telephone, express trains, multiple printing presses, cinematograph and radio, which unites a vastly greater number than ever before into one mass or crowd. “A large body is much more liable than a small one to this nervous conflagration, to this contagious intoxication of the emotions and judgment; for example, a numerous public meeting than a jury or a vestry,” wrote Cornwall Lewis nearly a century ago. A new chapter of history shaped by the possession on the part of the makers of public opinion of definite recognized and tested principles underlying their art is gathering momentum. Benjamin Kidd in one of his startling flashes of intuition saw this plainly:

It is clearly in evidence that the science of creating and transmitting public opinion under the influence of collective emotion is about to become the principal

science of civilization, to the mastery of which all governments and all powerful interests will in future address themselves with every resource at their command.

CHAPTER IV

SPELL-BINDING

JOHAN MORLEY remarks somewhere that to the Greek mind oratory was akin to the black arts. It was defined by their subtlest philosopher as "the art of enchanting the soul by argument." Our own reference to it as "spell-binding" is always made with an ironical implication. Why not admit without humorous reservation that oratory *is* spell-binding?

This business of controlling the behavior of others by the communication of thought is not restricted to the human species—the herd obeys the sentinel deer, and courier ants initiate tribal behavior of considerable complexity. But these have no personal ends to serve. It is otherwise with the human orator. His aim is not simply to communicate information, but to dominate and direct. The average man's conception of a parliament as a free intellectual arena where everyone who feels the impulse may

give expression to his thought—a tournament of ideas from which the wisest emerge triumphant—is very far from the truth. Experienced observers know that the speeches in a folk-mote that are of any account are not spontaneous wellings of thought, but carefully planned moves to win the control of the meeting and to direct its action in a predetermined course. And it is the same outside as inside parliament or congress.

It is one of the paradoxes of democracy that the “art of enchanting the soul by argument” flourishes best under the form of government that, theoretically, secures to every citizen perfect freedom of self-determination. In democracies we meet with the greatest efforts to substitute for the self-determination of the citizens the determination of orators. The chiefs of democratic governments are orators, like Gladstone and Lloyd George, Gambetta and Clemenceau, Crispi and Luzzatti. The leaders of popular reform movements have been orators, like Lasalle, Bebel, Danton, Jaures, Guesde, Ramsay McDonald, Bryan. Critical moments in the history of democratic nations have been made memorable

by the greatest of all spell-binders—Demos-thenes, Cicero, Pitt, Patrick Henry, Webster.

For the enchanter of souls, the beginning of wisdom is a knowledge of soul-nature, and not merely of the soul in general, but of the particular souls he aims to influence. But obviously, the amount of individual psychology the public orator can acquire is insignificant in proportion to the number of people he addresses. Nor would it be wise for him to greatly enlarge his knowledge, since he has but one speech to deliver and must frame his argument with a view to the character of his audience as a whole. When Patrick Henry, "the ablest defender of criminals in Virginia," knew there were conscientious or religious men among the jury, "he would most solemnly address himself to their sense of right and would adroitly bring in scriptural citations. If this handle were not offered, he would lay bare the sensibility of patriotism." These tactics enabled him on one occasion to save the life of a client who was guilty of deliberately shooting down a neighbor, by showing that the murdered man had once been under the suspicion of being a tory and refusing

supplies to a brigade of the American army. The argument that will evoke enthusiasm from a mass-meeting of labor unionists will have the opposite effect upon an assemblage of farmers. In general, as Aristotle remarks, old men and young, rich and poor, men and women, are moved by different feelings.

At the outset of his speech the orator confronts a many-headed monster. His first task is to make one out of the many, to unite the heterogeneous collection of listeners into a single audience. Here some modern researches into mob-psychology come to the assistance of the ancient and honorable art of spell-binding, which in its own way had evolved many excellent devices. In the first place the assemblage must be made physically as compact as possible. The listeners must feel each other's bodily presence, touch elbows, hear one another breathe. A practiced orator does not tolerate stragglers in the remote seats of a partly filled auditorium. All must come down in front leaving no visible gaps between them. Next, the auditors must do something together. Religious revivalists with their congregational singing at the beginning of

every service, have shown the way, and in stirring political campaigns the revivalist's example has been enthusiastically followed. The tremendous part song played in the exciting campaigns of the Forties still lingers as a tradition and is attested by the numerous songbooks like *The Clay Minstrel or National Songster*, *Log Cabin and Hard Cider Melodies*, *General Taylor's Old Rough and Ready Songster* and many others. The La Follette campaign managers tried to start a singing wave, but their candidate was unsingable.

Applause is another more or less mechanical device that is helpful to the spell-binder, not so much as an expression of approval, but as a means of uniting the auditors. To this end a claque is useful, although not indispensable. Every spell-binder worth his salt knows a number of clichés, patriotic or moral, that it would be disgraceful for a self-respecting citizen not to applaud. The funny stories at the opening of many speeches serve the same purpose. The important thing is not simply that the audience be put into a good humor, but that it be in a good humor about the same thing.

The thought of a spell-binder enchanting his audience by argument suggests a gradual and progressive conquest, culminating in a final Q. E. D., before which the audience capitulates. The facts are just the reverse. The orator must win his audience at the beginning of his speech, "for according to the favor of the audience so is the success of the orator," says Demosthenes. His argument will seem sound if the audience is favorably inclined; but if he has not made a hostile audience friendly at the start, all his cleverness will only set them more firmly against him. The effects produced by orators cannot be ascribed to their ideas or reasonings, however sound these may be. The discourses of great orators when printed often make a poor showing by the side of the productions of orators of inferior reputation. "It was very curious," said a well-known and successful advocate, "I had all the law and all the evidence, but that fellow Hale (his opponent) somehow got so intimate with the jury, that he won the case."

In the popular imagination, a certain physical equipment plays a conspicuous part in the endowment of the orator, and we

find this legend confirmed by the most eminent authentic examples. Just as in the case of the mesmeric magician, so with the oratorical spell-binder, the magic is usually believed to reside in the eye. "All the descriptions record the wonderful power of Pitt's eye in language that would be considered extravagant," says Frederick Harrison, "were it not that its effect is vouched by so many persons." Pitt's eye, we are told, was "that of a hawk"; it was "as significant as his words." "There was a kind of fascination in his look when he eyed one askance. Nothing could withstand the force of that contagion."

Webster awed and terrified juries; he commanded rather than persuaded, by sheer force of his personality. His eyes were "extraordinary"—"the dull black eyes under the precipice of brows, like dull anthracite furnaces needing only to be blown." Patrick Henry's eyes were "a dark gray, not large but penetrating, deep-set in his head; his eyelashes long and black, which with the color of his eye-brows made his eyes appear almost black." Gladstone had a "flashing eye," "an eye of remarkable depth." "The expression of his face would

be sombre were it not for this striking eye, which has a remarkable fascination," writes John Morley.

Along with the fascinating eye comes the "clarion voice." Mirabeau, it was said, ruled with his larynx. "He had the neck of a bull and a prodigious chest from which issued a voice of thunder." O'Connell's voice, says Disraeli, was the finest ever heard in Parliament, distinct, deep, sonorous, flexible. "A voice that covered the gamut," according to Wendell Phillips, Webster's voice was "low and musical in conversation, in debate, high and full, ringing out in moments of excitement like a clarion, and then sinking to deep notes with the solemn richness of organ tones." Pitt had a voice as well as an eye. Of him too, as of Mirabeau, it was said that he governed with his voice. "His lowest whisper was distinctly heard. His middle tones were sweet and rich and beautifully varied; when he elevated his voice to its highest pitch, the house was completely filled with the volume of sound."

That an oration is a species of chant was clearly recognized by the writers and rhetoricians of Greece and Rome. Aris-

totle and Cicero formulated metrical rules appropriate for oratory. No good orator in practice is indifferent to his rhythm. When a speaker becomes oratorical, he becomes rhythmical. He sets out to "weave a spell" just as truly as the primitive practitioner of charms and incantation. Mr. Everett Dean Martin, director of the Cooper Union Forum, where he had excellent opportunities for observation, remarks, that when an audience becomes a "crowd," the speaker's cadence becomes more marked, his voice more oracular, his gestures more emphatic.

From this it follows, that, like lyrics in general, orations are subject to the limitations pointed out by Poe, of being reasonably short. In most of them, the oratorical quality appears chiefly in the exordium and the peroration. The school-boy who, not satisfied with the text of any of the standard orations in its entirety, formed for himself a composite speaking piece by joining together the conclusion of the "Reply to Hayne" with the peroration of "Give me liberty or give me death" and choice bits from "Spartacus to the Gladiators" and Antony's Address to the Romans, had the

right feeling in this matter. A few long orations have attained fame for one reason or another. The effect of Burke's great speech On Conciliation upon the members of Parliament was to drive them outdoors. Sheridan's speech at the trial of Warren Hastings lasted four days and was attended by society ladies as if it were a theatrical performance; but after a long trial the defendant was acquitted. "A speech is a very fine thing," once said O'Connell, "but after all, the verdict is the thing."

Rhythm, as all know, is hypnoidal. Listening to a song one does not think of opposing considerations. There are elements of tone and pitch in oratorical rhythm for which no adequate description has yet been devised. Nevertheless, we know its presence. With some refinement of technique, it might be possible to identify orators like Pitt, Burke, Webster, Calhoun, Ingersoll, Gladstone and Bryan from their rhythm. Incidentally, it becomes apparent, that it is as impossible to really translate an oration from the language in which it was uttered, as a lyric. How ridiculous would be Demosthenes thundering in the paralytic measures of his translator!

“Don’t reason with an audience,” advises the psychologist. “Give them images! Stir up their emotions! The more emotional a crowd is, the more suggestible it is.” What then did Plato mean by “enchanting the soul by argument”? Is not reasoning futile? One thing seems certain. No amount of “sound” reasoning will of itself produce conviction. You may have perfectly sound reasoning leading to opposite conclusions.

Take a typical example of political debate, that on the League of Nations. Are the reasoning processes of the two sides to this debate different? do they disagree upon logical axioms? No; both sides reason in fundamentally the same way. Their intellects are similarly constituted. What they differ in is of another order. The orator may argue until he is black in the face that the League of Nations hands us over bound hand and foot to England; if I hate England, I will see nothing but death and dishonor in any sort of alliance with her. On the other hand, if I am animated by loyalty to Woodrow Wilson, no amount of imperfection in his League will turn me against it. Do those who are free from both these

biases, then, escape the spell-binder's arts? There is no such easy way. After listening to orators on both sides of the question, the perfectly colorless, undetermined person will simply be unable to decide. Perhaps he will accept the advice he gets last; or he may espouse the cause he hears the more frequently reiterated; or he will vote as his friends vote (unless he is of a "contrary" disposition and does the opposite for its own sake); or perhaps he will toss up a penny. While ostentatiously addressing your intellect, the orator actually appeals over your intellect's head to your instincts, complexes, prejudices, or interests. If you have none of these, you will be influenced by essentially irrelevant circumstances.

Emotion is presumed to be completely drained out of arguments made before the higher courts, where custom demands that all oratorical embellishment be omitted. A lighter tone would be an impertinence, an implication that Supreme Court judges can be influenced by inferior motives like other men. And yet it is common knowledge that even the judges of the Federal Supreme Court are divided into liberals and conservatives, certainly not a division upon

purely logical grounds. Before a jury, the orator does not feel compelled to exercise the same reserve as before a bench of judges. Yet just as the mere reasoner gets no attention, so there is a conventional obligation to reason on the part of the man who makes an emotional appeal. Man is a reasoning animal in public. As long as he is alone, he may shut himself in with his inarticulate instincts, but when he tries to become social, he talks, he confesses. Custom and education have put the stamp of disapproval upon purely impulsive conduct, so that few audiences will listen to an undisguised attempt at incitement to passion. They insist upon at least the semblance of reason, upon some assurance of remaining within rational bounds. So we can always hear even in the most violent appeals to the emotions a major premise booming away like a concealed battery.

One may venture the paradox that the function of argument in oratory is not to convince, but to make the orator credible. Sound reasoning adds to the spell-binder's prestige. It serves him like his hawk's eye, his clarion voice and his commanding gestures. Since few men arrive at conviction

by logical processes, the leaders who have the confidence of the many determine their opinions on those large matters that lie outside the range of their daily work and observation. Hard fact loses its identity when tossed between opposing spell-binders. It becomes difficult not to accept the version of a speaker possessed of abounding vitality, unimpeachable character, and an unsailable logic.

The spell-binder, as Plato and Cicero pointed out, must be an expert practical psychologist. He must understand human nature, and especially, human emotion, the strings that work this puppet—man. Says Cicero:

For who is ignorant that the highest power of an orator consists in exciting the minds of men to anger, or to hatred, or to grief, or in recalling them from these more violent emotions to gentleness and compassion? Which power will never be able to effect its object by eloquence except in him who has obtained a thorough insight into the nature of mankind, and all the passions of humanity, and those causes by which our minds are either impelled or restrained.

The emotions of men are linked up with certain basic instincts, such as love, fear and combativeness. For the political orator's purpose the greatest of these is combativeness. "To Æschines," said Demosthenes enviously of his accuser, "is assigned the part that gives pleasure. For it is the natural disposition of man to take pleasure in invective and accusation." Men like a fight. A debate will draw a larger crowd than a lecture. A great deal of Chatham's oratory was, to use his own words, "decisive indignation." The most interesting political campaigns in New York are those in which Tammany is ripped up. Many still remember the picturesque performances of W. T. Jerome when the crowds sought his meetings night after night as they ordinarily do the theaters. Even the evangelist, Sunday, owes the great attendance at his meetings in no small degree to the fact that he is regularly expected to abuse someone.

Fear, not pugnacity, is the instinct usually relied upon in religious oratory. In this field spell-binding is upon home ground. A Savonarola, a Whitefield, a Wesley, a Moody can produce effects that political orators may never hope to equal. Here it

is legitimate to play upon the emotions to the uttermost. That the excitation of large congregations to religious ecstasy is done by spell-binding arts which derive power from the laws of mob-psychology will hardly be questioned. Ask the individuals who have been swept along by one of these emotional whirlwinds, what it was that influenced them. They will not be able to answer. They do not know. They were carried along by mob-contagion. The converts who hit the trail under the excitement of the moment disappear from religious circles soon after the revivalist has finished his work.

As we look over the human race, we observe gifted spell-binders, diligently at work everywhere, laboring to mould the sentiments and direct the action of large bodies of their fellow-men; not always, by any means, for their own advantage, but intent, nevertheless, to make their own conceptions and policies prevail: out of pure love of men, in religion; for personal profit, in business; for power, in politics. Always, argument is employed,—the presentation and interpretation of fact, the clarification of concepts,—but the real reliance is upon

awakening the subtle, subconscious motives of conduct, instincts, emotions, biases, prejudices, complexes, and upon letting loose the irresistible power of crowd contagion. The secret magazines of explosive energy in the human soul are touched off by mere words, feeble breaths of air, which may start men upon trails of conquest or revolution, build up or destroy cities and empires, or transform the ways of living of millions. We have not yet fathomed the profound significance of the opening sentence of the gospel of St. John: "In the beginning was the word"—the greatest of all the engines of power.

CHAPTER V

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE

THE word "propaganda" has come to have a sinister connotation. Yet we have always had the thing itself more or less with us. The Collegium de Propaganda Fide is the official title of the Board of Missions of the Catholic church. In a political sense, propaganda is the process of creating public opinion, and it is doubtful whether anyone who shies at the word would be willing to give up his democratic right of trying to change his neighbor's vote.

There is a certain justification, nevertheless, for the apprehension usually aroused when propaganda is suspected. The aim of propaganda is not to clarify a situation. It differs in this respect from the give and take of open discussion. It is all give and no take. A speech in the Senate, for example, is not propaganda. It may be answered, and the ensuing debate proceeds on the as-

sumption of the possibility of compromise. In the case of propaganda, the conversion of the propagandist is out of the question from the start. His aim being nothing less than action along the lines he has mapped out, there is a well-grounded suspicion in the minds of those upon whom he confers his attention that any method that brings results is acceptable to him. It is not my reason that interests him, but my vote.

The wide-spread belief in the automatic evolution of society notwithstanding, there is always discernible amid the dust and smoke that hang over the inauguration of great social changes the figure of a man, or a small group of men, devoting themselves to the task of keeping the fires of agitation blazing—propagandists, in short. The “Grand Incendiary of the provinces,” as Governor Hutchinson called Samuel Adams, had carried on his agitation against Great Britain for nearly twenty years before the outbreak of the war, and as early as 1768 had resolved in his own mind upon independence. In the anti-slavery movement, Garrison had begun to print his *Liberator* as far back as 1831 and never paused in his efforts until the

slaves were free. In the great reform agitations in England during the nineteenth century, we find similar restless spirits—Cobden working for repeal of the Corn Laws, O'Connor fanning the flames of Chartism into fury. In France we see Robespierre and a small group of journalists directing the apparently chaotic forces that produce the Terror. Another group of journalists headed by Lenine have put Bolshevism in the place of Czarism.

Propaganda is feeble and ineffectual unless it fashions for itself an organization. An organization endows an idea with a degree of prestige which it can never obtain from the advocacy of scattered individuals. De Tocqueville thought he was discovering an American peculiarity when he noted the great number of organizations for all conceivable purposes. If the Bostonians were threatened with smallpox, they formed an anti-smallpox society, he said. Organization is the universal propaganda agency. It is the club with which non-official statesmen compel the official chiefs to make innovations in public policy.

Cobden used the Anti-Corn-Law League in his seven-year propaganda for free trade.

It brought into play, his opponents charged, "all the approved means of poisoning the stream of public sentiment," tracts, newspapers, lectures, conferences of dissenting clergymen, tea-parties given with the coöperation of the ladies, bazaars, mass-meetings and petitions to Parliament. Catholic emancipation was forced by the Catholic Association, the organization of Irishmen under their clergy, led by Daniel O'Connell. Chartism was sent on its wild career by the London Working Men's Association. In a month after the founding of the parent organization a hundred branches had sprung up in various parts of the country fostered by missionaries from London, and three years later a petition in favor of the charter was presented to the House of Commons, signed by over a million persons.

It was the Anti-Slavery society, organized by Garrison in 1832, that created an opposition to slavery powerful enough to force the professional politicians to admit the question into practical politics. Ten years before the beginning of the War for Independence we find the Sons of Liberty active in Boston, composed mainly of mechanics and laborers, who hold secret meetings and

are the prime movers under the guidance of Samuel Adams and his friends in every public demonstration against the British government. Other towns follow Boston's example. The famous Committees of Correspondence follow later and they have much propaganda to do; for revolutions, as a noted Englishman has observed, are the work of energetic minorities who succeed in committing majorities to measures for which they at first have little inclination. John Adams was of the opinion that about one third of the people of the Colonies were opposed to the Revolution. A much larger proportion was indifferent.

The chief medium of propaganda is, naturally, language, but in these days print for several reasons takes the lead of oral speech. Print lends itself to infinite multiplication. There is something, too, in the nature of cold print that makes it a peculiarly dangerous weapon of propaganda. No matter how incredulously you may stare at it, you cannot browbeat print into telling a different story. This immobility is, to the average mind, of the very essence of truth. The masters of propaganda have well understood its value from the days when Crom-

well smashed all the royalist presses and whipped the women caught selling contraband royalist journals, to the era of Bolshevism. Modern propaganda is helpless without the printing-press.

Before 1789 there had been two or three newspapers in Paris. Suddenly the flood-gates were opened, and Paris was deluged with journals. The booksellers' shops were crowded from morning to night. The price of printing was doubled. One collector is reported to have accumulated twenty-five hundred different political pamphlets in the last few months of 1788 and to have stopped in despair at the impossibility of completing his collection. Arthur Young writes in his *Diary* on June 9, 1789: "Thirteen came out to-day, sixteen yesterday, and ninety-two last week."

The Anti-Saloon League, which added the 18th amendment to the Constitution, published thirty-two monthlies and four weeklies. The Non-Partisan League of the Northwest had an official paper in every county in North Dakota. In the preparatory period of the American Revolution, the *Boston Gazette* and the *Worcester Spy* pounded away year after year; Samuel

Adams, "the penman of the Revolution," wrote under some twenty odd noms de plume; Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer* swept the Colonies like wild-fire. The Committees of Correspondence kept up a rain of broadsides, letters and pamphlets. The Abolitionists, too, "early learned how much paper could be covered with printer's ink at a small expense": witness the *Liberator*, the *Genius of Universal Emancipation*, the *Abolitionist*, the annual anti-slavery almanacs with wood-cuts of floggings and kidnappings of Negroes. That tremendous piece of propaganda, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, set millions of people weeping over the cruelty and pathos of the slave's condition, and through its effect upon the young, especially, gave the Republican party of 1860 a harvest of first voters who had been subjected to its spell.

It is in the news they carry, rather than in their editorial comment, that the propagandistic power of the newspapers lies. This has suggested to certain reformers, like W. J. Bryan, the advisability of government ownership of the news-distributing industry. Great newspapers are under the influence of "the financial interests." Let us,

therefore, have newspapers published by the government, which all can trust. Governments, that is, administrations, would no doubt welcome such an arrangement with open arms. Governments in power have as much need of a supporting public opinion as their opponents have of undermining that support. It is not difficult to imagine the absoluteness of a despotism that had the sources of news in its control. When the Bolsheviks published a despatch that the whole world was on the point of adopting a soviet form of government, no Russian had the hardihood to condemn Bolshevism.

Bismarck long ago taught Europe what could be done in this field, but in America the idea of an official press seems out of place. Yet governmental manipulation is not entirely unknown or, at any rate, not unsuspected even here. The combined outcry of the American press for the war with Spain is attributed by a writer like Gamaliel Bradford, to the need of the Republican administration of 1898, which had made a failure of its domestic policies, of getting a victorious war to its credit. Direct control of the press in that instance is not implied. There are subtler ways. No newspaper, said E. L.

Godkin, then editor of the *New York Evening Post*, would stir up a war, but, "with a few honorable exceptions, if it saw preparations making for a fight, the press would be inclined to encourage the combatants." During the Spanish American War, two newspapers were reported to have reached a circulation of over a million, "and some that had found it difficult to make a living in peace time made a fortune."

The recent war taught us fresh ways of handling news as propaganda. Picture and film in the opinion of Ludendorff, one of the greatest experts, make a deeper impression and a more compact one than the written word, and therefore have a greater influence on the masses. Those who cannot read can understand pictures. The more obscure technique of faking a picture as compared with that of printing a false despatch, makes the propaganda motive harder to detect and all the more effective.

Radio as a propaganda instrument undoubtedly has a great future. Already we have a broadcasting station on top of the New York Municipal Building so that the city fathers may tell the people "the truth" concerning their government. Presidential

candidates in the last campaign spoke to ten million listeners scattered over the entire continent instead of to two or three thousand in a hall.

Print is powerless to create the enthusiasm that a good orator may arouse in his immediate audience. The Prohibitionists, the Abolitionists, the Bolsheviks, the Corn-Leaguers, the Chartists, the Jacobins kept their orators continually in action. There was not a single evening for eighteen months, it is said, on which Robespierre did not make at least one speech, and that never a short one, to the mobs that crowded the meetings of the Jacobins in the Church of the Capuchins in Paris.

New occasions call for new forms of propaganda. British suffragettes, before the war, discovered carefully regulated violence. Hunger striking, to be sure, is a double-edged weapon that requires nice judgment in handling, as it depends upon an accurate estimation of the psychology of the men in power. The British women, as it turned out, were correct in their diagnosis, but the same weapon in other hands, in those of alien communists at Ellis Island, has not given such good results. It is applicable

only when used by members of the same class against each other or by women against men of their own class. Real violence, less regulated than the careful window-smashing and incendiarism of the British ladies, has been found valuable to both sides in industrial disputes. If the police shoot down workmen, that is propaganda for the cause of labor. If workmen riot and destroy property, it is propaganda for the employers. A little roughness on the part of the police, consequently, is not objectionable to labor leaders. It helps. Employers, on their side, have been known to engage men to damage their property. It gives them a grievance. The object of each party to the dispute is to get the neutral public to come on its side.

The most ambitious of the uses of propaganda has been credited to the Germans. The Germans were accused of propaganda through economic, educational, and diplomatic channels. With the outbreak of the war, propaganda became an important arm of their military organization, with the triple aim of winning the support of neutrals, breaking down enemy morale and strengthening morale at home. The sys-

tem was perfect, but somehow it broke down in operation. They miscalculated the trajectory of their propaganda; misjudged the incidence of violence. How their initial onset terrified the small neutrals but aroused in the strong ones a sense of danger and the will to resist, how Belgian atrocities and submarine sinkings proved fatal in bringing the most powerful of all the neutrals against them, has become a world fable.

Yet it is one of the strangest ironies of the war, that while propaganda for military purposes was generally regarded in the countries of the Allies as a treacherous German invention, the Germans themselves attributed their downfall to the superiority of the propaganda of the Allies. It was not military superiority that overcame him, laments Ludendorff. "We gazed at the enemy propaganda like the rabbit at the snake." The *Vossische Zeitung* cries out: "We try to shut our country off from enemy espionage and from the work of agents and rascals, but with open eyes we leave it defenceless while a stream of poisonous speeches pours over our people." And Herr Hechsler: "Time presses. Just as

the enemy has learned many things from us during the war, so we ought not to shrink from going to the enemy's school if his teachings and his methods have stood the test. I repeat what I have said for years, that Reuter and the English news propaganda are mightier than the English fleet and more dangerous than the English army." The English news propaganda was in the hands of Lord Northcliffe which is perhaps sufficient guarantee of its excellence.

Ludendorff confirms George Creel's boast that American propaganda advertising the colossal military effort of this country contributed materially towards the breaking of German morale. The General acquired an unwholesome respect for American publicity work. It had got on his nerves. He notes as propaganda material used by the Allies references to Prussian Militarism, the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Ludendorff himself, the League of Nations, a peace of understanding, national self-determination, social revolution, "Belgian cruelties," abuse of prisoners, democracy versus aristocracy. The Allies could not open their mouths without uttering propaganda. President Wil-

son's notes and speeches especially crumpled them up behind the lines. The Allies sent their propaganda over with rifle grenades that scattered pamphlets and leaflets, with 75 shells, six-inch guns, rockets, and still more directly by wireless, shouting over the earth for all to hear.

The perfection of the German propaganda outfit at the beginning of the war developed an anti-toxin which later became an immunizing suspicion against their good and bad intentions alike. When they begged for peace, they were charged with propaganda. Their revolution was propaganda, and even though they killed one another in civil strife, we were warned, especially from Paris, against propaganda. The same immunizing suspicion is in danger of being overworked in other fields. When a labor organization makes unpleasant demands, or tenants agitate for restrictions upon rent profiteering, some one arises to remind us of propaganda aimed at all our most cherished institutions. The mayor of New York not long ago remarked that the action of the public school teachers to arouse sentiment in favor of higher salaries for themselves was "nothing but propaganda."

The word "propaganda" itself, like other catch-words and slogans—"Bolshevism," "Prussianism," "16 to 1," "Remember the Maine," etc.,—has become a powerful propaganda missile.

Whenever possible, propaganda makes use of the principles of mob-psychology, for which the best opportunities exist in cities; but it should not be forgotten that crowds may be crowds just as truly though they be invisible and dispersed—especially under the conditions of modern rapid communication. Crowds are subject to mass contagion and stampede. The uninitiated take the applause of a clique for the sentiment of the whole audience, and all but the most independent characters join in. On the political stage the part of the clique is played by mass meetings, demonstrations and processions. Rhythm and dazzle render a crowd more suggestible; hence the use in political campaigns of mass singing, band music, torchlight processions, fire-works and bunting. A presidential campaign is a double, sometimes triple, propaganda on the largest known scale.

The development of the art of propaganda has given us a new profession.

Its members used to be known commonly as press agents. The press agent became a publicity man. His latest appellation is "counsel on public relations." Propaganda is his trade. Of necessity he does not seek personal notoriety, for the success of his work depends upon the ignorance of large numbers of people of his methods. He might be called the "mob-artist." Man in bulk, the crowd, is the material he works with. Give him the tools of his trade, chiefly printer's ink and paper, and he will turn you out any sort of crowd you desire. It will shout for war or peace, Bolshevism or Czarism, as he dictates. At his command it will adore Wagner, Russian violinists, mahjong, cross-word puzzles. He is the *deus ex machina* of drives, nominations, selling campaigns and Billy Sunday revivals. He is the ventilator of ideas, the organizer of public opinion, the instigator of action. Without him progress would halt and modern civilization sink into a parochial dullness. He is the leaven of the lump. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that democracy, as we know it, is under the dictatorship of the mob-artist. Our only salvation is to keep the profession open to competition.

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGGLING OF THE MARKET

ONE of the many text-books on the science of selling is entitled *Making Him Buy*. We have yet to hear of a book on *Making Him Sell*. For the most part, business is a drive of sellers against buyers, a more or less organized offensive against an undisciplined mob. Sellers are the aggressive agents, and salesmanship may be defined as the art of making those buy who would not have bought if let alone.

The fact that salesmanship is a subtle form of compulsion is evident in the maxims and admonitions handed out to novices by the adepts. "Don't give up at anything short of a knock-out," is the advice of one, "but that given, shake hands with the victor good-naturedly and then proceed to lay plans for another interview." And again, "Never make it easy for a prospect to turn you down, or out. If he is going to do these things make him work hard to do it." The

business of the salesman is to break down "sales-resistance."

What prevents the prospect from turning the salesman down and out, as, nine times out of ten, he feels inclined to do? The reason appears under various disguises in every selling code. There is something like a tribal taboo protecting the salesman. He is safe as long as he keeps to the forms of conventional politeness. The prospect cannot get rid of him without violating that ritual. This is the meaning of the emphasis laid by the professors of the art upon such items as poise, restraint, self-respect, courage, authority, a good front, the very best approach, and always, "personality." The prospect who would gladly turn his back upon the selling artist or bid him begone is prevented by these gossamer threads spun by the salesman. He must listen.

Nerve, of all the virtues, is undoubtedly the one that is most indispensable to a salesman. But holding the prospect's attention is not sufficient. He must be galvanized into activity. Technically speaking, the prospect's "interest" has to be awakened; that is to say, some lively instinct in him

must be set in motion. Now, the relative strength of the various instincts with which men are equipped varies in different individuals. Buyers who will in turn become sellers need only be shown one thing: "If you do nothing but say, 'It will save you money' seven times, you have made a good approach," remarks a sellers' sage. With the ultimate consumer the salesman's task is not so simple. A few decades ago it would have been said that the salesman's business was to find out the prospect's "ruling idea" and to operate upon that. To-day it seems more natural to speak of "suppressed wishes" and of "complexes." In a rough way and so far as his purpose is served, the salesman must be a psychoanalyst. Expertness therein is his open sesame to fortune.

Even though he has aroused interest and desire in his prospect, the crucial moment is still to come. This is the moment when he compels the prospect to "sign on the dotted line." The technique of eliciting this act, the goal of all business endeavors, is varied. It depends upon the specific talents of the salesman. Some have been

known to drop their fountain pen, which the polite prospect unwittingly picks up, receiving the suggestion to write through the tactile sense, assisted by the salesman's courteous but firm indication of the dotted line. Again, at the other extreme, the salesman may, his monitors tell him, exhibit a spirit akin to that of the earnest worker at a revival meeting, lay his hand upon the prospect's arm and impress upon him "the urgent need of his doing this thing for his own good."

But now mark something of the utmost significance! Once the signature is written, the order given, the salesman, all authorities agree, must immediately depart and not show himself again before the goods have been delivered. He must accept no invitations to lunch or the theater. If he is in a small town he should take the earliest train out lest he run into his customer by accident. In brief, we have here universal recognition of the fact that the prospect was brought to the dotted line under a spell woven by the salesman. It might be called the spell of the selling rite. Nine out of ten buyers emerging from that spell would

cancel their orders if they could do so gracefully. The sagacious salesman does not show them the way.

At his best the salesman works under certain inescapable limitations. If, in spite of all his science, he is forbidden access to his prospect, that ends the matter; he cannot force his way in. If he fails to get an order, as is the case more often than not, he is debarred from coming again the next day. These limitations do not exist for the impersonal salesmanship of advertising. Print repeats incessantly and cannot be contradicted or dismissed. It pursues a man into the inner recesses of his home or office. It thrusts itself between him and the sky, intercepts him as he tracks his fiction amidst the columns of his magazine, dazzles him with moving lights and shouts at him with letters mountain high. It cannot be silenced or avoided. In time one's resistance wears down. One observes the multitude paying attention, being amused, doing as it is bidden. Finally the advertisement becomes a tradition, part of the popular mythology.

A theater audience is as much in the cast as the players. The advertisement likewise

draws a great part of its power from the very crowd it is designed to influence. The costly electric sign on Broadway acquires prestige from the mere fact that it is read night after night by tens of thousands. Its bold eminence carries in itself an implication of approval by the perusing multitude. These again accept it as part of their city architecture and assist in making good the advertisement's assumption. A similar suggestibility emanates from the fact of ubiquity. The omnipresent advertisement comes to seem not the effort of an interested vendor but an integral part of the country's and the city's landscape.

Conspicuousness and repetition, the loud and incessant association of the thing vended with a real need, until nobody can feel the need without thinking of that particular way of meeting it—here we have the secret of the power of the advertisement over men's minds. The rest of the advertising art is concerned mainly with the technique of utterance. One should carefully avoid, for example, being feeble, unintelligible or repulsive in the choice of phraseology, style of print or illustrative coloring.

The northeast and the southwest corners of the printed page have their several and specific pulling values. One should address oneself to lively and dynamic instincts directly. Offer a vision of gastronomic rapture on the countenance of a person consuming shredded wheat with highly colored fruit and cream, rather than a table giving the food-value of the dish in calories.

In the drive of sellers against buyers that we have sketched, price is assumed to be fixed and unalterable. There is another phase of business in which the determination of price is the paramount issue. It is the operation referred to specifically as "the higgling of the market." Let us observe for a moment what takes place in a typical higgling bout, when a skillful buyer undertakes to make a purchase of an equally skillful merchant. We shall borrow the description of such a contest from an article on shopping in Italy by Louise Hale.

The most dignified method of procedure is to lay aside all that one would like to buy, calmly figure what it will cost, and ask the dealer his lowest price on the lot. He will immediately take off a few francs, whereupon the customer, as graciously as

before, offers to pay something less than two-thirds of the sum total. With a sad shake of the head she will be assured that it cannot be under—and off come a few more francs. At this point it is well for the buyer to put on her gloves slowly but decidedly and tell the thrifty knave that she could not pay more than two-thirds the original price and that she is very sorry to have troubled him. Before she leaves the shop he will have been persuaded that the time for higgling is past and the moment for taking advantage of the present opportunity has arrived. The chances are that the goods will be in her hands and old feuds forgotten.

Obviously, a battle has been waged between buyer and seller. What were the weapons employed? They were enticement, dissimulation and intimidation. The buyer conceals her eagerness to possess the goods; the dealer his need of cash. “If you want a thing,” said G. B. Shaw to William Morris, “you always get the worst of the bargain.” Each seeks to frighten the other with the threat of breaking off negotiations. As in the old time American horse-trade in which it was as important to judge human nature as to judge horses, much depends upon bluff. The similarity between the

higgling of the market and the game of poker is striking. In higgling, as in poker, facial expression, voice, gesture, are used to mislead one's opponent, to get him to bid high in the hope of a great victory, or to frighten him into premature surrender through ignorance of his opponent's weak hand. And, just as in an honest game of poker there are no mirrors behind the players, so in a case of genuine bargaining it is assumed that neither party has any advantage over the other in knowledge of his necessities or intentions.

In a market where many traders meet, at a county fair, for example, the conditions of the game are more complex. Each man in such a market has not only to watch those to whom he would sell, or from whom he would buy, but those who are on the same side of the market with himself. If he is a buyer, he has competing buyers; and if a seller, competing sellers. The higgling between buyers and sellers is now interfered with by other buyers and sellers. Each man has to guess not only the eagerness or nervousness of his opposites, but also the probable action of his similars.

One gets an odd notion from the writings

of economists of what happens in a market where prices are made. One reads of "the market price" being ground out as if by a sort of mechanical pressure between buyers and sellers. An eminent economist writes: "In no instance where there is perfect competition can there be more than one price for the same thing at the same time." What does this mean? Only that when things are sold at a price that is the price they are sold at. Moreover, "perfect competition" does not exist. There is not time for every trader to know what every other trader is doing in order to compete with him when trading becomes brisk. Transactions take place at different prices between traders only a few feet apart even in a market as nearly perfect as the New York Stock Exchange.

Every trader knows that there is for him no "market price." There *was* a price. But that is past. What the price will be the next minute when he offers to buy or sell he does not know. That is still to be determined by the higgling between him and some unknown trader. A government bond may have been sold a minute ago at 100. That does not mean that you can get 100 for

your bond. The next deal may have to be made at 99 or at 101. Every change of a fraction in the price indicates the passage of a separate and individual higgling bout. There *is* no market price; there only *was*.

Higgling on the big exchanges is obviously of a different character from that which takes place at a county fair or at an oriental bazaar. The majority of the bargainers do not see each other but are scattered over continents, or over the whole world. They act through brokers. Higgling is conducted not, to any great extent, by means of voice, expression and gesture, but by rumor, print and the stimulation of massed buying and selling. Since most of the trading on the exchange is done with borrowed capital, on margin, the speculators who engage in it are peculiarly sensitive to suggestion. One might say that their susceptibility to hope or fear was roughly in proportion to the smallness of their "margins." The trader on a small margin is never quite free from the fear of being "wiped out." On the other hand, having the chance of gaining, say, ten times as much as he would have had by limiting himself to his own capital, he may be so much

the more easily inflamed with speculative mania.

It is the business of market operators to take advantage of this sensitiveness of the speculative mind. The method chiefly employed is that which every street-corner fakir knows who has an accomplice or two to start the buying. Nothing induces buying like the sight of buying, and nothing induces selling like the sight of selling. It is a familiar Wall Street maxim, that you cannot induce "the public" to buy by proving that securities are cheap. "The public" buys when prices have risen; it sells when prices have fallen. It refuses to touch a stock that can be bought at a low price, but grasps wildly at upward soaring shares and sends them still higher. Market operators, therefore, endeavor to create an appearance of great trading activity. A senate investigating committee has described the mechanism by which this is effected. "When a banker or broker wants to create an appearance of activity in a stock, he gives at the same time to a number of different brokers orders day by day, and sometimes hour by hour, to sell the security on a scale up or down according to whether

he wishes to raise or lower the price. He gives at the same time to another set of brokers orders to buy on a scale. The effect is to give a great appearance of activity although the operator has neither more nor less of the stock than before."

"Activity" alone, however, does not suffice. It must be rationalized. Clouds of reasons appear in "dope sheets," brokers' letters, the financial columns of the big dailies, and rumors emanating from "well-informed quarters." Real news can be created when desired. An increase in the dividend rate of "American Telegraph and Telephone," for example, was made in the spring of 1921 for the avowed purpose of furnishing a better basis for future financing. The contrary operation of depressing a stock by omitting a dividend, with the less reputable motive of buying it in at the lower level, is also well known.

The most common method of influencing speculative prices is that of combining artificial "activity" with real news. A striking illustration was offered by the armistice market of November, 1918. For a month before the armistice the stock market had been rising. The combined average closing

prices of fifty stocks charted by the *New York Times* on September 28, October 11, October 28, and November 9, were 72.51, 73.36, 77.19, and 79.17, respectively. The market was discounting the armistice.

In other words, prices were going higher in anticipation of the blessings sure to follow upon the restoration of peace. The morning of the armistice, prices rose more violently than ever, and upon the official announcement of the truce, the exchange was closed because the rush to buy stocks had become unmanageable. The next day, prices opened at about the previous day's closing figures, hung there a while and then began to decline. The downward tendency continued for three months. The average closing prices of the same stocks on November 12 and 30, December 28, and February 1, were 78.01, 73.80, 72.82, and 71.01, respectively. Are we to assume that the crowds of speculators who had been crazy to buy stocks at any price on November 11, suddenly changed their minds the moment peace had become a reality instead of only a hope, and became just as crazy to sell? Or were there cool heads behind the scenes, equipped with knowledge rather than

guesses, who simply helped, with the apparatus at their command, the mob to excite itself, themselves selling while the selling was good and staying out as the wave receded?

Another instance: There were three distinct movements in stock-market prices from the beginning of 1923 to February, 1924. First, an upward swing from January to April, then a downward movement lasting until late in October; finally an upward movement which extended into 1924, ending on February 15. Comment of financial writers at the time of these sudden reversals is illuminating. In its issue of November 5, 1923, the *Annalist* remarks: "The declaration of an extra dividend of $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1 percent by the U. S. Steel Corporation and the announcement by Jesse L. Livermore, one of the largest operators in the Street, that first class stocks bought at this level should show good profits, served unexpectedly as propelling factors to push the stock market out of the rut of inaction last week. These developments occurred on the same day—Wednesday—and had the effect of starting more or less hasty short-covering in all sections of the Stock Exchange list."

The announcement of Mr. Livermore's market attitude was apparently as influential as the declaration of an extra dividend by the Steel Corporation. The upward movement continued unbroken for over three months, until February 15, 1924.

In its issue of February 18, 1924, the *Analyst* says of the collapse of prices which had taken place a few days before: "The oil scandal uncovered at Washington, the impending Government investigation into petroleum prices, and the shock from these sources to oil stocks generally, were given in Wall Street as main causes of the break. But in truth quite as much influence appears to have been exerted by the switching of one of the most important operators in the market from the bull to the bear-side." Again, Mr. Livermore!

The *New York Evening Post* February 16, 1924, says: "After a period of irregularity the markets finally have entered on the sharpest reaction since the upward movement began last November. The reaction generally being attributed to rumors of a change in position by the trader who has been the leader of the bull party, its significance should perhaps be accepted

with reserve. . . . Under the circumstances it would not be surprising if certain traders decided to let someone else carry a part of their stocks for a while, possibly with an eye to buying them back cheaper later on."

According to the veteran financial editors of the two most important financial pages in New York, Mr. Livermore's signal was sufficient to cause the market to go up or down.

The bull market following the election of President Coolidge was one of the most remarkable in the history of the Stock Exchange. It was greeted by newspaper writers with hallelujahs of praise and wonder. Here at last was an honest, unmanipulated bull market! It was the voice of the country, of its business men registering satisfaction with the political situation. The notion that it was a spontaneous expression of opinion independent of professional influence was nevertheless false.

The state of mind which produced the bull market of 1924 had been created by the Republican campaign managers throughout the preceding summer when they drew the issue sharply between conservatism and radicalism in politics. This formulation

had been accepted by all parties. Conservatism meant cessation from railroad baiting by Congress, a definite abandonment of the threat at government ownership, and a let-up in the zeal to regulate profits out of existence. In a more general sense, it meant that the sympathetic bond between government and business would not be seriously disturbed.

That professionals had not been taken by surprise was proven by the preparations bankers had made many months ahead for Republican success. During the previous summer, prices were obviously tugging at the leash whenever Republican success seemed sure and lagging at every breath of uncertainty. It was the strength of the rise, not the fact itself, which swept many traders off their feet.

The guidance of master minds quickly became apparent in the familiar switching from group to group. One day the high-priced railroads; next, the non-dividend paying railroads; the industrials, the oils, and the steels were given a spin in succession. The engineers of a market cannot predict the exact strength of the response they will obtain. They can start the move-

ment, and having done so, can sway and shunt it at will. By assiduous labor, like the engineers of a great water system, they collect and impound the individual drops of hope and expectancy. At the proper moment the flow is started. The fiercer the torrent the more opportunities there are of sluicing its energies into profitable channels.

The influence of mind upon mind is apparent not only in such undulations of price as have just been pointed out, but also in those major cycles that last for months or even years and are known as booms, depressions, and crises. There have been crises in the United States during the last thirty-five years in 1890, 1893, 1903, 1912, 1920. They have been commonly regarded as beyond human control, like the periodicity of the seasons or of sun-spots. Nevertheless, crises are fundamentally psychological.

The phases of the business cycle—prosperity and depression—are projections upon the business world of states of mind. Booms result from the vision by multitudes of business men of endlessly swelling profits; panics, from the sudden invasion of this hectic paradise by fear. In the technical language of economics, the boom is due to

“the over-capitalization of prospective profits.” “There is a rhythmic miscalculation of rents and of capital value,” and the crisis, or panic, is “the forcible and sudden movement of readjustment in the mistaken capitalization of productive agents.” In short, panics follow from massed erroneous guessing. The disastrousness of these errors of judgment follows from the fact that not only speculation but all business is more or less conducted on credit, that is, practically on margin, and the pyramid of credit is reared upon the foundation of exaggerated expectations of profits. “The success or failure of a man engaged in manufacturing, or in transportation, or in agriculture, depends more upon his skill as a prophet than upon his industry as a producer.” Much more does the success or failure of the merchant depend upon his guessing ability.

The outstanding feature of booms, crises, panics and depressions is their apparent irresistibility. All stand by helplessly, knowing that there is something absurd in the spectacle, yet unable to stop it. The uprush of business is usually initiated by some stimulus to men’s imaginations—the discov-

ery of new wealth, such as oil or gold, the opening of new markets, an extraordinary wheat crop, the conclusion of a war. Once having started, the continual rise of prices acts as a colossal suggestion upon buyers and sellers. All are under the spell, demanding higher prices and paying them. Finally someone does become sceptical. The doubt spreads and there is a wild rush to unload.

Now, although it is impossible for any individual or group to reverse the tide of inflation when it is running strong, is it not possible for a group advantageously situated to give the signal that will hasten, if only by a month or two, the inevitable change from flood to ebb? Professors Thorstein Veblen and Wesley C. Mitchell believe that the coteries of financiers that control the large banks of New York are in such a position. "The advantage enjoyed by this small group of major financiers," writes Mitchell, "is not limited to superior opportunities for foreseeing approaching changes. In a measure they can control the events they forecast."

Two things are clear. One is the "mo-

tive," as they say in murder cases. The more the inside mechanism of business is revealed, the more certain it becomes that the number of men who are in business for anything but business is negligible. The other is the opportunity. A push to the credit system such as has been suggested might be delivered in the form of an opinion emanating from the head of one of the international banking houses in New York, or from the president of the United States Steel Corporation. But louder than words speaks action. The meaning of an actual restriction of loans or of the raising of the rate of interest is immediately understood. "If they lock up large sums of money, they reduce the reserves of banks and precipitate the downward revision of credits with which a crisis begins. If they prevent corporations from raising loans needed to meet maturing obligations, they force the appointment of receivers, beat down the price of stocks and create a sentiment of distrust, which produces further consequences of its own."

Crowds are subject to stampede from fright or ecstasy. These movements may result from the summation of many small

impulses, or they may be started by a scientifically planned series of blows, rumors from "well informed quarter," statements from "official sources," "leaks from Washington," and by those familiar devices for arousing imitation known as "rigging the market." By close observance of the laws of mob psychology the market operator or the pool with powerful resources is enabled to initiate movements of which the foreordained consequences are incoming tides of gold.

From the simple duel between buyer and seller in a retail shop to the complex operations of a crisis, business consists largely of efforts at persuasion. The semi-rural shopkeeper sits patiently waiting for customers. The modern merchant herds them into his store. The difference in their methods measures the progress in the technique of controlling behavior. Everywhere in business we see individuals engaged in laboring to influence the minds of others, sometimes by means of logical argument, but more often by indirect appeals to the subconscious, to masked instincts, and to that curious susceptibility to mob contagion that is just beginning to be understood. The bulls try to

communicate their bullishness; the bears their bearishness. Business is the sum total of this bluffing and higgling, this cajolery, deception, intimidation, propaganda and persuasion.

CHAPTER VII

MORALE-MAKING

WHAT sends thousands of men across a shell-swept battle-field, or keeps them in water-soaked trenches amidst vermin and fever? What keeps members of a political party "in line," factory workers at their tasks, ships' crews obedient in all sorts of weather, passengers on sinking ocean liners behaving creditably to their humanity, workmen with wives and children staying out doggedly on strike?

To the external observer there is something magical in the sight of thousands of men obeying the same order, who seem to be miraculously moved by the fiat of a single brain. The magic is not impromptu. In all important instances morale is the product of science and art. It is made. Even savages who fight with spears and arrows do not leave morale to chance; hence the war-dance, the tom-tom, the battle cry, the ram's

horn. Impromptu efforts of gifted leaders to inspire morale in emergencies—the Philistine's "Quit you like men, or you will become the slaves of the Hebrews as they have been yours," or Napoleon's "Soldiers, forty centuries look down upon you!" or Lawrence's "Don't give up the ship!"—are but romantic flashes in the long grind of age-long warfare. The effective morale that wins wars is no sudden inspiration but the result of forethought and painstaking labor. The Macedonian phalanx with which Alexander conquered the world was the creation of his father Philip. Cæsar's disciplined legions were the products of a firmly established civilization. Frederick's regiments had been drilled by his father. Napoleon profited by the labors of Carnot. His Old Guard had been tempered in the fire of many victories.

The value of morale as compared with other engines of warfare was never so keenly appreciated as now. General Foch declares flatly that morale alone wins battles. "Ninety thousand conquered men retire before ninety thousand conquering men only because they have had enough; they no longer believe in victory, because they are

demoralized at the end of their moral resistance." "Defeat," he says again, "is in fact a purely moral result, that of a mood of discouragement, of terror, wrought in the soul of the conquered by the combined use of moral and material factors simultaneously resorted to by the victor."

This view is commonly accepted by modern generals. We see one curious result of it in the use of high explosives not to kill but to terrify the enemy. This was the purpose of the firing of the long range gun trained on Paris by the Germans in their last drive. "See that battery firing in front of us," said a Japanese general in the Russo-Japanese war, "it aims at the Russian redoubts at 3500 meters and it is composed of mountain guns. I am sure at this distance of not killing many Russians, but I have no doubt of the pleasure with which our infantry two kilometers in front of us take in hearing the shells go over their heads."

The measure of morale in use by army officers is the percentage of loss a unit can sustain without going to pieces. Judged by that standard there never were displays of higher morale than in the last war when reports of units wiped out to a man were not

rare. Soldiers lacking morale run before anyone is hurt, as at the battle of Bull Run. De Wet in his memoirs relates how on two different occasions his troops ran away under the fire of artillery without having lost a single man.

What is the technique of morale-making? What are the methods by which this spirit that often defies death is created? Morale-making is in progress in all fields where a definite behavior is desired from large numbers of men. The morale staffs of the army are duplicated by the welfare departments of industrial plants and the publicity bureaus of political parties. All have borrowed from the army in which the methods were first developed and have reached the highest perfection.

We may divide the methods of morale-making into three classes—the mechanical, the hypnoidal and the rational. Mechanical are those means that rely upon habit-formation. Men grow accustomed to danger. Miners and architectural iron-workers daily face risks without a thought which make even the unaccustomed onlooker turn pale. Drills and salutes are of the mechanical sort. Army officers believe in them and

believe also in making them rigorous and carried through with the punctiliousness of a religious ritual, although it may well be doubted whether the habit of concerted action on the parade ground survives the test of battle. What drill does is to fix the status of commander and private so firmly in the minds of both that only a very great shock can destroy the prestige of the one and the habit of obedience in the other.

Of a hypnoidal character are drums and bugles, flags and banners. Phrases like "La patrie," "Remember the Maine!" "Vaterland," "They shall not pass!" belong to the same category. A crowd is hypnoidal. The new recruit on entering the army is subjected to an irresistible mass-suggestion which only an abnormal individual can resist. His moral judgments become identical with those of the organization of which he has become a member. This mass-suggestion aims at the subjection of the personal will to the will of the superior entity, the company, the regiment, the army. Its object is uniformity. If the organization be one of great reputation and prestige there springs up that pride, or

esprit de corps, which is morale of the highest order.

In the average man, the discovery of opposition between his personal conduct and the moral judgment of the regiment or army produces acute distress known as "shame." Stephen Crane's hero, in *The Red Badge of Courage*, amazes his comrades by his superhuman daring after he has been tempered in the hell-fire of shame following upon his initial cowardice. What makes such a book as *Three Soldiers* by Don Passos repulsive to most men is the absence in the three chief figures of the feeling which normal men have when discovered doing anything condemned by the great body of their fellows. Other men too have felt the senselessness of war but have had their personal repugnance overcome by the unreasoning, yet somehow significant, fear of being found devoid of the fighting instinct. War is hell, they said, but went through it.

Leadership, too, should be placed among the hypnoidal agencies. Its appeal is to something instinctive, unreasoned and inexpressible. Yet, although leaders are born, they are also made. Leadership operates

according to definite principles and a knowledge of its technique, while often possessed by born leaders intuitively, may also be acquired by men not exceptionally endowed by nature.

The influence of a leader arises, in the first place, from his representative character. He commands not for himself, but for that higher being, sovereign or cause which he serves. It follows that he must give the impression of impersonality. To seem free from the weaknesses of mere men he cultivates an impassive demeanor. He encourages the legend of infallibility. The leader never reverses himself. "An officer should never take a step from which he must back down." He must, nevertheless, impress his followers with his humanity, and in his human capacity his prestige depends upon the myth of his past. Every gesture becomes a sign of latent strength, of unlimited courage. In a crisis he must, of course, infallibly lead. In the words of the French field regulations, "the officers should be permeated with the idea that their first and greatest mission consists of giving an example to their troops. Nowhere is the soldier more obedient and more devoted than in battle.

His eyes are constantly fixed on his chiefs. Their bravery and coolness will pass unto his soul; they render him capable of all exertions and all sacrifice."

Rational methods of morale-making operate with ideas, with language. Logic and reasoning are in the foreground here. The aim of it all is to fill every individual with a sense of devotion to something greater than himself. Armies in which the idea of a cause or common end dominates all personal interests reach the highest pitch of morale. The power of such armies was demonstrated in the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars. In the Boer war forces numerically much inferior to their opponents for a time had the British empire shaking. In the Russo-Japanese war the patriotically inspired troops went through to victory. Patriotism in these and many other instances has proved to be worth more than countless divisions of indifferent fighters not vitally interested in the purposes of their leaders.

Vastly more potent than patriotism as an energizer of morale is religion. The Crusaders, the followers of Mohammed, Cromwell's Ironsides are examples familiar to everybody. Nothing short of extermina-

tion will stop a charging army of religious fanatics, like the adherents of the Mahdi who tried conclusions with the English in the Sudan.

In more recent times the cause for which they are urged to do battle is commonly represented to the rank and file as an idealized *Being* in distress calling for their protection—Vaterland, Liberty, La France, Democracy, Civilization. Perhaps the defensive and appealing posture in which the Cause is pictured in these latter days is due to the fact that war itself is on the defensive. It was different in other ages when men went out to fight for the Lord of Hosts, to convert the nations to Allah, to conquer the world for Alexander or get glory for Napoleon.

Every nation in the World War professed to the international public to have taken up arms in self-defence. An army having no interest in the objects of a war, although weak in attack, may, like the Russians, be very formidable on the defensive. In attack, men simply obey the orders of officers whose aims they do not understand. On the defensive, they fight for one and the

same cause perfectly comprehended by all—their own safety.

If morale can be made, it can also be destroyed. "Victory," says Foch, "is imposing our will upon the enemy." Make him believe his cause is not worth fighting for or hopeless and he is already defeated. "You are licked when you think you are," said a famous prizefighter. The primitive method of demoralization was to confront the enemy with terrifying banners, ferocious face-masks, yells and leaps. Mr. Chester Lord, who saw the great John L. Sullivan in action, writes that, in his opinion, an important element in the champion's success was the ferocious expression his face was capable of assuming, reflecting no doubt the fighting fury behind it. The glaring eye and the huge jaw thrust forward were positively terrifying, and to this, Lord thinks, was due his most notable victory—that over Slade.

Shells with their noise and stench are more effective than painted banners or ferocious gestures. These, however, are effectively supplemented by assaults upon the soldier's faith in the cause for which he be-

lieves himself to be fighting. "You are fighting not for *Vaterland* but for the ambition of a dynasty. We are not the enemies of you as a people, but of your governing dynasty," proclaimed President Wilson to the Germans in the trenches. German leaflets said to each of the Allies, "You are not fighting for what you think you are, but to pull out of the fire chestnuts for the other fellows." Fraternizing parties and the sumptuous treatment of prisoners of war had the same purpose—the softening of the enemy, the mitigation of his pugnacity.

It is instructive to note the technique by which revolts from the inside are handled. What does the ship-captain, the military commander, the schoolmaster do when his authority is defied? In the first place, he exhibits the calmness of one whose personal fortune is not at stake. The cause, the higher entity that he serves, controls his behavior. Secondly, he is very careful to direct his disciplinary remarks or measures at the individual, or individuals, in whom the mutinous spirit has become explicit. He does not make the fatal mistake of assailing the whole ship's crew, regiment or class, remembering the profound truth in

the dictum that you cannot indict a whole nation. He tries to keep disaffection split up into disparate, mutually unaware units, being careful to forestall the crystallization of sentiment around a hostile leader. As long as he can do this he may hope to suppress the mutiny. If that becomes impossible his case is hopeless.

Political campaigns closely imitate war in all those measures that are concerned with stimulating morale among friends and breaking down the morale of opponents. Morale in a party is required to resist the seductions of opposing politicians, to listen only to the arguments of friendly leaders, and to vote as directed. Successful politicians are great masters in the science of morale. It is morale, that enables organizations of the Tammany type to keep control of city and state governments despite the clamor of numerous but poorly disciplined enemies. The use of hypnoidal measures for the making of political morale is familiar to everybody—fife-and-drum corps, banners, fireworks, processions, posters, buttons, pictures of leaders.

In politics the super-being which all serve is the party. Loyalty to party here does

the work of patriotism and religion elsewhere. The discussion of principles must be wholly neglected, for the intelligent voter does not relish being discomfited by the superior logic of an opponent in debate, but the warmth of comradeship, the magnetism of leaders, the primitive appeal of symbols, the premonitory taste of victory exert on the great majority a far greater pull than logic, however perfect.

The need of morale in peace may not be so obvious as in war, yet the disasters that follow upon a complete breakdown of morale in industry may be far greater than those that follow upon demoralization in war. Russia, the world's laboratory of social experimentation, has taught this lesson. The workers, in Emma Goldman's words, came to the factories to rest or to make something for the children at home. The farmers saw no sense in planting more than they were likely to require for their own use if their surplus was to be confiscated by communist raiders from the cities. The result was economic collapse.

Poor morale in industry shows in two ways. Workmen stay on the job but work listlessly, indulging in a great deal of ab-

senteism, corresponding to military A. W. O. L., or low morale manifests itself in frequent change of job with the loss in productivity which is inseparable from much hiring and firing.

Obviously many of the measures found effective for stimulating morale in the army are futile in industry—flags and drums, for example. Experiments to provide workers with phonograph music have been made but not largely followed. *Esprit de corps*, pride of organization, is operative in some industries of high reputation and long standing. It is, for instance, a matter of some pride to be a locomotive engineer on the Pennsylvania railroad, or a salesman for the International Harvester Company in a foreign country. Only to a moderate extent is it possible to get results by direct appeal. Elbert Hubbard's *A Message to Garcia*, still extant, is remarkable as a rare type of composition.

Set speeches intended to show the identity of the workers' interests with those of industry as a whole have slight success, but the many short phrases, the clichés that create the moral atmosphere in which an industrial population lives are of great im-

portance,—“service,” “efficiency,” “loyalty,” “production,” “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay.” Whatever destroys the prestige of these concepts is rightly regarded by leaders of the industrial system as destructive of the system itself.

It is difficult to convince the workman of the superior importance of the business or industry in which he is employed over his own happiness. The matter resolves itself in his mind simply into a choice between his own comfort and profits for the owners or stockholders. Hygienic work-rooms, lunch-rooms and recreation rooms have their influence, but in the main, the efficiency, that is, the morale of labor, is commensurate with the rate of wages. Just as there is no such stimulator of morale in war as victory—“a victorious army is a disciplined one,”—so in peaceful industry nothing stirs ambition like the well-earned reward duly paid. Poorly paid labor is low in morale; slave labor, lowest. But overpaid labor receiving a return out of proportion to the social value of the product is not the highest.

Leadership plays an obscure but real part in industrial morale. When a man who is

a good craftsman but without ability as a leader is promoted to be foreman the result is friction, a decline in the morale of the workers, and loss in production. The petty tyranny of a tactless foreman is repaid with a minimum of production necessary to hold the job until another is found. Factory experts estimate that a very large proportion of labor turn-over, say, about seventy-five percent, is due to faulty labor management. In certain industries a large labor turn-over is natural, in those that are by nature seasonal—fruit-picking, lumbering, harvesting, ice-cutting. In these the efficiency of labor is low not only because of the seasonal hiring and firing but because of the poor morale of the floaters, without home-ties or sense of social responsibility, who find temporary employment in them.

When labor goes on strike we have war conditions set up again. It is a struggle for morale. Men on strike require to see their comrades in mass, hence parades and “demonstrations.” In the great steel strike of 1919 the company managers put forth much effort to prevent parades and open-air meetings. Legal permits were required to use the streets and parks as places

of assembly. The managers through their political connections were able to block the attempts of the strikers to obtain such permits. Speech-making is indispensable for keeping the morale of strikers up to striking pitch, and halls are necessary for oratory. The company managers secured the cancellation of strikers' leases on halls. Strike-breakers are hired not for the purpose of permanently filling the places of strikers but to break their morale. Picketing is the strikers' counter offensive. Occasionally it is an attack upon the morale of strike-breakers. Leaders are as important in a labor strike as in the army. Without leaders a strike dribbles away, and the recognition of this fact is seen in the fame of unusually successful leaders like Tom Mann, Debs, Smilie. The corporation managers aim to drive a wedge between men and leaders. The leaders are labelled "outsiders," "professional agitators," "radicals." The most telling talk in the steel strike was that Foster, the leader of the strikers, was not a pure trade-unionist but a Bolshevik. War is proclaimed not upon the enemy population, but upon their government.

Great industrial strikes are conducted by armies of allies, by workmen of many grades and classes. On a railroad there are engineers, conductors, switchmen, shopmen, maintenance-of-way men—a hierarchy of various grades of skill, intelligence, responsibility and compensation. In the steel industry there is not only a hierarchy like that on the railroads, but also diversity of race and nationality—Hungarians, Poles, Finns, Slovaks, Americans. Under these circumstances, the policy of the corporation manager is the old one, “*divide et impera.*” The opportunities for dividing allies who speak half a dozen different languages are numerous. The task of the labor organizer of uniting such heterogeneous elements is correspondingly difficult. Strike leaders find it practically impossible to reach the neutrals, for neutrals in an industrial war read none but “capitalistic” papers.

To balance this handicap in the means of communication and expression strike-leaders have in their armory an idea of tremendous power. It is the idea of a class war waged for the realization of the millennium. This conception is popularly known in Europe as “the general strike.” Georges

Sorel conceived the general strike solely as a means of morale-making. Granted that a general strike is not feasible, nevertheless the conception is invaluable, in his opinion, as a "vital myth," for practical purposes. "Even if the only result of the general strike was to make the socialist conception more heroic," he wrote, "it should on that account alone be looked upon as having an incalculable value." This idea of the general strike serves not only to raise the morale of the proletariat, but strikes terror into the hearts of stock and bond holders. "That party will possess the future which can most skillfully manipulate the specter of revolution; the radical party is beginning to understand this." Obviously, it would be disastrous to the utility of the general strike as an instrument of morale if it were ever called into action and failed. For morale purposes, therefore, it must, as long as possible, be held in reserve. Only so long as it forbears becoming an actuality can it continue to function as a "vital myth."

Morale is the disposition on the part of the individuals of an organization to lose themselves for the sake of the Whole or for the cause in which the Whole is engaged.

It is the spirit of "playing the game." It is the measure of a community's civilization. Civilization would be impossible without it. A Russian author has pointed out that the behavior of a New York subway crowd would be inconceivable in Russia. Catastrophe would be the inevitable result there of such congestion as New Yorkers are used to, whereas here, good humor, individual intelligence, orderliness,—morale, in short,—make an impossible situation almost tolerable.

Morale is not instinctive. The behavior of high-spirited passengers on a sinking ocean-liner is the fine fruit of a multitude of scarcely noticed, endlessly continuing socializing endeavors on the part of the race. It is for this and similar emergencies that mankind treasures up examples of unusual heroism, constructs legends about heroic personalities, perpetuates its heroes in song and story.

Religion looks to the same end. By making men moral it also raises their morale, prepares them for community of effort in daily life and in the contingencies that try men's souls. It goes deeper. By inspiring hope and consolation it sustains the will to

live. For man cannot live by instinct alone. Life must be made acceptable to his understanding or he faints by the way. The rationalization of life is the function of religion, and as the need of this ministration is nearly universal, religion may well be called the most important of all morale-making agencies.

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION

THE family has two powerful rivals in education,—the State and the Church,—but it has a lead which they can never entirely overcome in the sole possession of the child during the first four or five years of its life. The desire to educate appears to be part of the reproductive instinct in parents, who wish their children to grow up like themselves, or as they would have liked to be. As very little of the training given during those early but most important years is rational or in any sense scientific, it is obvious what room is here for race amelioration without going into the difficult problems of eugenics.

Nations, too, aim to bring forth after their kind, each people regarding its own folk-ways sacred and assuming that it confers the greatest possible blessing upon the next generation by training the young in the traditional mental habits. The State needs

defenders as well as citizens, and the schools are the most convenient agencies for creating the appropriate spirit. Two conflicting ideals have to be harmonized in the educational policy of the State, that of making good citizens and that of making good men. Sparta followed one line exclusively. She taught scarcely anything but gymnastics, military tactics and the virtues of patriotism in her state-controlled schools. Athens had a broader curriculum, more in the spirit of Plato's definition of education, "to draw out of the body and the soul all the perfection of which they are capable." Prussia was perhaps the most thoroughgoing modern instance of a State deliberately going to work to stamp its image upon the souls of its citizenry. "It is our duty to educate young men to become young Germans and not young Greeks or Romans," said Wilhelm II.

The habits of mind which serve the purpose of the State are obedience, respect for authority, reverence for classics in literature, acceptance of finished truths as distinct from curiosity about new truth—in other words, thoughts, rather than thinking. These habits of mind may be formed

not alone by means of instruction in history, civics and literature, but by the very organization of the school with pyramided authority, routine and discipline suggesting that the aim of education is to turn out interchangeable parts of a vast mechanism. Habits of thinking, however, cannot be trained without facts. The facts are, therefore, selected for patriotic or civic purposes, those only being emphasized that are likely to create the desired habitual reaction.

“The English,” says Bertrand Russell, “impress upon the minds of their school children that the Empire is great and beneficent, that it has never oppressed India or forced opium upon China, that it has been invariably humanitarian in Africa and that all Germans are wicked. Russian elementary schools teach that communists are virtuous, anarchists wicked, and the bourgeois misguided; that the social revolution is imminent throughout Europe, and that there cannot be any imperialism in the communist party because all imperialism is due to capitalism. The Japanese teach that the Mikado is a divine being descended from the Sun Goddess; that Japan was created ear-

lier than other parts of the earth, and that it is therefore the duty of the Chinese to submit to whatever commands the Japanese may lay upon them. American elementary schools teach the children to become 100% American, i. e. to believe that America is God's own country, its constitution divinely inspired and its millionaires models of Sunday-school virtue."

The economic order, as an integral part of the State, likewise, seeks to perpetuate itself. Universities controlled by legislatures will necessarily reflect the standards of dominant political groups, and in so far as politicians are the playmates and partners of business men these two influences will tend in the same direction. Universities supported by the benefactions of millionaires are naturally tender-hearted towards the sources of their endowments. Business men have taken the place once held by the clergy in the control of American colleges. Boards of business men do what they can to enforce orthodoxy in economic views. We have it on the authority of Professor Veblen that "where the alumni have a voice in the naming of a college president, the successful business men have the

deciding voice. Successful men of affairs assert themselves with easy confidence and are looked up to so that their word carries weight beyond that of any other class or order of men. The community has a sentimental conviction that pecuniary success is the final test of manhood."

The Church has the same need of raising up supporters, servants and defenders as the State. And its chief resource is also the school. Religion by nature is propagandistic. It cannot stand by idly while souls are going to perdition. To do so would be irreligious. Sunday-schools, parochial schools, denominational colleges are familiar evidence of the Church's realization of its educational opportunities. The Mohammedans, too, attach a school to every mosque. The tenacity of the Jewish religion is probably due to the Jews' having raised the love of learning to the height of a supreme virtue.

The most determined and systematic employment of education for religious propaganda has been that of the Jesuits, who for three centuries were recognized as the best teachers in Europe, and earned for themselves the title of "the order of

professors.” The charge most often heard against them of suppressing originality and independence of mind is pointless. That was exactly what they had set out to do. “Let us all think in the same way. Let us all speak in the same way if possible,” Loyola had said. To teach the principles of religion as interpreted by the Catholic Church was the purpose of their existence, and it was due to their exertions that southern and western Germany and Austria were reconquered for the Catholic Church, and the Catholic faith was preserved in France and other countries.

Their great success was due in large part to their superior pedagogy. Protestants, as well as Catholics, sent their sons to be educated in Jesuit schools. Their methods and text-books were far in advance of anything previously known. Morals and religion were, of course, taught in every grade, and next to these studies, “eloquence and style” were emphasized. But the success of the Jesuit pedagogues was due especially to the combined firmness and gentleness with which they won the good-will of their pupils. In other words, they were remarkable teachers, because they were exception-

ally disciplined men. "Their pulpits rang with a studied eloquence—and in the confessional their advice was eagerly sought in all kinds of difficulties, for they were the fashionable professors of the art of direction." So great was their success that they were hated and feared by Catholics even more than by Protestants. In 1773 the order was suppressed by law in most countries of Europe.

Now, while the State and the Church labor to keep things as they are, to perpetuate themselves, there is almost always an opposition which aims to change the existing order. This too works through education. The most noteworthy educational theorists have been men who first of all called for changes in the State or the economic order. The school is made the battle-field of things-as-they-are and things-as-they-should-be. The Russian revolutionists of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth asked only to be allowed to teach the peasants reading and writing. They went out armed with a primer to transform the Russian empire. Ferrer in Spain was executed for doing nothing more startling than organizing Modern Schools, as he called them.

It may be recalled also that in the Southern States before the Civil War very severe penalties were meted out to those who dared to teach the Negroes to read.

As against the mental habits of obedience, respect for authority, patriotism and piety, reformers demand freedom, informal discipline, science, and true thinking rather than truth. The State and the Church favor an education that keeps men where they are. "We want men who will continue unceasingly to develop," said Ferrer, "men who are capable of constantly destroying and renewing their surroundings and renewing themselves, . . . men always disposed for things that are better, eager for the triumph of new ideas. Society fears such men, you cannot expect it to set up a system of education which will produce them."

Every subject of study has its propagandistic value. Arithmetic, says E. L. Thorndike, should be adapted to "life's simpler arithmetical needs." A good deal of difference of opinion has existed as to what life's simpler arithmetical needs are. Do they include digging cellars, papering walls, finding how many cords in a pile of wood, or in

how many hours train A will overtake train B? On the other hand, it is easy to see how constant harping on profit and loss, rate of discount, compound interest and bond yields may be objectionable to those who never come into actual contact with these things. Ferrer appointed a committee of teachers to devise a series of easy and practical problems in which there should be no reference to such capitalistic concepts, but which should deal with agricultural and industrial production, the just distribution of raw material and manufactured articles, the means of communication, the transport of merchandise, the comparison of human labor with mechanical, the benefits of public works, and so on. Pestalozzi believed in giving the children a thorough training in arithmetic because, "arithmetic is the natural safeguard against error in the pursuit of truth." In the mediæval scheme of education arithmetic was justified, "because in large measure it turns the mind from fleshly desires and furthermore awakens the wish to comprehend what with God's help we can merely receive with the heart." Geometry and astronomy were valued also for the elevation of mind they induced; as-

tronomy being useful besides in calculating the dates of religious holidays.

The distinguished geographer Elisée Reclus wrote, that he did not know one textbook for teaching geography in the elementary schools that "was not tainted with religious or patriotic poison, or what is worse, administrative routine." His colossal work in nineteen quarto volumes, *La Géographie Universelle*, and also *L'Homme et la Terre* are propagandistic for the anarchist point of view. Grammar thirty years ago was taught by having pupils analyze and parse sentences from *Paradise Lost*. To-day the material for the study of English may be taken from the reports of sporting events or from newspaper articles on the evil plight of Soviet Russia.

If I know that a war is imminent I am able to act in the market before other less informed traders. Thus knowledge is power. Not less valuable than knowledge of coming events is ability to control the behavior of others. The most popular forms of education have, therefore, been those that taught the arts of persuasion, rhetoric and oratory. One of the greatest of all educational movements was that of the Sophists in Greece.

"Every school-boy knows" that the Sophists were a tribe of charlatans who taught how the worse may be made to appear the better reason. But actually, as Grote has shown, the Sophists taught no new doctrines in morals or philosophy, but were just professional educators, the first professors. What they taught particularly was Success. This it was that gave them their great popularity. The road to success in the democratic city-states of Greece lay through rhetoric and oratory applied in the field of politics. These were the studies in which the Sophists specialized.

Socrates asks Protagoras, a Sophist, with the view, as usual, of showing him up, what he undertakes to teach. Protagoras replies, "Not arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, but prudence in affairs, private as well as public; how to order one's house in the best manner, and to be able to speak and act for the best in affairs of the State." "Do I understand you and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics?" asks Socrates. "That, Socrates, is exactly the profession I make." Whereupon Socrates shows the impossibility of teaching politics. But the young men crowded to the lectures

of the Sophists and paid money to hear them, which was a new thing and further scandalized the Platonists.

A similar stampede for education occurred at Rome. Says Cicero: "For when our empire over all nations was established, and after a period of tranquillity, there was scarcely a youth ambitious of praise who did not think that he must strive with all his might to attain the art of speaking. There were then, as there are now also, the highest inducements offered for the cultivation of this study in regard to public favor, wealth and dignity." In Gaul, Spain and Africa the study of oratory was carried on with even greater avidity than at Rome. Rhetoric and oratory were not regarded as narrow specialties, but as arts which included all knowledge, especially knowledge of human nature and of the means by which minds may be moved. Politics were then big business and received a fresh attention very much like that shown now to salesmanship and advertising.

In the mediæval universities too we find the chief emphasis on the arts of persuasion. The most brilliant careers open to men of intellect were in the Church. The University

of Paris in the thirteenth century had an enrollment of thirty thousand students. Teachers like Abelard were the chief attraction, and the principal form of intellectual exercise was disputation on theological subjects. In Italy law offered the chief prizes. The University of Bologna had at one time eighteen thousand students drawn by the fame of jurists like Gratian and Irnerius. Oxford was founded to train statesmen and it was long an honored tradition that none but Oxford graduates were eligible to cabinet positions.

Despite the prestige of science to-day it is plain that languages, native and foreign, still form the backbone of the educational scheme in secondary schools and colleges. This is simply recognition of the great part the arts of persuasion and influence play in the lives of men. The possession of a special talent or skill is not sufficient to see one through life. The possessor of ability is obliged to "sell" himself. He must find or make opportunities for employing his talent. The American college as a country club at which young men form social connections recognizes this need. A college course has become a requisite of gentility.

A liberal education, the education of a gentleman, consists to a large extent in the command of certain speech habits (the Oxford accent, for instance). Eton and Rugby have been marvelously successful in instilling the feeling for "good form" in their graduates.

Bertram Russell writes:

To them (those whose intellectual interests are strongest) most of all, but to all in some degree, education appears as a means of acquiring superiority over others; it is infected through and through with ruthlessness and glorification of social inequality. . . . Its essence is the assumption that what is most important is a certain kind of behavior, a behavior which minimizes friction between equals and delicately impresses inferiors with a conviction of their own crudity. As a practical weapon for preserving the privileges of the rich in a snobbish democracy it is unsurpassable. As a means of producing an agreeable social *milieu* for those who have money with no strong beliefs or unusual desires, it has some merit. In every other respect it is abominable.

The advantage of a foreign language lies mostly in the prestige it gives, a prestige that may accrue to the scholar even though

the culturally superior race whose language he knows is not the more powerful politically. The Romans learned Greek when Greece was a vassal state. For centuries after Rome as a political power was extinct, education meant the learning of Latin. The Moslem world learns Arabic; the Japanese learn Chinese.

Education as a process, that is, the art of teaching, is obviously from first to last a technique for directing the formation of mental habits. The Freudian psychology has thrown a new light upon the process. It has, for one thing, put the personal relationship between teacher and pupil back at the center of the process, and shown the reason for the futility of three-fourths of the mechanical mass-education that is now generally practiced.

That children like to study if they like the teacher and make no headway if the teacher repels them; that the subject is identified with the teacher, has always been known. It would seem that a personally attractive teacher could arouse enthusiasm in a student for any subject whatever, whether or not the teacher knew anything about it at all. Subconscious attractions and repul-

sions which have always been regarded as incidental and negligible actually play a predominant part in teaching and learning. The love-hate emotion explains a great deal of the difficulty of teaching.

"It's a great error," says Meiklejohn, "on the part of teachers to try to give their students instruction. The days of instruction are numbered. You can't teach young men of college age. But you can give them the opportunity to learn." There is a resistance to being told in the lower grades as well as in college classes. It is opposition on the part of the pupil who has no chance to the superiority of the teacher who is an expert. The Socratic method, by which ignorance is assumed by the teacher so as to give the pupil an opportunity of playing the part of teller, is a device to meet this situation. The use of indirect suggestion is explicable as a means of evading resistance to the teacher's superiority. Homilies and direct moral instruction are to be avoided for the same reason.

The Greeks taught all the morals a child should know with Homer. Bibles and epics were probably composed for just this purpose, to hold up pictures of the kind of

conduct all the world admires and of some kinds that it hates. Supported by the proper emotional reactions, skillfully aroused, the pictures do the work. "Thou shalt" and "thou shall not" strike home with much greater force when addressed by God in the epos to the chief hero than such commandments would if pronounced on the teacher's authority.

Two movements in education to-day aim at the restoration to the teacher of his function of teaching; that is, of influencing the mind and character of his pupils directly. One of these is the so-called New Education, —the Dalton plan may be taken as an instance—which breaks the lock-step of the usual classroom, allowing each pupil to go as fast as he can under the personal direction of the teacher. Schools with like traits are springing up in every part of the country. The intelligence-testing movement is another step towards breaking up the mass-formation of pupils, aiming as it does to give the teacher a chance with more homogeneously assorted groups.

The secret of the influence of great pedagogues is at least as deserving of analysis as are the charms of remarkable actors and ac-

tresses which have received so much more attention. Teachers like Socrates and Confucius have, it is true, been abundantly written about, but here are meant more particularly schoolmasters like Pestalozzi, Dr. Thomas Arnold and Mark Hopkins. Mr. Lytton Strachey's ironical portrait of Thomas Arnold in *Eminent Victorians* leaves the secret of his fame and influence unexplained. We gather from this sketch that Arnold had an absurd faith in himself and his mission, ridiculously overestimated his own significance as an intellectual force in his generation while of obviously limited penetration in the historical and spiritual fields in which he chose to work. Yet his influence upon his students was very great. If he was not a first-class thinker, he gave his pupils the impression that he was. Part of his duty as a schoolmaster was to conduct religious services, to preach and behave as a moral model for the boys. If he took himself seriously, so did they. "The younger boys," writes Dean Stanley (one of them), "feared him, but out of this feeling of fear grew up a deep admiration partaking largely of awe and this softened into a sort of loyalty which

remained even in the closer and more affectionate sympathy of later years." Many would have been willing to die for him.

A certain imperiousness seems essential in the teacher's make-up. Arnold had a large share of it. He had "the school-master's eye." Professor George Herbert Palmer notes that Homer in introducing a character is apt to draw attention to the eye. He remarks of a certain professor Sophocles who taught Greek at Harvard for forty years, that his eye "was the feature that first attracted notice, for it had uncommon alertness and intelligence. Those who knew him well detected in it a hidden sweetness, but against the stranger it burned and glared and guarded all the avenues of approach." The sympathetic heart hidden behind a rough exterior,—this is the traditional and established type.

On the part of the pupil a submissive, assimulative, docile attitude is recognized as most desirable, although this is known to be incompatible with creativeness. The intractability of many students who later have made striking contributions to science, art or literature has been often noted. The "good" student is rather apt to turn out a

humdrum subaltern. That the teacher in the classroom should prefer the assimilative type of student is to be expected. This type is valued, however, hardly less by statesmen, churchmen and business-men. William Jennings Bryan's doctrine that the hand that signs the pay-check should prescribe what should be taught meets with the approval of the majority, which has strong convictions on the rights of ownership. Control of the educational system is a form of property. The owners have the right to impose obedience and to define the nature of the product that should be turned out by their educational plant.

The idea that education has a more distant and a wider purpose than that of promoting the manufacture and distribution of wealth is held only by a few visionaries. These see that education is in truth more than a parochial or even a state concern, and certainly cannot be compressed into the conception of a contrivance by industrialists to provide themselves with intelligent clerks and mechanics.

The efforts that are constantly made to exploit the schools in the interest of a particular class, sect or clique are readily

seen to be pernicious. But not many see that the stake of the contemporaneous state itself in education is limited by the greater interest of the nation of to-morrow and after to-morrow. This limitation justifies the denial of the absolute, unrestricted rights of the immediate government in educational policy. The hand that signs the pay-check of the teacher is only the cashier for posterity. It is considerations like these that make the arrogance of upstart members of school-boards and legislatures ridiculous.

The Church, the State, the Opposition, the Family, the moralist, the merchant and the patriot,—all have their eyes fixed upon the school. The future belongs to that group which most intelligently grasps the significance of the educational process, the immense potentiality hidden in the child's plastic and impressionable mind. The freest development of the children themselves, however, must be the paramount consideration of directors of public school systems.

CHAPTER IX

THE TECHNIQUE OF RELIGIOUS PERSUASION

“**F**EAR not” said Jesus to Peter, “from henceforth thou shalt catch men.” The work laid out for the original twelve was, “Go and teach all nations.”

Gautama, too, gathered about him a group which caused his fame as a seeker after wisdom to resound throughout the land. Mohammed won over first his friends and immediate relatives, then a few tribes in Medina, and from there the teaching of the Koran was carried over large portions of Asia, Africa, Europe and the Islands of the Pacific. No man when he hath lighted a lamp putteth it under a bed, but putteth it on a stand that they that enter may see the light.

The founders of the great historic religions not only proclaimed a new wisdom, but they filled their disciples with the longing to be in person and manner of living

like themselves. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point with regard to Jesus. Gautama's influence upon his immediate friends must have been very great, for after they had deserted him on account of his heresy in rejecting asceticism he persuaded them to return, and they went out to spread his ideas with more zeal than ever. That it was not doctrine alone which launched Islam on its amazing career is evident in the undeniable fascination Mohammed exerted over his intimate friends—Omar, Abu Bekr, Ayesha and the rest. W. Muir, in *The Life of Mohammed*, gives a vivid picture of this fascination:

Omar, even with the prophet's inanimate form before him, cried: "The Prophet is not dead: he hath only swooned away!" Moghira, who was standing by, tried to convince him that he was mistaken. "Thou liest!" cried Omar. "The apostle of God is not dead; it is thy seditious spirit which hath suggested this, thine imagination. The prophet of the Lord shall not die until he have rooted out every hypocrite and unbeliever!"

Abu Bekr, kissing the face of his departed friend, said: "Sweet thou wert in life, and sweet art thou in death."

Holding the head between his hands he exclaimed: "Yes, thou art dead! Alas my friend, my chosen one! Dearer than father or mother to me! Thou hast tasted the bitter pains of death; and thou art too precious in the sight of the Lord, that he should give thee this cup a second time to drink!"

The personality of successful apostles and preachers affects their followers with an almost physical impact. John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, the largest single Protestant denomination in English speaking countries, is a good example of the type. "In eighteenth century England" writes W. H. Lecky, "no single figure influenced so many minds, no single voice touched so many hearts." He lived to be eighty-eight, and was active almost to the last day. Someone has calculated that in his lifetime he travelled 208,000 miles mostly on horseback and preached 40,462 sermons, not counting an infinite number of minor exhortations. His brother-in-law preferred to write to him rather than undergo the ordeal of a personal interview. His brother Charles had "a half superstitious dread of the man." At one of his London meetings a concerted

attempt led by a violent and notorious woman was made to raise disorder. "As soon as she broke out," writes Wesley, "I turned full upon her and declared the love God had for her soul, and then I prayed for God to confirm the word. She was struck to the heart, and shame covered her face. From her I turned to the rest who melted away like water and were as men that had no strength." His preaching style was calm and logical. He disliked the sensational manner of his friend Whitefield. But his hearers fell in convulsions, screamed, choked, wept and passed into cataleptic trances.

The apostle, preacher or missionary cannot go far at the outset unless he has established a certain prestige. A reputation for miraculous powers served in primitive communities. The medical mission is the most effective means of winning the confidence of savages. Moses appeared with an assortment of tricks. The multitude flocked to Jesus as a healer of the sick. "What manner of man is this whom even the winds and waves obey?" whispered the apostles. Mohammed declared that his messages came from the angel Gabriel. One night he flew

from Mecca to Jerusalem and back. In the Middle Ages in Christian Europe there was a boundless demand for miracles and a boundless supply.

Asceticism, too, has a prestige-creating power. Few can go the lengths of eminent ascetics, and that probably accounts for much of the fascination which asceticism has for the masses. Its attraction is universal among primitive as among civilized people. The self-torture of savages is familiar. Those who have read "*Moby Dick*" will not forget the picture of the cannibal Queequeg celebrating the Feast of Ramaddan by sitting motionless on his heels for twenty-four hours in a cold room, without food, holding a wooden idol rigidly before him. Mohammed himself, it is reported, sometimes stood so long in prayer that his feet swelled. His mode of living, even after he had become a great political personage, was extremely frugal. The Hebrew prophets went about emaciated and barefoot. Jesus, like John the Baptist, was a member of an ascetic set.

The histrionic element in the art of religious persuasion is obvious. Peculiarities of dress are used to attract attention. A

dramatic setting is chosen for the deliverance of the religious message. Dresses of skins, scanty clothing, long hair and beards and an emaciated appearance due to long fasting, inevitably excite curiosity and awe. The early Quakers followed the prophetic example by going barefooted, in sack-cloth, or altogether naked. The first Methodists drew great crowds by the mere fact that they spoke outdoors, used colloquial language and made extemporaneous prayers, things unheard of before in England. Samuel Johnson with his usual robust realism remarked that Whitefield would have been followed by crowds if he merely wore a nightcap in the pulpit or if he preached from a tree. "By standing on his head on a horse's back he would collect a multitude to hear him although the quality of his sermon were none the better for his circus tricks."

"No man exhibited more wonderfully that strange power which great histrionic talent exercises over the human mind," says Lecky. "He invested words which were the emptiest bombast with all the glow of the most majestic eloquence, imparting for a moment, at least, to confident assertions

more than the weight of the most convincing argument." He could pronounce the word Mesopotamia, it was said, in such a way as to move an audience to tears. He seldom went through a sermon without himself weeping, and his audience wept with him. "Sometimes he wept exceedingly, stamped loudly and passionately and was frequently so overcome that for a few seconds you would suspect he could not recover."¹

A significant change has come over revivalistic technique. It now uses the methods of modern business. The revival is a "drive." Billy Sunday, the most daring of recent operators, leaves little to the spontaneous workings of the spirit. As a crowd-gatherer he has never been surpassed. In his Philadelphia campaign he drew twenty thousand hearers twice a day, three times on Sunday, for eight weeks.

At the outset of his career Sunday brought to religion the prestige of the professional baseball player, but when he began to show signs of success he was joined by big capital. Sport and Business, two American idols, have proved an irresistible combination.

¹ Winter's letter to Jay; Gillies' *Life of Whitefield* .

Organization for a Billy Sunday revival begins months before his début. The community is carefully districted. The best hand-shaking and smiling talent is enlisted for the army of ushers. Prayer meetings are held in private houses. Executive committees, entertainment committees, dinner committees, decorating committees, shop-meeting committees are organized. Before the New York campaign began in April, 1917, there was a private meeting of seven thousand workers.

The fame of Sunday's leaping on and off tables while alternately instructing God and "bawling out" the Devil precedes him. All have heard of his delightful denunciations of booze-hoisters, card-players, tango-dancers and cigarette-smokers. There is a rush to see and hear the famous comedian.

At the meetings in the immense tabernacles especially built for him by his great ally, Business, Sunday uses to the utmost the hypnoidal effect of massed singing. A trained choir of five hundred to one thousand voices under the direction of a remarkable personality leads the congregation. The nature of the gospel hymns which are sung at every meeting is of peculiar signif-

icance. Few religiously minded people can resist "Just as I am without one plea" and "I am coming home" sung tenderly and appealingly with a diminishing cadence.

The sawdust trail itself is a brilliant conception. There it is, broad and plain, begging to be trodden. It is an easy way for cynics as well as saints to get a close-up view of the witch-doctor who has been tirelessly leaping about for an hour. The significance of trail-hitting even for those who are sincere is mainly technical. Being saved or converted means usually reverting to an emotional state standardized in revivalistic discourse. One does not experience conversion from a state of paganism. One has been a Christian, has allowed one's religious feelings to become numb, has neglected one's early training. The effect of the Billy Sunday treatment is to start a resurgence of old memories. Nostalgia plays a large part in conversion. Terror and self-pity lend their aid. The lost beatitude of childhood even more than the possible bliss of heaven chokes the poor trail-hitter while the great assemblage under the skilled leadership of the trained choir sings tender and appealing gospel-hymns. Here

is the hypnotic influence of song and rhythm and the immense suggestion of a huge congregation to hit the trail, a spectacle they have come to assist in as well as to view.

Religious conviction like other forms of persuasion is brought about by the contagion of numbers. The further away we get from the original fountain-heads of inspiration the more we see employed purely technical methods for creating conviction *en masse*. The master sows; the disciples seek only to reap. To maintain religious conviction in large numbers, synagogues, churches, mosques and temples are necessary, places where many may pray, sing and worship together. A religion without ritual, public worship and ceremonial does not exist. When these decay religious conviction dies out. A few choice minds may support one another by the written word. The masses need each other's physical presence to give evidence of a common emotion. The arts, architecture, painting and music lend their aid. Of these, music is for religious purposes no doubt the most effective. The canny revivalist is never without his choir-leader and trained chorus. Sankey shares the glory with Moody, and Rodeheaver with

Sunday. In revivalist practice, congregational singing is not left to extemporaneous fervor. Congregations seldom break into spontaneous singing. One such instance is described by H. Lewis in his account of the Welsh revival, but the delight with which he notes the incident shows its rarity:

And so prayer and hymn followed and mingled without a single halt or jar. It was as if an invisible Harper had the string of each soul ready to His finger, awakening the finest music at His touch and making it fade again to hushed expectancy. Anything more orderly, more harmonious than that unconducted meeting I can scarcely conceive.

Sects of a rationalistic cast which minimize the occasions for public worship remain numerically weak and tend to disappear. The vigorous religions that have a firm hold upon great multitudes enjoin numerous prayers, public and private. The network of habits thus formed constitutes a system of auto-suggestion. The thought of living without them gives the religious devotee a chill of terror. The auto-suggestive value of such practices is perfectly clear to western eyes in the case of the Buddhist who puts up his little water-wheel with prayers

printed on the vanes. The efficacy of the numerous masses, confessions and communions of the Catholic Church in maintaining the morale of its communicants is familiar. Islam prescribes five daily prayers. Orthodox Judaism requires three synagogue services daily, short prayers aloud and in unison whenever three male adults dine together, and set prayers on many occasions—on holidays, at full moon, at name-givings and upon innumerable minor occurrences like thunder, enjoying the first fruits of the season, going to sleep, rising up, and so on.

Pilgrimages to holy places are partly of the nature of ceremonials, partly of the nature of ascetic practices. Their difficulty provides the lure of asceticism. The greatest attraction is probably that of taking part in a mass movement, going somewhere and doing something with a crowd. The Mohammedan pilgrimage to Mecca is perhaps the best known of all, both because of the picturesqueness of the attending rites and because the pilgrimage is enjoined as a primary duty upon all Mohammedans. The ceremonial is sufficiently elaborate and mystifying to satisfy the dramatic craving of any child or barbarian. When five or six

miles from Mecca, the pilgrim puts off ordinary dress, dons two seamless wrappers and proceeds without hat or shoes. He must not shave, trim his nails or anoint his head during the ceremonial period. At Mecca he visits the sacred mosque, kisses the Kaba, runs three times around it and walks round four times. Then he ascends Mount Safa and visits the tomb of Ibrahim, runs to Mount Arafot, hears a sermon, goes to Muzdalipha where he stays the night, throws stones at the three pillars in Mina and offers sacrifice there. Truly a fascinating mummary! The Buddhist pilgrim is sent to the places where Buddha was born, where he first preached, where he learned perfect wisdom and where he sank into Nirvana.

The Christian Church too has made extensive use of pilgrimages. In the eleventh century, part of the penance imposed in the confessional was remitted to those who made a prescribed pilgrimage. In the next three or four centuries the rewards offered for pilgrimages were increased. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the indulgence became a cancellation of the guilt itself. The crusades were armed pilgrimages. It

has been computed that an average of two hundred thousand strangers were in Rome daily during the Year of Jubilee, drawn by the offer of plenary indulgence set forth in the bull of Boniface VIII in 1300. Boniface planned to have the year of jubilee come once every hundred years, but his successors have wisely ruled that the religious benefits derived from pilgrimages undertaken in jubilee years are too precious to be postponed from century to century. The year of jubilee now comes every twenty-five years. Lourdes has become a remarkable focal point for pilgrimages. At the dedication of the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in 1876 there were present thirty Bishops, three hundred priests, and one hundred thousand pilgrims. In 1877 the number of pilgrims to Lourdes had risen to two hundred and fifty thousand. Those numbers have since doubled.

Material objects, fetishes, play a large part in suggesting religious emotion. The rôle of crucifixes, icons, holy water, palm leaves, church spires need only be mentioned. They have been unquestionably very powerful instruments in the hands of the ecclesiastical organization. The Prophet saw

the wisdom of sluicing the reverence paid the Kaba at Mecca into the spiritual treasury of Islam. Buddhism possesses a similar object in the Bo Tree, the ancient fig-tree under which Buddha is reputed to have rested while evolving his eight-fold path to salvation. A Bo Tree (assumed to be a cutting of the original tree) is planted near every temple. The Bo tree in Ceylon, eighty miles from Kandy, is worshipped by throngs of pilgrims who come long distances to pray. In Judaism religious emotion is aroused by the sight of the Scroll, the *Tefilin*, the *Talith* or praying shawl, and more or less by any printed Hebrew letters of the alphabet.

The average person catches religion by contagion from the eye, the voice, the speech and the manner of gifted individuals in whom conviction glows at white heat, as well as from crowds. Personality in the physical sense is of no little importance in moving the hearts of religious audiences. The *Shekinah* that rested upon the face of Moses was dazzling to mortal eyes. Painters for centuries have strained the resources of their art to picture the beauty of the face of Christ. The companions of Mohammed

have left detailed descriptions of his appearance. When he walked, it seemed as if he were descending a mountain. The dazzling whiteness of his teeth is dwelt upon, the glow in his eyes, his wavy hair, the melodiousness of his voice.

The technique of persuasion used by revivalists will be found to illustrate strikingly the principles stated in general terms by psychologists like Bain, Bagehot and James. The first of these is confident affirmation. Jesus taught, not as the scribes, but as one having authority. He urged his followers to acquire the confidence that he had. A frequent reproach of his was, "Ye of little faith!" What thrilling assurance Gautama displays as he leaves a life of comfort, wife and first-born, forever, to go in search of wisdom! Mohammed was fully convinced, at least in the early part of his career, that the communications later embodied in the Koran were inspired by Allah through the mediation of the angel Gabriel. The same temper is evident in Francis of Assisi, Augustine, Tolstoi, John Huss, Savonarola, in all the saints, martyrs and preachers who have succeeded in carrying conviction to others.

In the second place comes vividness of the pictures suggested. Missionaries begin work with the untutored savages by merely narrating the gospel story simply and vividly. "If you make a thing quite clear to a person the chances are you will almost have persuaded him," says Bagehot.

Thirdly, there should be no obvious contradictions. Any idea in the mind which is uncontradicted is believed. "There is a primitive credulity in the mind which causes men to accept as true any idea that is uncontradicted," says Bain. Remote or implied contradictions do not trouble the average man. The reconciliation of these difficulties is left to theologians. A fourth principle is repetition. This comes into operation in the church ritual, and especially in the religious school. A fifth, which was formulated and made familiar by James, has been long known to ecclesiastics, "We need only in cold blood to act as if the thing in question were real and keep on acting as if it were real and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real." Act as if it were real; that is, pray, sing, say the responses, kneel and rise with the congrega-

tion, live the religious life, and in the end you will believe! The Moravian preacher Bohler, to whom Wesley owed his conversion, gave him the same advice! "Preach faith," he said, "until you have it, and then because you have faith, you will preach it."

Now, all the technique in the world devoted to the presentation of ideas must prove unavailing if it fall on deaf ears. Some powerful emotion, or the consciousness of some vital need must be awakened which the doctrine presented promises to satisfy. The real core of the religious problem, to use James's words, is expressed in the cry, "Help! Help!" But religion is meaningless to those who feel no distress. To gather converts it is necessary to awaken the fear of death, or to paint the evils of the natural life and the torments sure to follow after death. The listeners' mind must be filled with depressing emotions, remorse, anxiety, melancholy, fear.

The text of Jonathan Edwards's famous Enfield sermon was: "And they shall go forth and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched, and they shall be an abhor-

rence to all flesh.” He went on to prove conclusively that there was no hope for the Northampton farmers and their wives and children who listened to him on that beautiful summer afternoon, except in the grace of God. They wept, fell to the ground, cried out and were converted. “What is the pain of the body which you do or may endure to that of lying in a lake of fire burning with brimstone,” Wesley asked in his quaint cool way. “When you ask a friend who is sick how he does, ‘I am in pain now,’ says he, ‘but I hope to be easy soon.’ That is a sweet mitigation of the present uneasiness. But how dreadful would be his case if he should answer, ‘I am all over pain and I shall never be easy of it. I lie under the exquisite torment of body and horror of soul and I shall feel it forever!’ Such is the case of the damned sinners in Hell!”

The appeal of revivalists cannot be disposed of as just “hell-fire Christianity.” The early Christians spoke the same language. “Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels. And these shall go away into eternal punishment, but the

righteous into eternal life.” “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end. I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely. He that overcometh shall inherit these things: and I will be his God, and he shall be my son. But for the fearful and unbelieving and abominable and murderers and fornicators and sorcerers and idolaters and all liars, their part shall be in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone which is the second death.”

Mohammed too put his flock in a receptive mood with visions of hell-fire. His hell had seven divisions—Gehenna, the flaming fire, the-raging-fire-that-splits-everything-to-pieces, the Blaze, the Scorching Fire, the Fierce Fire, the Abyss. “Verily those who disbelieve in our signs, we will broil them with fire; whenever their skins are well done, then we will change them for other skins, that they may taste torment. Verily God is glorious and wise.”

Buddha's disciples put the Hindoos in a state of fear by vividly picturing the horrors of reincarnation in the bodies of loathsome animals, a form of hell familiar to the Brahmins. “They urged virtue upon the

people lest they should live again in degraded or miserable forms, or fall into some of the innumerable hells of torment with which the Brahminical teachers had already familiarized their minds. They represented the Buddha as the savior from almost unlimited torment."

Having sufficiently agitated his hearers with pictures of hell, disease and death, the preacher returns to visions of eternal happiness. Longing takes the place of depression. Ecstasy follows hopelessness. This is the regular cycle.

It is, of course, the business of the apostle to urge the *truth* of his doctrine. But it should be remembered that truth and myth are not opposed in religion. Myth is the greatest of all propaganda devices. Its utility in government and politics is well recognized,—the Washington myth, for example, the still growing Lincoln myth, the myth of the perfection of ancestors. Mainly the work of many anonymous contributors, myth-making shows signs of becoming a conscious process. Publicity agents deliberately foster legends about their heroes for which most people have an avid appetite. Myth is not concerned with

objective truth. Its persuasive power lies in its subjective or spiritual truth. It expresses the inexpressible. The idea of immortality is a beneficent vital myth, since it inspires courage and serenity in the face of death. That is the most persuasive religious truth which offers the greatest encouragement, the greatest solace and comfort. The doctrine of God as the Father, however difficult it may be from a biological point of view, is superior to the cautious cosmological formulæ that are proposed as substitutes, because it best meets all the needs of the spirit; because it is on the whole truer to all the experiences of life,—the human relationship of parent and child being one of them,—and is free from the chill of materialism.

What matters most in religion is the pragmatic test. Does the doctrine help life along, promote happiness, love, justice? If it does it has the qualities of truth! Dogmas, therefore, that by strictly objective tests are not demonstrably real have yet won enormous approval because in a mystic, indefinable way they have served the ends of religious truth. A valid technique of persuasion is nevertheless necessary to make them prevail.

CHAPTER X

MYTH AND ILLUSION

MAN has a "will to illusion," a mythologizing instinct bent upon shaping reality to his desires. He makes myths about his past, his present and his future. The beginnings of nations, of Athens, Thebes, Rome, Japan, are enveloped in myths which have been preserved by poets and historians for the gratification of national self-esteem. It is as a means of acting upon the present that myth must be regarded. The historical accuracy of a myth which deals with the past, or its reliability in detail when it deals with the future, is beside the mark. Its essential aim is to influence conduct.

The French Revolution was ushered in with a magnificent display of pictures of the coming world. Those ideals remain ideals, but the actual work of the Revolution would hardly have made much progress if men's

minds had not been fired by utopian visions. The myths that have gathered around the beginnings of America, the Federal Constitution and the Founding Fathers, serve likewise to preserve in Americans of to-day the consciousness of a high destiny.

The mythologizing instinct describes the events clustering about the American Revolution as proceeding on a lofty epic plane. The men of that epoch were sharply divided between heroic patriots and villainous Tories. The framers of the Constitution were actuated solely by principles of abstract justice, never by material interests. Their differences were differences of pure opinion. And as there must be a devil where there are gods, the Revolution produced its Benedict Arnold; the Constitution forming period, its Aaron Burr.

This epic treatment has been extended to the War of 1812, which a recent historian characterizes as insignificant, humiliating and futile. More Americans were killed on the morning of November 11, 1918, after the signing of the armistice, than in the whole of the War of 1812, but it has passed already into the heroic age, and the average educated American's knowledge of the truth concern-

ing it is as hazy as his knowledge of the causes of the Punic wars.

The mythologizing tendency is especially active about the personalities of those who took part in the national epos. And this hero-worship is as vigorous with regard to contemporaneous great men as towards the dead. The need of the crowd for leaders prompts it to idealize whatever leaders are given to it. All through the late World War was heard the cry for a hero. No sooner was a new commander named than the mythologizers stepped forward with their rhapsodies. The commander-in-chief, whoever he might be, had of necessity to be a super-man. The morale of the nation and of the army required it.

The discrepancies between popular fancy and reality at General Headquarters are disclosed in such books as Jean de Pierrefeu's *Plutarch Lied* and Philip Gibbs's *Now It Can Be Told*. Disaster after disaster is traceable to the illusion in the minds of the French general staff that great battles are fought according to plans worked out in detail by the master-mind at G. H. Q. This illusion played havoc with French and British alike. Time and again the master-mind

did not know what was happening, gave orders that could not be carried out, ordered assaults that the officers in the trenches knew were just stupid suicide. For these as well as many other disasters the world has to thank the pernicious legend of the little Italian adventurer, Napoleon Bonaparte: the French generals were determined to "play Napoleon."

How did Napoleon himself play Napoleon? His ambition at different periods in his career was to play Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne and Alexander. An inveterate actor, shoddy theatricalism is visible throughout his entire career. He had the construction of his legend constantly in mind. That was his sole occupation during his seven years on St. Helena. When he took the crown from the Pope's hand and placed it on his own head he was playing Charlemagne. He had read his Plutarch assiduously, but his Egyptian expedition has been called "the rashest attempt history records." His Russian campaign was one of the tragedies of history. Six hundred thousand invaded Russia; but a handful of survivors returned. Here as well as in the Egyptian campaign he displays a revolting

baseness. Yet the Napoleonic myth remains one of the marvels of the human mind. It persists in spite of the scorn poured upon it by writers of genius. The damage it has done is incalculable. Every unscrupulous plunger in politics, finance or safe-breaking is dubbed Napoleonic and at once elevated in the estimation of the multitude to an exempt category, which absolves him from responsibility for his crimes.

Cæsar as well as Napoleon understood the use of myth and legend in the making of his career. As a politician he knew perfectly the value of publicity, and as a soldier the weight of reputation. Ferrero gives a striking example of the latter in his description of the campaign leading up to the battle of Pharsalia, generally regarded as one of the most momentous in history. Cæsar and Pompey had manœvered opposite one another for six months, Cæsar trying to entice Pompey to battle and Pompey evading a decision. Time and again Pompey could have turned and crushed Cæsar but he was overawed by his adversary's prestige. When he did give battle, it was against his better judgment, surrendering to the impatience of his aristocratic entourage. The

battle of Pharsalia was an almost bloodless skirmish. Cæsar lost two hundred men and Pompey a few thousand. Even then, when the event had turned against him, Pompey could have retired in good order to his fortified camp and prolonged the contest indefinitely, but he lost his nerve and thought only of his personal safety. On the strength of this episode Cæsar was proclaimed the conqueror of his greatest military opponent and hence, so to speak, champion of the world.

The greatest hero-myths of the World War were those of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Hindenburg's is still vigorous, although the number of those who liken the paucity of ideas in his head with the sterility of his famous wooden statue is increasing. Ludendorff's legend crashed to earth with the surrender of Germany. Up till then he had enjoyed a prodigious prestige as a master-mind directing a battle line flung across the continent of Europe. His most spectacular victory, Tannenburg, Pierrefeu shows, was either an outright gamble or planned with definite knowledge of the enemy's intentions which had been betrayed by a traitor in the Russian high command. In either case, the fiction of a master-mind

moving men as on a chess-board with absolute certainty of aim and method is destroyed. It is this fiction, however, which the propagandists for war find indispensable to their purpose.

Politicians who, like militarists, are under the necessity of creating leaders understand the great assistance rendered them by myth and legend. The myth-making activity of politicians can be studied at first hand. It is always with us. The most umbrageous hero-myth we have had since the Civil War was that of Theodore Roosevelt. He was undoubtedly an extraordinary individual. That his unusual personality was not in itself the cause of his great popularity is shown by the history of his latter years. When he rose to truly impressive moral heights he spoke to deaf ears. He was out of touch, he confessed privately, with his fellow-citizens. What did give him his hold upon the American mind during the hey-day of his career? The answer is clearly indicated by writers of diverse points of view. Stuart P. Sherman characterized him as a typical American who possessed every important virtue that we admire. John Dewey wrote: "As he repeatedly

confessed, he 'stood' for justice, for right, for truth, against injustice, wrong and falsity. When he did not stand he fought." The American people, in other words, admired themselves in Roosevelt. It was necessary, however, to point out to the average American that here was his ideal. This need was cared for by Roosevelt himself, who was his own best publicity engineer. "He deeply divined," says Dewey, "the demand for publicity of an emphatic and commanding kind and he allowed no private modesty to stand in the way of furnishing it. When one has performed a resounding act it is stultifying not to allow it to resound." It was no doubt due to the fact that Roosevelt was a first-rate journalist that he was able to "come back" so often after his opponents were certain they had knocked him out.

The urge to build up his legend was always in Roosevelt's mind, and so far as was consistent with the temper of the time, he sought to add to it by means of picturesque adventure. He takes a great deal of space in his autobiography to prove that he did actually charge up San Juan Hill at the head of the Rough Riders. He was not

sure, indeed, that the hill was San Juan (a detail that had been disputed); he had not inquired about the name; but some hill there had been, and he had charged it. Admitting everything the letters and affidavits claim, it was such a deed as has been surpassed for daring by thousands of obscure nobodies in every war.

The contribution of the mytho-poetic process to the success of politicians is now pretty well understood. From the moment that a man is first mentioned for office to the time when his campaign is in full swing, and then again after election, his myth may be observed swelling. The average citizen is unaware of the transformation going on before his eyes. He is under the illusion that what looms up before him is a disclosure of something hitherto hidden rather than a new creation. The practical politician alone stands clear-eyed, outside the illusion which he exploits.

The statesman as hero has a powerful rival these days in the financier. P. T. Barnum has been called the father of publicity in America applied to money-making. He succeeded in making huge sums by persistently and ingeniously building up his

own myth, the Barnum myth. He once heard a small boy in Toronto ask his father excitedly: "Say, Pa, in which cage is Barnum?" This delighted the great showman, as indicating the prodigious growth of the legend he was cultivating. At another time a farmer was overheard saying to his wife when a young equestrian rode round the ring standing on his head: "I'll bet five dollars that's Barnum. There ain't another man in America who can do that but Barnum!" He boldly described himself in his autobiography (which was given free to every purchaser of a fifty-cent ticket to the show) as the Prince of Humbugs. All he asked of anyone was: "Mention my name!" Although he described in his book several of the frauds he had perpetrated (including the Woolly Horse and the Feejee Mermaid) he had the hearty backing of the clergy, who recommended both book and circus. The circus was always advertised as "Barnum's Great Moral Show," and on his programs he assured his patrons that he desired to elevate their morals and refine their tastes. "In fine, I aspire to make the world better for my having lived in it." Yet this great uplifter was the author of

the adage, "There is a sucker born every minute," and frankly let it be known that he would consider himself remiss in his moral obligations if he did not take advantage of nature's fecundity.

The mytho-poetic faculty so ably encouraged by Barnum has since his day been employed more and more confidently upon the hero as money-maker. The greatest legend of this type is at present that of Henry Ford. Every few days the newspapers announce a new industry which he is about to acquire and "revolutionize." Now it is railroads, now aeroplanes, now banking, now shipping. Muscle Shoals was offered to him at his own price on the assumption that whatever he undertook must prove a great success. "Ford—Miracle-maker" is the title of a serious magazine article by Professor John R. Commons. Henry Ford is really a plunger, a plunger in social psychology, writes the professor. "Instead of sharing profits with employees at the end of the year, he shares them before they are earned." Because he saw the profits that could be made from large-scale production of a cheap automobile, he is supposed to be the wisest of men. He has him-

self fallen under the spell of his legend. After acquiring the peace-ship, with which he proposed to cross over and stop the war, he gave the following interview to the newspaper men:

"Well, boys, I have got the ship!"

"What ship, Mr. Ford?"

"Why, the *Oscar II*."

"Well, what are you going to do with her?"

"We're going to stop the war."

"Going to stop the war?"

"Yes, we're going to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas."

"But how are you going to do it?"

"Oh, you'll see."

"Well, who is going with you?"

"I don't know."

"Where are you going?"

"I don't know."

"But what makes you think you can put it over?"

"Oh, we have had assurances."

When he reached the other side and discovered his mistake, he turned round and fled for home, leaving his guests to shift for themselves.

"Enter any of the great factories that

line the railroads between New York and Boston," wrote the *Nation*, "and you will find a dozen foremen just like Henry Ford, save that Fortune has poured no unending golden stream into their laps."

The operation of a malignant legend may be seen in the case of John D. Rockefeller. Ill-luck timed his rise to unprecedented fortune in the era of the muck-rakers. Standard Oil for a generation was synonymous with sinister influence. Standard Oil was the devil among the god-like corporations. Very, very slowly has J. D. Rockefeller's reputation been emerging from the cloud of obloquy. It is almost entirely clear to-day. The average man, if he thinks of this remarkable transformation at all, attributes it to the softening influence of time, but those who know give not a little of the credit to the extraordinary ability of Mr. Rockefeller's press-agent, Mr. Ivy Lee. In truth, however, the miraculous Ford has only his snooping profit-sharing system to match against the statesmanship shown in the employment of the Rockefeller millions for education and science.

The business man, the judge, the statesman, the physician borrows prestige from

the myth of his profession. "Every profession is a conspiracy against the laity." The professional legend is maintained by means of a distinctive ritual, manners and costume. Every member of a profession is supposed to have a typical style of thought, a typical appearance, typical manners. The young doctor wears a beard and speaks from his stomach. The young business man's trousers are always creased to a knife-edge; his collars and his hair-cut indicate the lightning go-getter. Clubs like Rotary and Kiwanis, and chambers of commerce participate in the business conspiracy which awes, besides the laity on the outside, clerks and subalterns on the inside, all of whom are taught to repeat solemn, hypnotic phrases like "service" and "efficiency," and to withdraw worshipfully before the sign "in conference."

That illusion is essential to life and has a survival value was recognized even by that ferocious destroyer of illusions Friedrich Nietzsche. Had he lived, says Hans Vaihinger, "he would not have revoked his Antichrist, whose incisive truths had, once for all, to be spoken, but he would have presented the obverse of evil things with the

same relentless frankness; he would have justified the utility and the necessity of religious fictions." A few of the most striking of Nietzsche's sentences in support of this assumption, which Vaihinger has collected are:

It is the major falsifications and interpretations that in the past have lifted us above mere animal happiness.

We need blindness sometimes and must allow certain articles of faith and errors to remain untouched within us—so long as they maintain us in life.

Why cannot we learn to look upon metaphysics and religion as the legitimate play of grown-ups?

Religious myths are first held as dogmas, "gospel truths"; they end by being clung to as poetic truth, or moral fictions. This was the history of the Greek mythology; the process has been repeated in the Christian theology. The controversy now raging between fundamentalists and modernists is but the age-long war between realists and fictionists flaring up at a new point. The realists (or fundamentalists) insist that myths are records of actual occurrences; the modernists protest that myth is myth, but

nevertheless priceless as poetic truth, necessary fiction, indispensable illusion.

The Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick, the most eminent protagonist of the modernist party, has put this view clearly and logically in *The Modern Use of the Bible*. Instead of "myth" and "fiction," however, he invents a term. The survival of the myth, in his terminology, is the retention of an "obsolete category." An obsolete category is a conception that has lost the meaning it once had, owing to change in historic conditions or the fading of systems of philosophy.

The conception of Jesus as the Son of God is derived from the Greek idea of Logos. To the Greek mind, Jesus was Logos, reason incarnate. Logos emanated from God. It was the link between God and man. Jesus, therefore, was the Son of God. The notion of Logos is an obsolete category. To the modern mind, the idea of Jesus literally the Son of God is difficult. There remains the poetic fiction of the perfect man, perfect example, perfect teacher who, of all created beings, is most like God. Such was Jesus, says the Modernist. One may use the ob-

solete category of the Son of God, not in the literal, but in the poetic sense. The Virgin Birth and other dogmas, impossible as fact, may be retained similarly as morally dynamic myths, precious because hallowed by time and echoing with the religious meditation of centuries.

The Fundamentalist position—the position of the Realist—although logically weak, is practically impregnable, for the reason that only the elect few can live with myth as such. The masses demand reality. They insist that myth be called “history.” The mind of the majority has not the elasticity requisite for working with poetic truth. It knows only “truth” and “falsehood.” To the Realist it is mere hypocrisy for men who are themselves without faith to support religious institutions; or for Jews and Baptists to contribute to the building fund of an Episcopal Cathedral.

The impossibility of complete disillusionment from religious myth is seen in the ideas of moral philosophy and ethical culture. Professor E. A. Ross has pointed out that concepts like Duty, Conscience, Categorical Imperative, Moral Law, etc., are but “torsos of deity, ghosts of the Presence that gave

the Law from Sinai." Kant recommends that each one act under a self-imposed illusion, as if his action were to become a general law of society. The chances of one's action becoming a general law of society are practically nil, but the benefit to society of each one's adopting Kant's maxim is indisputable.

Among other illusions that are extremely useful to morals and moralists, is the most common one of exaggerated consequence, which is closely related to the religious myth of retribution in one or another hell. This is clearly a regulative device to keep man moral. With the dissolution of religious myths, the moralists set to work mythologizing physical laws. Sin was interpreted as a "violation" of natural law, retribution—the natural effect of such violations. Good actions are followed by health, wealth, and happiness; bad actions—by disease, poverty and death.

The devious but unrelenting course of nemesis is the theme of all popular melodrama as well as of the tragic poets. In George Eliot's *Romola* we are asked to believe that Tito's single disavowal of his foster-father set in train all the dire calam-

ities that followed one another until his destruction was complete. Having told one lie, he must tell another to back it up. Having slipped up in one instance, he must continue without power to stop on the downward road. This inexorable linking in the chain of consequences has been universally admired. It is what has made George Eliot's masterpiece a powerful means of edification. She supplied a satisfactory substitute for hell.

The same theme has been employed in Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter*, in the novels of W. D. Howells, in Edith Wharton's *Ethan Frome*, in O'Neill's *Desire under the Elms*, in innumerable "movies." Human nature has been trained to demand poetic justice, even though criminal statistics show that a considerable percentage of robbers and murderers escape, and very often the possessor of ill-gotten millions lives to distribute them in his old age to hospitals, art-galleries and universities.

Professor E. A. Ross names the idea of solidarity, so forcibly stated by Paul, as another moralistic illusion though of great practical value.

For the body is not one member, but many.

The eye cannot say unto the hand, "I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, "I have no need of you."

And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it."

It is obvious that one may injure society and get profit out of all proportion to the reflex harm he suffers. The exchange may be highly in favor of the swindler. Hans Vaihinger mentions the belief in the freedom of the will as a moralistic fiction without which legal and moral control would be impossible. No one could be held responsible for his action, if we did not assume that his will was free. The alternative assumption, that behavior is only the effect of physical causes, would make society impossible. All action would lose its moral significance: and this, in spite of the accumulation of evidence for the potency of heredity, environment, education, defective metabolism, or gland-functioning in determining behavior.

The rapidly growing literature of myth deflation is evidence of the recognition of

the great part that myth, legend, illusion and fiction play in the social life of man. The deflational activity has been especially evident in biography, following Lytton Strachey's brilliant performance with *Eminent Victorians* and *Queen Victoria*. In the former work Strachey takes down revered British idols, like Cardinal Newman, Florence Nightingale, General Gordon, examines them carefully for mythological elements, takes them to pieces and reconstructs them according to a realistic formula. The results are startling. The Victorians, including the Queen, emerge different, yet not unworthy of respect and admiration. They have lost something, certain moral attributes that in the popular conception no great personage can be without.

The books we have been getting about the real George Washington, the true Benjamin Franklin, the real Abraham Lincoln, the *Ordeal of Mark Twain*, the so-called psychoanalytical studies in biography, are in the same line. A monthly magazine devotes a great part of its space to the work of deflating and "debunking."

Much historical writing consists in deflat-

ing the myths built up by previous historians. Ferrero's *History of Rome* is a well-known example. His refreshingly unconventional manner of treating the politics of Rome, caught the fancy of Theodore Roosevelt, whose boisterous commendation made the book almost a best-seller in America. Under Mommsen's treatment Julius Cæsar had loomed up a truly colossal figure, endowed with superhuman energy, astuteness, breadth of view, generosity, patriotism. Ferrero brings him down to earth—an extraordinary man, but an unscrupulous politician, sensual, reckless, a gambler with fate.

Reform movements naturally become deflating or "debunking" campaigns in an effort to disillusionize the masses. "Debunking" is the sport of satirists. Deflation of one myth is, however, inevitably followed by the growth of a new one. The Bolshevik myth is as difficult to destroy as was the Czarist myth which it replaced. Social and political movements make no progress without the employment of myths that stir the imagination of men. The fiction of the *Social Contract* at the close of the eighteenth century, as expounded by Rousseau,

was one such myth. It was needed in order to explode the monarchical myth. The fiction of the Economic Man, whose sole motive is to buy cheap and sell dear, was valuable to economists in rationalizing the capitalistic system. We have noted in another chapter the appraisal by French radicals of the General Strike as a "vital myth," regardless of the impossibility of its realization, purely as a device for inspiring the working classes with revolutionary ardor.

Extreme radicals, while attacking the "economic system," have until recently respected the financial operator's technique. They have denounced his motives, while revering his genius. In the community as a whole the business priesthood has acquired the supreme prestige. Evidence that this sacred caste is not invulnerable has begun to appear. Sinclair Lewis's *Babbitt* and William Woodward's *Bunk and Lottery* have dealt it a few effective blows. Stripped of mythology it is seen that the man who collects the millions has indeed ability—ability to keep his eyes unfalteringly upon the thing he intends to get, the ability to keep his attention from being diverted to irrelevant interests. He is said

to be "a good judge of men"; that is, he knows who will serve his purpose and who will not or cannot.

Those who profit most from the mythologizing instinct of man are not the believers but the cynics. The Republican orator who rounds out his speech with a quotation from Lincoln knows as little of Lincoln's principles as the Democratic orator who apostrophizes the shade of Jefferson believes in his, or the ecclesiastic who sprinkles a sermon with sonorous gospel-phrases believes in imitating Jesus.

Public performers, musicians, conductors of orchestras, singers, actors, lecturers derive invaluable support from their mythical personalities, the work of skillful press-agents. It takes time and money to build up a strong artist-myth. When Caruso made his *début* in New York on December 1, 1903, he was thirty years old, a mature age for a singer. His biographer, P. V. R. Key, painstakingly reports the character of his singing on that occasion, the nature of his reception and the newspaper criticisms. He sums up the press notices with the remark: "Nothing in these reviews to indicate that the critics had been swept off their

feet, surely little hint that this new tenor was soon to become the tenor of his time." Caruso duly became the tenor of his time. No other tenor finally was allowed in the same class with him. The operatic masses demanded not a good, or very good tenor, but a mythical super-tenor. The bust of the singer with the face and neck of a Roman emperor, which stands in the lobby of the Metropolitan Opera House, is of the mythical Caruso.

When Jenny Lind sang, after Barnum had spent a fortune to prepare the way for her, the *New York Herald* spoke of the performance as "melting into the song of the seraphim," until it was "lost in eternity." After she had left Barnum and was singing under her own management, the same paper wrote: "She has been principally engaged in singing pieces of operas and catches of all kinds, which were considerably more of the claptrap style than in accordance with the rigid rules of classical music." Upon her departure from America the *Herald* wrote: "There has been very little of the classic or pure artistic in her concerts; and she has been applauded not as an artist but as a clever vocalist."

The Mark Twain legend had grown to such dimensions in his lifetime that, when he appeared on a lecture platform, the audience laughed before he began to speak. The same thing happens to all celebrated comedians. The performer's myth reacts upon himself to spur him on to exertions of which, in a neutral atmosphere, he would have been incapable.

“Art itself is the conscious creation of an æsthetic illusion.” The drama, for example, aims to create as nearly as possible, the illusion of an actual occurrence. The illusion is complete only in such rare cases as that of the yokel in the audience who leaps across the footlights to rescue the heroine from abuse. For most persons, the pleasure felt at a dramatic performance arises from the very incompleteness of the illusion. The spectator, while transported in imagination to the fictive scene and identifying himself with one or another character, is yet able to be himself, to judge and comment inwardly and muse amidst his own past. The appeal of the plastic arts, of painting and sculpture, is also through the illusion of reality, a reality filtered through the temperament of the artist.

The aim of the artist is to excite in others the same perception and emotion that he has had. He paints a ragged beggar in order that a millionaire may feel the thrill of the contrast between comfort and want. Art does not necessarily raise up the beholder—it may also subtly degrade him—except in so far as the psychic energy put forth by the artist is stimulating.

The influence of literature and painting upon manners is indisputable. The so-called prudery of the Victorian novelists set the fashion in love-making among the respectable middle classes. In the epistolary disclosures at divorce trials may be seen the rhetorical eroticism of popular third-rate novelists. Conversational style, to say nothing of the senseless “gags” that live for a season and die away, is set by the novelists and perhaps to a greater extent by vaudeville “artists.” The argument that the relation of art to reality is the other way about, that realism in art is a transcript, or a photographic reproduction of life, is untenable. The artist is compelled to select what he will represent, and his selection is controlled by a theory or a temperament. It is through his theory or temperament that

he sways his public. He makes use of such material as suits his purpose. The profanity in recent plays has been defended on the ground that it reproduces reality; but the authors themselves have urged in self-defence that the authentic obscenity of real life is unpresentable on a stage; that the audience would walk out, if it were attempted. The authors permitted themselves only a carefully edited profanity, just sufficient to create the illusion of brutality. The effect upon some listeners is probably to relax somewhat their habitual reserve. Why be so everlastingly repressed when out there, where men are men, speech takes such and such form?

In every generation may be seen a group of artists who proclaim their freedom from the illusions of their predecessors. Back to life and reality is a recurrent slogan in the history of art. In fact, there occurs only an exchange of one set of illusions for another. The myth of realism provides a technique for arousing a more piquant thrill. Nudity is not immoral but is a trifle disturbing after an era or two of clothes. When art has become over-refined, coarseness becomes interesting, but absolute realism in art is

as much an illusion as the dreams of confessed romancers.

Hans Vaihinger has shown how science itself makes use of admitted fictions for the purpose of forwarding thought and investigation. He names among these the fiction underlying the differential calculus, the notion that a circle is a polygon with an infinite number of sides, that space is a real container, that time is discontinuous, coming in spurts of eons, hours or seconds. He includes the ether and the atom. As to some of these conceptions, especially the ether and the atom, there is a difference of opinion among scientists, some regarding them as hypotheses that may in time be demonstrated completely like the hypothesis of the influence of the moon on the tides. Others hold that ether and atoms are, as Vaihinger says, helpful fictions incapable of proof, although indispensable for the advance of science.

This conception of Vaihinger's, developed in detail in his remarkable book entitled *Die Philosophie des 'Als Ob'* (The Philosophy of 'As If') is closely related to the Pragmatism of William James, John Dewey and F. C. S. Schiller. Vaihinger, however,

derived his leading ideas from Kant and Nietzsche. He holds with the pragmatists that thought is not a copy of reality, but a means of dealing with reality. The meeting of the two currents, thought and events, at predetermined points is proof of the truth of thought, but that is the extent of the "correspondence" of thoughts and events. Thought is an art and has a technique of its own. It uses myth and fiction as tools. "At the beginning of all intellectual activity," says Nietzsche, "we encounter the grossest assumptions and inventions; for instance, identity, thing, permanence—these are all coeval with the intellect and the intellect has modelled its conduct upon them."

Illusion is not a sign of sickness but of health. The question is not one of illusion or no illusion, but of what illusion. Some illusions are useless or mischievous, others are necessary to life and thought. The sick man has the fewest illusions, being engrossed with his own symptoms under the one overpowering illusion that these constitute the ultimate reality. In him whose spirit is exuberant, illusions flourish. The realist does not escape illusions but rises oc-

casionally to a height from which he can see them for what they are, and this talent enables him to control the masses of mankind, steeped in their illusions.

CHAPTER XI

PSYCHOTHERAPY

IN early civilizations and among savages the practice of healing was in the hands of the same caste that had charge of religious ceremonial. Until recently the notion prevailed that the methods of those priest-doctors were mere mumbo-jumbo. What effect could an incantation, a dose of some disgusting brew, or meaningless motions of the hands have upon a germ-laden body? The fact is that the particular drug, chant or gesture did not matter. Suggestion, in the use of which the primitive healer was no fool, did the work.

The Assyrians had elaborate religious rites for healing the sick. The procedure for curing a sufferer from rheumatism has been deciphered as follows: "Surround the patient with a circle of leavened meal, place his foot upon a reed bearing dough, then put away the refuse-food. Take him seven times across the surrounding circle

saying, "Ea hath loosed, free the evil; Ea hath created, still the wrath; undo the knots of evil, for Ea is with thee! O physician of the world! O Ninnisin! Thou art the gracious mother of the underworld, the mistress of E-dubbo," and so on.

From ancient Assyria to Elizabethan England is a long step in time, but there is a distinct resemblance between their styles of incantation. The Englishman recited: "When Christ saw the cross he trembled and shaked and they said to him, Hast thou the ague? And he said unto them, 'I have neither ague nor fever; and whosoever bears these words either in writing or in mind, shall never be troubled with ague or fever.' So help thy servants, O Lord, who put their trust in thee." To stop a hemorrhage the Elizabethan recited: "So may it please the Son of God. So his mother Mary. In the name of the Father, stop, O blood! In the name of the Holy Ghost, stop, O blood! In the name of the Holy Trinity." For toothache he repeated lines like these:

Christ passed by his brother's door,
Saw his brother lying upon the floor,
What aileth thee, brother?

Pain in the teeth?

Thy teeth shall pain thee no more,

In the name of the Father, Son and the Holy
Ghost.

The theoretical separation of religion from medicine has not been altogether a triumph of progress. Their reunion does not mean a confusion of knowledge with faith. The two are distinct, but in healing the sick they coöperate. The oldest school of professed medicine, that of Æsculapius, operated almost entirely through the mind. The health resorts of the Æsculapians were both medical and religious in character. They contained temples and gymnasia. The course of treatment was arranged with a keen insight into the methods of suggestion. At Epidaurus dramatic entertainments and games were arranged in a theater seating twenty thousand, and a stadium with a capacity for twelve thousand. According to Caton, spots of great natural beauty were chosen as health resorts. "The vivifying air, the well cultivated gardens surrounding the shrine, the magnificent view, all tended to cheer the heart with new hope of cure." Access to the shrine was forbidden to the unclean, the impure and the mortally

afflicted. No dead body could rest within the holy precincts. The suppliants for aid had to undergo careful purification, to bathe in sea, river or spring and fast for a prescribed time. This lengthy and exhausting preparation partly dietetic, partly suggestive, was accompanied by a solemn service of prayer and sacrifice, whose symbolism tended highly to excite the imagination. After offering sacrifices the suppliants lay on pallets in the temple, and the god sent to those who were fortunate dreams assuring them of their restoration to health. A large number of votive tablets expressing gratitude for cures have been deciphered at Epidaurus. Diseases of the joints, affections of women, wounds, baldness, gout, are the most common. The cult lasted a thousand years. Sleeping in a temple or church, pedantically called "incubation," is still found in Greece and Italy and is not unknown in England. Those who are fortunate enough to have the local saint appear to them in a dream are assured of a cure.

At Lourdes, the miracle of healing through religious faith still grows. Fear of conceding too much to superstition has

caused many a critic to deny the incontestable. Whatever be the interpretation, the fact is beyond question, that many are cured at Lourdes of diseases given up by regular physicians as hopeless. It does not matter whether the vision of Mary, "Our Lady of Lourdes," which a fourteen year old girl saw, was Mary herself or only an hallucination. The neighbors believed it was genuine, and their faith spread to the Church which formally sanctioned the erection of the chapel at the grotto of Lourdes, organized the ceremonial of the healing rite and lent the weight of its great authority to the belief in the original miracle—the appearance of the Virgin and the creation of the spring of healing.

Charcot thought there was no better medicine than Lourdes, for those who had the faith. He sent annually fifty to sixty patients from the Salpêtrière hospital. Bernheim said of Lourdes: "All these observations down yonder have been made by honorable men, and they have collected and tested them in the most complete sincerity. The facts are right enough, it is only the explanation that is at fault." Like Pharaoh's magicians these celebrated neurologists ad-

mit the facts but affirm they can duplicate them by their own methods, viz., by suggestion as practiced in their hospitals. The churchmen insist "it is the finger of God." But the cures at Lourdes are plainly beyond anything performed by the school of hypnotic suggestion. The diseases cured are by no means only those classed as nervous and functional. Cases of suppurating ulcers, pulmonary and spinal tuberculosis healing rapidly in a few days are recorded. The records of cases at Lourdes are kept by a scientifically organized office under the control of physicians. The widest opportunity is given to visiting physicians regardless of nationality or religion for examination of patients and records. Such examinations have been made by many who came in a skeptical frame of mind but who went away convinced.

Cures similar to those at Lourdes have been performed at the church of St. Anne of Beaupré in Quebec and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. It is undoubtedly true that reputed relics like the Holy Coat of Treves, the Winding-Sheet of Christ at Besançon and the Santa Scala at Rome have proved good medicine. The

therapeutic principle is in the mind of the believer, to whom the spot supposed to have been pressed by the foot of a saint, a shred of his garment, a piece of bone, anything he touched and the words he spoke have medicinal virtue.

The performances of modern healers are sufficiently striking to make one pause before dismissing the cures imputed to saints like Philip Neri, Francis Xavier, Francis of Assisi, Bernard, Catherine of Siena, Teresa, Joan of Arc as frauds or illusions. An endless succession of healers basing their activity upon the words of the gospel: "They shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover," have come and gone.

The sensational career of James Alexander Dowie at Chicago is particularly instructive. While a Presbyterian minister in New Zealand he cured his wife of a headache, to his own surprise, by "laying on of hands." He studied the New Treatment more intensively, read everything bearing on psychotherapy, became a member of the Fraternity of Divine Healers, and later the president of the International Organization of Divine Healers. He came to America, where he found congenial soil for his pro-

jects. He abandoned the Divine Healers who had supplied him with funds to carry on his work and organized not only a church but a city of his own. The church was the Christian Catholic Church, of which he was the "General Overseer," later, "Prophet" and finally "First Apostle." The city was Zion City, about forty miles from Chicago. During the Chicago World's Fair in 1893 his little wooden hut near the exposition was visited by more than a thousand persons a week. Paralytics were borne in on litters and many took up their beds and walked. By the end of 1893 believers in his powers were scattered throughout the world, and contributions, literally tithes, were coming even from China. Back of his pulpit at Zion City, Dowie built decorations of crutches and braces "snatched from the devil." He had a robed choir of several hundreds and invested everything he did with pomp and ceremony.

No doubt the success of his healing efforts was as much a mystery to Dowie as to everybody else. A cool and impartial journalist wrote: "He is unquestionably sincere, although he uses all the methods of the charlatan." His theology remained practically

the ordinary doctrines of Christianity as taught by Scotch-Presbyterians. An admiring disciple had suggested that he might be Elijah reincarnated. He laughed at the idea, but the suggestion stuck and later he allowed himself to be referred to as "Elijah the Restorer."

In this remarkable demonstration of psychotherapy we note first the personality of Dowie. His appearance was striking. "At the head of an army or as a celebrated surgeon his figure, though of medium stature, would be imposing. His voice is clear and strong; his eye penetrating; his countenance, naturally stern, frequently lights up with smiles; the fountain of his tears overflows readily." His physical endurance was as extraordinary as his mental activity. Besides building up a huge clientele in many parts of the world, he managed the affairs of a small city, of which he was the absolute autocrat. Next, Dowie worked on prepared soil. The belief in the possibility of healing by faith and prayer is embedded more or less deeply in the minds of all who have been brought up in the Christian tradition. Dowie capitalized this subconscious attachment, for which few can give

rational grounds. Dowie's career, too, exemplified the truth of the observation, that "Nothing is so credulous as misery." Those who came to him to be healed wished with all their strength that everything reported concerning him might be true. They were willing to believe despite all reasoning to the contrary. Finally, Dowie used the tremendous suggestive reinforcement of attending crowds, of ritual and ceremonial. We shall see these same elements in the practice of other healers. Here we have a buoyant, affirmative personality making suggestions which are reinforced by an intensely emotional audience determined to witness a miracle.

In the notorious Royal Touch which the sovereigns of England and France exercised for centuries we find under very different external surroundings and trappings the same psychological principles employed. Here, too, the vague association of the operator (the king) with religion, his awe-inspiring personality, the crowds of spectators and the hypnotic ceremonial produced effects that seem to-day impossible. However, as Lecky testifies, "the genuineness of the King's touch was asserted by the

Privy Council, by the bishops of two religions, by the general voice of the clergy in the palmiest days of the English Church, by the university of Oxford, and by the enthusiastic assent of the people. It survived the ages of the Reformation, of Bacon, of Milton and of Hobbes. It was by no means extinct at the age of Locke, and would probably have lasted longer had not the change of dynasty at the Revolution assisted the tardy skepticism."

Note the elaborate enginery of suggestion, described by Macaulay. The days on which the miracle was to be performed were fixed at sittings of the Privy Council, and the clergy of all the parish churches were solemnly notified. In this way great expectations were aroused. "When the appointed time came, several divines stood around the canopy of state. The surgeon of the royal household introduced the sick. A passage of Mark 16 was read. When the words 'They shall lay their hands on the sick and they shall recover' had been pronounced there was a pause, and one of the sick was brought to the king. His majesty stroked the ulcers and swellings and hung round the patient's neck a white ribbon to

which was fastened a gold coin. The other sufferers were led up in succession, and, as each was touched, the chaplain repeated the incantation, 'They shall lay their hands on the sick and they shall recover.' Then came the epistle, prayers, antiphonies and a benediction." The patients went home bearing the ribbon and coin as blessed amulets. A more powerful system of suggestive therapeutics could hardly be devised. Nothing is omitted—the great hope aroused in advance, the contact with the divinely-royal hands, the thrilling ceremonial, the great throngs partaking of the blessing, and the amulet to be carried about as an aid to repeated auto-suggestion.

In the reign of Charles II a record was kept of the number touched, month by month. In 1682 he touched eight thousand five hundred. In 1684 the crowd was so great that six or seven of the sick were trampled to death. The total number touched in this reign was ninety-two thousand one hundred and six. Some of the English kings, William III, for example, being skeptical of their healing ability were told by the managers of the show, the government, that their opinions had nothing to do

with the business. It would be unfair to large numbers of sick people, they insisted, to stop the performances. The personal belief of the king was nothing to those in need of healing. His actual personality did not matter. He ruled by a mystic arrangement with divinity. What did matter was the popular conception of him.

In Christian Science the religious therapy of the gospels is combined with fragments of scientific knowledge relating to hypnotism, suggestion, telepathy, and psychoanalysis. The rapid spread of this cult has exceeded that of any other mental healing movement in modern times. To those not in the Christian Science Church the metaphysics of the founder may seem crude and her book intolerably dull. The therapeutic claims of the Church, however, have become impressive, backed up by marble temples over the length and breadth of the land and by a growing membership of men who in their material success give the strongest proof of their hard-headedness.

The Church started as a close association of disciples whom Mrs. Eddy charged one hundred dollars for a course of instructions.

The fee was later raised, with the approval of God, as she reported, to three hundred dollars. The first organization met at Lynn, near Salem, later at Boston. Mrs. Eddy then wrote her book which both she and her followers treat as another inspired gospel. A very shrewdly conceived regulation of the Church which has served to keep it free from heresies is that there shall be no preachers but only "readers" at the church services. Only two books are read, the Bible and Mrs. Eddy's *Science and Health*.

Phineas P. Quimby is now admitted to have supplied Mrs. Eddy with her basic idea. There is a striking similarity between Quimby's statement of his method and the method of psychoanalysis. "I tell the patient his troubles and what he thinks is his disease; and my explanation is the cure. If I succeed in correcting his errors, I change the fluids of the system and establish the truth, or health. The truth is the cure." Mrs. Eddy grasped this conception firmly. "Destroy the patient's belief in his physical condition," she writes. "Mentally contradict every complaint of the body." "Destroy fear, and you end the fever."

In those days, when Quimby was formu-

lating his ideas, in the forties and fifties, itinerant magnetizers swarmed over the land. The therapeutics of Christian Science can be traced directly to mesmerism. In the practice of healing under religious auspices, however, can be seen the reunion of ancient mates, medicine and religion. Prayer had fallen into disrepute. Christian Science restored it as the binding practice between faith and healing. Christian Science met the demand for physical comfort, health and material well-being. Its success, however, has not been due to this service so much as to the amazing shrewdness of its propaganda technique. Its free reading rooms and its daily newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* (for which many who are not Scientists are glad to pay five cents) are not the least noteworthy.

The emotional state aroused by religion, superstition, or by plain terror, horror or disgust, may be made to produce powerful reactions upon the physical system. The mysterious, the weird, the horrible sets the nerves quivering and widens communication between the mind and the body. Hence when the witch-doctor, or any all-wise old woman, sends a patient out alone at un-

earthly hours, during unusual conjunctions of the moon and planets, on St. John's or St. Agnes' Eve, to a graveyard, to the scene of an execution, to touch a corpse or a skull, something is bound to happen. In 1856 it was usual for numbers of invalids in certain parts of England, to congregate around the gallows in order to receive the "death stroke," the touch of an executed criminal's hand. At the execution of Crowley, a murderer of Warwick in 1848, "at least five thousand persons of the lowest of the low were mustered, to witness the dying moments of the unhappy culprit. As usual in such cases (to their shame be it spoken) a number of females were present and scarcely had the soul of the deceased taken its farewell flight from its earthly tabernacle than the scaffold was crowded with members of the gentler sex afflicted with wens in the neck, with white swellings in the knees, upon whose afflictions the cold, clammy hand of the sufferer was passed to and fro for the benefit of the executioner."

The Romans drank the blood of gladiators for epilepsy. Analogous to touching the hand of an executed criminal must be reckoned taking a cat along to bed (a New

England remedy for rheumatism) or wearing a snake-skin around the neck. The bitter doses that used to be given by old-fashioned doctors, compounds from the excreta of goats, cats, dogs, mice, fleas, and other animals, worked on the same principle.

These things are often done on authority. Eminent men lead the way. The celebrated chemist, Robert Boyle, in an essay "On the Porousness of Animal Bodies," tells how some moss off a dead man's skull sent for a present from Ireland where it is far less rare than in most other countries, stopped his nosebleed, "though it did but touch my skin till the herb was a little warmed." Sir Thomas Browne wrote, "For warts we rub our hands before the moon and commit any maculated part to the touch of the dead."

Sir Kenelm Digby persuaded the royal household that he could cure wounds by merely dipping the garter of a wounded man in a solution of a sympathetic powder, which was nothing but powdered blue vitriol, "brought by a friar from the East." Bishop Berkeley attracted much attention with tar-water, which he urged was a cure

for pleurisy, indigestion, dropsy, hypochondria, gout, fevers, sore-teeth and gums, and particularly to be recommended to sailors, ladies, and men of studious and sedentary habits. Charlatans have, it is well known, found gold mines in this field of human gullibility, but Digby, Boyle and Berkeley, were purely philanthropic.

The rise of the physical sciences acted upon the imagination of half-informed people—that is of nearly everybody—very much like primitive magic. Every great scientific discovery has been followed by a swarm of cures. The most elaborately exploited of all has been electricity. Mesmerism, a real psychic force, derived all its early prestige from its supposed identity with “animal magnetism,” a fluid which streamed from healer to patient. Mesmer, however, had a keen intuition into the real nature of his work. He managed his patients’ surroundings with a subtle knowledge of the technique of suggestion. An uncanny silence reigned throughout his house, except for the soft music played or sung by invisible performers. “Richly stained glass shed a dim religious light on his spacious salons which were almost covered with

mirrors. Orange blossoms scented the air of his corridors; incense of the most expensive kinds burned in antique vases on his chimney pieces."

Most significant of all, Mesmer treated his patients in groups, seating them in a ring round a circular oaken case, a foot high, which contained powdered glass, iron filings and bottles symmetrically arranged. The patients held hands and were also joined to each other by cords passed around their bodies. All this was in accordance with popular ideas of an electrical experiment. In the early stages of mesmerism there were violent physiological effects, sometimes ending in convulsions. But it appeared subsequently that these effects happened because they were expected. When invalids grasped the idea that convulsions were not on the program they ceased to have them.

Mesmerism, as everyone now knows, was hypnotism, and hypnotism is produced by the reiterated suggestion, under proper surroundings, of sleep. Drowsiness, more or less profound, follows such suggestions, and in this condition the subject is peculiarly susceptible to further suggestions from the hypnotist. Memories, which in the normal

state the subject had forgotten, may return. The body may become rigid as in catalepsy. Certain functions such as the heart-beat, the circulation at particular points, and the secretions of glands may be accelerated or slowed down. Parts of the body may be made anæsthetic. The mental life lies at the mercy of suggestions from the hypnotist. The fears that were expressed at the time when scientific hypnotism became generally known, that a widespread control of minds by designing persons even for criminal purposes might follow, have proved unfounded. It seems probable that nobody can be hypnotized against his will. There is indeed a tendency to "mental dissociation," which renders everybody hypnotizable to some degree, but complete self-possession is a protection against any hypnotist.

The idea that a magnetic fluid issues from the hypnotist has been abandoned. The theory of hypnotism has, however, swung back toward the view held by Mesmer, that the operation is essentially dependent upon the personality of the hypnotist. There is always an emotional element involved.

The patient has to feel an interest in the physician of fear or confidence.

Freud was induced to abandon hypnotism because only one third of his patients could be hypnotized. The psychoanalytic method has the advantage of being applicable to all persons. In hypnotism the patient is put into an artificial sleep. In psychoanalysis there is no sleep but thorough-going confession. The patient is urged to tell whatever comes to his mind. The physician by skillful questioning, guided by certain scientific principles governing "free association," delves into the hidden sources of the patient's psychic disturbance. According to psychoanalytic theory, this is always a suppressed complex, a buried idea highly charged with painful emotion. The idea is painful for moral reasons. It has been forgotten by the conscious self on purpose. It lives on, however, below the surface in the subconsciousness. The neuroses and psychoses that follow are the results of the struggle on the part of the consciousness to keep the disagreeable memory down, out of sight.

According to Freud, "transference" is es-

sential to a cure. Transference is a technical term for the shunting of the thwarted "libido" to the person of the physician. It is, according to one psychoanalytic writer, "a feeling of acknowledged sympathy from the patient to the physician, the same as occurs in all lines of medical treatment when the patient has confidence in his physician." In other words, the patient being abnormally attached to his suppressed idea, is enticed into an attachment to the physician, whence he can be again detached by "sublimation" or a change in the nature of his interest.

It is not true that the patient cures himself automatically by merely perceiving, under the questioning of the psychoanalyst, the true nature of his subconscious obsession. His own insight would not be sufficient for a cure. The deciding factor is his personal relation to the physician. This is Freud's own view. The patient's active part consists in clothing the physician with authority and accepting his statements with absolute faith. Without such submission the advice of the physician would not be listened to for a moment.

The resemblance between the method of

psychoanalysis and the practice of auricular confession in the Catholic Church must occur to everyone. The two methods are much alike in technique and it is fair to conclude that the rationale of their operation is the same. The confessor too asks the penitent to tell everything. It is true the confessional is intended for the treatment of moral lapses and not of physical disorders, but the truly remarkable feature in psychoanalytic theory is the coalescence of physiological disorder with moral shock. "Censor" in psychoanalysis coincides with "Conscience." "Complexes" are suppressed for moral reasons—because the social ego in the person cannot tolerate their existence. Here is the line where sinfulness and hysteria merge. The method of the psychoanalyst is to elude the censor by lifting the weight of responsibility from the sick man's shoulders. The troublesome complex is dissolved, first by recognizing it for what it is—an unfortunate incident in the patient's past that need play no part in his current life; secondly, by "transferring" the interest, the "libido" of the patient, from the disagreeable or forbidden person or object to the person of the physi-

cian; and, thirdly, by "sublimation" of this last bond, thus setting the troubled soul free. In sacramental confession, the soul similarly unburdens itself to a sympathetic listener. In this case the confessor has behind him the authority of the Church. The psychoanalyst has the prestige of medical science. The condemnation of the censor is evaded, the responsibility, or sin, is removed from the sinner by transference, through the mediation of the priest, to the Savior of the world in whose capacity for bearing the burden of the world's sin the penitent has been persuaded to believe. Without this belief he cannot be saved. And if the patient seeking the aid of a physician have not an analogous faith in the power of psychoanalysis and its practitioner he too cannot be saved.

The moral requirements for a good psychoanalyst are the same as for a good confessor. If sacramental confession has fallen short of its ideal end, it has been because perfect success would require angels to officiate as priests. Can more be hoped from psychoanalysis? "What should be the attitude of the psychoanalyst to the patient?" asks a psychoanalytic catechism. *Answer:*

“The psychoanalyst must have as clean a mind as the surgeon has clean hands.” Q.

“What should be the mental attitude of the person during a psychoanalysis?” A.

“Absolute frankness and sincerity, concealing nothing from the physician.”

Confession, according to Henry Lea, has not improved morality, judging from a comparison of the statistics of crime in Catholic and Protestant countries. Although Catholic Ireland has the smallest percentage of illegitimate births, Catholic Austria far exceeds Protestant England and Wales. Catholic Italy is way ahead of all other European countries in the number of homicides. But the tendency to suicide is less where the confessional prevails. This is significant. Lea puts the responsibility for both crime and suicide upon race. The Germans, he thinks, have a suicidal tendency; but he does not say why.

The sacrament of confession, at any rate, says Lea, “has succeeded in establishing the domination of the priest over the consciences of the faithful in a manner which no other institution could effect and which has no parallel in human history. The Hindu Brahmin, the Buddhist Lama, the Parsee

dustoor, the Tartar shaman, the Roman flamen, the Mosaic Levite, the Talmudic rabbi, the Mahometan alfaqui have all sought in their several ways to secure what control they could over the souls of their believers, but in no other faith has there been devised a plan under which a spiritual director could render himself the absolute autocrat over every act, whether of external or internal life, of the beings subjected to his dictation."

It seems probable that all forms of psychotherapy are dependent upon suggestion administered by persons of prestige or authority. Coué has been insisting that he cures nobody, but that each one cures himself. It is significant that he takes his patients in groups and gets his best results with a large audience looking on and applauding. To say that the patient must believe in himself, in his own power to overcome disease, is to ask the ego to lift itself by its own boot-straps. The patient is sick because he has not this belief in himself. He would not be sick if he had. Whether the cure is performed by a religious healer, by psychoanalysis, by auto-suggestion or by

a regular doctor of medicine the action of another personality appears to be essential.

We have the word of a great physician, Dr. Osler, that a large part of all cures is due to faith, "which buoys up the spirits, sets the blood flowing more freely and the nerves doing their part unhindered." "Despondency will often sink the stoutest constitution almost to death's door; faith will enable a bread pill or a spoonful of clear water to do almost miracles of healing." He works the most cures in whom the most have faith; so that a medicine prescribed by a renowned healer performs wonders but the same mixture given by a man of slight repute is useless. The doctor's very title inspires confidence. "Faith in the doctor and his drugs is the basis of the entire profession of medicine," wrote Osler.

The treatment of the body as a mechanical and chemical engine, complete in itself, is by no means the last word of science. It is not even new. The underlying materialistic illusion seems to have been prevalent at the time when science began. "Let no one persuade you to cure the head until he has first given you his soul to be cured," wrote

Plato. "For this is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body."

A mysterious rapport between thought and health has always been suspected. Among primitive folk the mediation of spirits, sometimes under the control of privileged individuals, is assumed. In spite of the spread of scientific knowledge, simple folks have continued to tell stories of the evil-eye, of cures by enchantment, by amulets, by all sorts of weird and foolish practices. Witchcraft, voodooism, dancing manias have sprung from the belief that the mind of one can control the mind and the health of another. Did people actually fall sick and die under the malign influence of witches? The conclusion now seems inevitable that they did but that the primitive explanation of the event was false. It is certain that not only is the body a unit with respect to health and disease, but body and mind are one, and what affects the mind affects the body. It is certain that men can, and do, make others better or ill, without drugs, by mental influence.

CHAPTER XII

INSTINCTS AND MECHANISMS

MAN is subject to control because he has a psychological nature which reacts in specific ways whenever certain objects or ideas are brought to his attention. To get men to act in a desired way the manipulator touches off the appropriate mechanism. He must, in order to do so, be master of a technique for applying the proper irritant,—for presenting the most moving ideas, and also upon occasion making the human mechanism whose reaction is craved more than ordinarily sensitive. The arts of persuasion, oratory, salesmanship, advertising, demagoguery, histrionics are developments of this mind-moving technique. The mechanisms which thus explode under specific irritants, are the instincts—hunger, fear, sex, greed, gregariousness, self-assertion and others. These are also the names of emotions which accompany the instincts in action; “instinct”

and "emotion" in ordinary speech being blended. The point that concerns us here is that emotion or instinct normally discharges into some definite purposive activity. If, for example, you arouse fear in a man, you make him want to run away or hide. If you get a man angry, he wants to fight.

Fear and pugnacity are obviously distinct feelings, leading to quite opposite types of behavior. For that reason it is convenient to call them *primary* instincts, or emotions. The sexual instinct, the acquisitive instinct, the parental instinct, curiosity, self-assertion, and gregariousness are easily recognizable as "primary" in the same sense, viz., that of leading to different and distinct types of behavior. These are the drives to action which salesmen, showmen, demagogues and the whole tribe of publicity artists try to awaken. There are *secondary* emotions also, produced by combination of *primary* emotions: religion and moral indignation, for example. The main ingredient in religious emotion appears to be fear, but gratitude and reverence are present in its higher forms. Moral indignation is not purely anger, but anger com-

bined with the desire to protect the weak, a feeling which is derived from the parental instinct.

Besides the fundamental, innate instincts, men have individual sentiments and prejudices, a knowledge of which is essential to the manipulator of behavior. Thus A is susceptible to the charms of beautiful ladies in general, but there is one in particular for whom he would die. A Republican senator's pugnacity is aroused when the Democrats propose a measure, but he becomes implacable when asked to consider one favored by a President who has snubbed him. So we have instincts which are innate and which respond to any one of a class of incitements, but also sentiments and prejudices that have been acquired in the course of the individual's life and that respond only to a specific and definite stimulus.

Upon this background of instincts, emotions, prejudices and sentiments, suggestion operates. Although all normal persons are suggestible, they react in varying degrees. At one end of the scale are individuals impervious to ideas, popularly classed as "stubborn"; at the other, ignorant, tired, hysterical persons who are more suggestible

than the average person. Suggestibility is not, however, as is often assumed, a morbid condition but is simply the tendency of the healthy mind to believe ideas that are not contradicted and that are consistent with what is already believed. All persuasion depends upon this fundamental idiosyncrasy of the mind. We believe what is vividly present and what points to the satisfaction of a craving or hunger.

The question arises whether men are moved only by instinctive impulses, which are non-rational; or, does reason play a part in this game? Without instincts and emotions, men would remain inert. These are the impulses that drive them to action. McDougall asserts that "the instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfaction."

It cannot be denied, however, that a sentiment of rationality is active in a considerable proportion of men, especially in those of a certain temperament, and per-

haps products of a type of education, who cannot be moved to action until they have mentally canvassed all the alleged facts, tested the conclusions, and found the proposed line of action free from inconsistencies. A mere show of reasoning is immensely impressive to most men. The most unscrupulous demagogues, therefore, appear to reason.

If human beings are moved mainly by instinctive and subconscious motives, how is civilization possible, which implies a rational control of behavior? Civilization is moralization, that is, the training of men in certain habits of behavior which are favorable to life in society, and it must be admitted that the work of moralization has met with some success. This work is carried on by reason. Reason, it is true, can seldom block the primary instincts—fear, rage, sex, greed—after they have been aroused, but it can habituate them to socially desirable modes of discharge by incessant suggestion in the form of moral and religious maxims, until there is created an atmosphere, a social conscience in which the average individual lives. The continual impact of precept produces its effect. “For

thousands of years," Ross writes, "the mere learning by rote of *Analects*, or *Vedas*, or *Koran* or *Torah*, has been not unjustly deemed of great effect in fixing habits of thought and moulding character." Religion works hand in hand with morality. Morality derives sanction for its commandments and taboos from religion. Religion is intensified by a feeling of reconciliation with the supernatural powers through righteous behavior. Morality without religion lacks drive. "Be good for goodness sake" means nothing to most men. "Be good to gratify father, teacher, leader, God" awakens profound reverberations.

The part of individual initiative in modifying social forms has been much underrated. We are still under the spell of Herbert Spencer's conception of automatic, mechanical evolution. In such a process the activities of any one person, no matter how able he may be, must be practically negligible, and the main outlines of society would be the same if there had been no Mahomet, no Jesus, no Cæsar or Alexander, no Rousseau or Hamilton. The prevalence of this view among philosophers does not prevent many individuals from working

hard to reform society or to keep it in a state of normalcy. If the view were seriously believed we should at once sink into a torpid fatalism. William James, in an early essay, vigorously contended for the alternative view. "The mutations of societies from generation to generation," he wrote, "are in the main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the example of individuals whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment or whose accidental position of authority was so critical that they became ferments, initiators of movement, setters of precedent or fashion, centers of corruption or destroyers of other persons whose gifts, had they had free play, would have led society in another direction." He goes on: "It is folly then to speak of the laws of history, as of something inevitable, which science has only to discover and whose consequences anyone can then foretell but do nothing to alter or avert. The utmost the student of sociology can ever predict is that if a genius of a certain sort show the way, society will be sure to follow." "Both factors are essential to a change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away with-

out the sympathy of the community." The brilliancy of such epochs as the Renaissance in Italy and the Periclean Age was due, James contends, to the simultaneous appearance of galaxies of exceptional men who caused an up-flare of the arts and sciences. Succeeding ages have vainly endeavored to account for these outbursts on other grounds.

Whatever may have been the situation in past ages, the present is remarkable as an age in which the channels of communication and the tools of influence have been multiplied enormously. The manipulator of minds has a vast apparatus ready to his hand. The printing press and the telegraph, the "movie" and the radio, to the great majority of people are, no doubt, only the means of satisfying an urge to talk and to be entertained. Many great inventions begin as toys. But to the aggressive publicity artist, the expansion of the facilities for communication has promptly appeared as an opportunity for talking to a purpose. Not only the mechanical means for the multiplication of printed matter, but the organization of the business of publishing has expanded so that in this respect we are in a

new era. The same syndicated articles, the same comic strips appear from Maine to California, from Florida to Oregon. The whole continent is becoming of one mind. The same suggestions are given to a hundred million and the responses may be expected to be of a high degree of uniformity. Here is a magazine of power hitherto unimagined. Railroads, telegraph and power printing-presses are hardly a century old. The movie is but of yesterday. Now comes radio, making of the whole world one whispering gallery. Yesterday, three thousand might have heard an orator in a hall. To-day twenty million sit at home and listen-in. The will to power does not grow weaker, and such a miraculous opening for its exercise will certainly not be neglected. A presidential candidate has said with truth as well as humor: "Eventually we will pick our candidate for two qualifications: first, does he film well; second, does he radio well. All other qualifications are minor."

Like the press and the telegraph, movie and radio lend themselves to large concentrations of capital, and, therefore, to control by comparatively few men. High-priced actors and expensive scenic-effects crowd

out the under-capitalized shows. News, travel and educational film-service require the same costly staff as the big newspaper association. Improvements in apparatus bought up by the large radio corporations will put the smaller units out of business. Preliminary skirmishes for possession have already occurred. A governmental radio would not neutralize the propaganda possibilities in this field. It would only add the propaganda of the party in power to the others.

Besides the growth of mechanical invention and the organization of the business of communication, the course of psychological research has aided the practitioners of influence. The discovery of a technique for controlling human behavior has undoubtedly been the motive behind the great expansion in recent years of the study of the crowd, of suggestion, of mental therapeutics, of the psychology of salesmanship, advertising, labor-management and labor efficiency.

The arts of publicity, persuasion and propaganda have received a powerful impetus from the revelations made by Freud and his students of the drives to action. There is hardly a social activity which has

not felt the impulse of the new psychology. It has revolutionized the methods of marketing, the manner of appeal to the individual buyer and the art of mass-selling. It has influenced the methods of production, through a better understanding of the psychology of the workman. Reference to workmen as "hands" is entirely obsolete. The employer who should revert to that bit of crudeness would find himself promptly out of business. Literature in the forms of fiction, poetry, drama and biography shows the deep influence of the new psychology. Biography is not content with the conventional explanations of conduct. It probes deeper. It does not halt until psychologically authentic motives have been found. Verbal explanations, abstractions as motivating forces, are discredited.

In politics we are fast arriving at a standardization of the methods of influencing public opinion. We are passing out of the era of individual inspiration into one of objectively tested technique. All parties acquiesce in the necessity and propriety of certain measures for influencing opinion. A striking illustration of this fact was afforded during the presidential campaign of

1924 by a full-page advertisement published by the Republican National Committee in the large metropolitan dailies. Across the top of the page was the heading: "How much is \$3,000,000?" The advertisement read:

William M. Butler, as chairman of the Republican National Committee is preparing to finish the spending of a \$3,000,000 campaign fund. Senator La Follette proclaims with what seems to be senile hysteria, that Mr. Butler is administering a slush fund. Mr. La Follette knows better, but he believes the American voter does not know better.

In the same building in Chicago where Chairman Butler is at work, William M. Wrigley, as head of the chewing gum organization that bears his name, is directing the expenditure of an advertising appropriation that sometimes exceeds \$3,500,000 annually. His purpose is to sell his chewing gum. Not even Mr. La Follette has ever thought to refer to Mr. Wrigley's selling campaign fund as slush money. Not even Mr. La Follette pretends to believe that the Wrigley expenditures for selling gum are secretly accomplished for the purpose of bribing customers to chew gum. In his own words, what Mr. Wrigley is doing is to

“tell ’em quick and tell ’em often.” In the forgetfulness of the public, which costs Mr. Wrigley so much for advertising each year, is concealed the answer to the question, “Why don’t Americans vote?”

Similar comparisons are then drawn with Henry Ford’s advertising appropriation, the advertising of several soaps, a famous soup, a talking machine, a linoleum, and a talcum powder.

The advertisement then continues:

The necessity that compels them to employ the methods of Wrigley, of Barnum, of Belasco, is one of the strangest, most baffling failures of democracy.—The possessors of suffrage must be lured to the poles, and for generations it has been the whim of many of the sovereign voters to ride to the polls at the expense of a strange entity known to them as “the organization.”

The advertisement presents figures to show the natural inertia of the voters. In 1920, of the 54,421,832 persons qualified to vote, 27,635,074 failed to make use of the privilege. After quoting some politicians on the subject the advertisement says:

How much did it cost to persuade them (the people) to subscribe to a Liberty Loan? Just short of \$12,000,000 was the selling cost of the Liberty Loan. The actual amount was \$11,990,870.72, of which \$2,605,966.67 was spent for publicity, plus an additional \$987,751.87 for posters and stickers.

At the foot of the page is the line:

The cost of this advertisement has been contributed by Republican advertising men who believe in advertising.

In religion the new psychology has undoubtedly been very effective in bringing about recognition of the futility of relying upon rationalistic explanations of religious doctrine. It is at the root of so-called Modernism. The dissolution of the inconsequential distinctions between sects of the same religion, probably the imminent merging of Presbyterians and Baptists, of Episcopalians and Catholics, is in no small measure due to the growing distrust of the logical grounds for schism. The contribution of the new psychology to Christian Science is immeasurable.

The art of healing has felt the full impact of the new psychology (psychoanalysis is,

of course, entirely its offspring), not only in the innumerable forms of mental therapeutics, but throughout the regular practice of medicine.

The new knowledge of the arts of persuasion and publicity, although of most value directly to the manipulators of influence, ought not to be ignored by those who are usually passive subjects to be operated on. The "prospect" might profitably understand the salesman's technique. The mere consumer would save money from knowledge of the advertiser's art. Democracy would become worthier of its name, if every citizen knew the great game of politics as it is played by the professional politicians.

At best, however, it is hardly likely that the skill of the defense will ever be equal to that of the offense. The efforts of aggressive operators to extort advantage from herds of placid men, or to drive them in spite of themselves along ways that are good for them, will continue. Souls will be fought over, partisans sought, patrons solicited, opinions promoted. The human scene is not that of an automatically evolving organism. It is a complicated drama

in which individuals are forever planning to get power. Power means the control of the wills of others. The subtleties of the arts of control have always been known to the few. The new thing which we have tried to point out is the growing realization not only of the wide scope of this activity but also of the mechanics of its operation in the minds of the responsive subjects, the nature of the psychological dispositions that make control possible, and the character of the instruments and tools that are being perfected, multiplied and put at the disposal of the engineers of influence.

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